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Abraham became the father of Isaac, Isaac the father of Jacob, Jacob the father of 
Judah and his brothers … Thus reads the genealogy of the most eminent family 
in human history, the genealogy of Jesus Christ, as found in the pages of the 
Gospel according to St Matthew.1 Genealogy defines the place, time, and devel-
opment of individual lives, of the faces that look back at us from old photos, 
redolent of the past and stern, sepia gazes. They come to life when animated by 
the memories of the living. Children lean over the photos and ask their parents 
about their ancestors, grandfathers, great grandfathers, their customs, likes and 
dislikes, what made them happy and what made them sad. At such moments 
the past assumes the form of an urgent question begging an answer: why am 
I what I am? or: why am I the way I am?
It is good to remember one’s own ancestors who shaped us, who stood by 
our side when we made efforts to take our first steps or uttered our first words; 
who told us what is good and what is bad. I remember very well my grandfa-
ther with his ever- present pipe dangling between his lips, as he would sit in 
an armchair with his hands tightly clasped on his walking stick. He would tap 
it regularly and hum various melodies under his nose. I remember his palms 
carved with wrinkles and lined with blue veins that bulged and pulsated under 
the thin skin. He hummed the melody of the passing of time. Like an eternal 
sage he would gaze into the distance.
Aside from a genealogy that results from natural family ties, we also have 
genealogies of the spirit and thoughts. We observe them in literary currents 
and trends, schools of painting, sculpture or architecture. The Middle Ages 
would draw on antiquity, the Renaissance on the Middle Ages, Romanticism 
on antiquity and the Renaissance. Shakespeare would draw on ancient drama; 
likewise, romantic writers drew on this drama and Shakespeare’s own endeav-
ours. Plato was Socrates’ disciple, and Aristotle spent twenty years as a stu-
dent at Plato’s academy; St Thomas Aquinas adapted Aristotle’s philosophy to 
Catholic doctrine. This heritage can be positive, and then it creates followers, 
or negative, giving birth to opponents. In the area of the spirit we encounter 
very powerful influences and ties between disciples and teachers as well. The 
prophets of the Old Testament had their followers, whom they guided and to 
whom they taught faith, dedication and unshaken confidence in God. Elijah 
brought up Elisha. The bereaved Elisha watched his master disappear in a 





flaming chariot and be taken up to Heaven on a whirlwind. Christ shaped His 
disciples. The abandoned Disciples watched their Master as He ascended into 
Heaven. These are telling signs for the generations to come: remember where 
your Master has gone and do what He has taught you, as this is the surest way 
to personal fulfilment.
In this book, I would like to devote my attention to two figures in the area 
of spirit and thought whose ideas and impact and, above all, their lives, have 
affected the history of modern Europe: Saint John Henry Newman (1801– 1890) 
and Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross (Edith Stein, 1891– 1942). Their heri-
tage is again embedded in the intellectual landscape and spiritual inspirations 
of what has preceded them. Newman, for his part, owed much to the influ-
ence of primitive Christianity, ancient philosophy (especially Aristotle), the 
Alexandrian School of theology (with Athanasius at the head), and British 
empiricism; he would look up to Christian antiquity and the figure of St Philip 
Neri (1515– 1595) to assuage the turmoil of his inner struggle. Edith Stein first 
found the gratification of her thirst for knowledge in phenomenology, and 
then fixed her eyes on St Augustine, St Francis, St John of the Cross, and St 
Teresa of Avila. It must be noted that they had both gone through a period of 
rationalistic delusion and even verged on the scepticism and indifference of 
their eras.
An opportunity for such an inter- generational discourse was Stein’s encoun-
ter with Newman’s writings in which she found consolation. She was commis-
sioned with their translation by the Jesuit priest, philosopher, and theologian Fr 
Erich Przywara (1889– 1972). In a letter to her Polish colleague Roman Ingarden 
(1893– 1970), Edith Stein herself reports: “For the last year, I used these frag-
ments of time, during which my own work is out of the question, to translate 
Cardinal Newman’s The Idea of a University for the Theatiner- Verlag in Munich. 
[…] The translation gave me pure pleasure. And in addition, it is very good for 
me to come in close contact with such a mind as Newman— something that 
comes along with the translation process. His entire life was a search for reli-
gious truth and led him, inevitably, to the Catholic Church.”2 Thus, something 
that was supposed to be a mere intellectual challenge— as any translation usu-
ally is— became her personal experience. And, to use Newmanian parlance, 
the formal and notional level of the language barrier imperceptibly turned into 
a genuine communing with its author.
 2 E. Stein, Letters to Roman Ingarden, trans. H. C. Hunt, Washington, D.C.: ics Publications 




The main reason why I decided to embark on combining John Henry 
Newman with Edith Stein was not only the fact that the Carmelite saint trans-
lated the Cardinal’s texts, but primarily because they both stood firmly by 
what they had personally discovered as the truth of their persons: Newman 
in his Anglican Britain, in which Roman Catholicism was long- held in disre-
spect as the seat of the gravest of errors, decided to leave his cosy academic 
position in response to the call of his inner duty; Stein left her Jewish ances-
try for Christianity and triumphed amid the inhuman national- socialist ter-
ror. Indeed, there is something triumphant in her posture as she stands on 
the train during her last journey to the concentration camp of Auschwitz. She 
stood there — and eye- witnesses testified to it — as if she were carved out of 
some solid matter crushed by the overwhelming sadness and inflicted injus-
tice, and yet, at the same time, untouched by what was going on outside and in 
a mysterious way triumphant; a participant of the here and now and, simulta-
neously, a being from another reality. Reposed and majestic in her innermost 
certitude, Newman might say.
They are exemplars of personal prowess and dignity. The famous Carmelite 
was an academic scholar with a doctor’s degree in philosophy. Therefore, it is all 
the more interesting to see how this professional philosopher should have been 
inspired by someone who was from outside the academic world, who directed 
all his intellectual endeavours to spiritual growth. It is true that Edward Sillem, 
the editor of Newman’s texts published as Philosophical Notebook, acquiesces 
that “Newman has indeed a philosophy to give that is at least of interest […],”3 
but the famous Briton did not seek a philosophy in the first place, rather a liv-
ing principle that could become the driving motor of his life.
This is what is meant by living in the context, by being at one with oneself. 
Edith Stein, in a sense, also had such a personal approach to philosophy, i.e. 
the way to find the truth. Only after her personal conversion did she realise 
that this quest for the truth would require a more personal effort and commit-
ment. Both Newman and Stein illustrate the important fact that, despite our 
common nature as humans, we have our most unique and incommunicable 
tasks to fulfil.
The choice of such prolific writers as John Henry Newman and Edith Stein 
must evidently be mitigated by a realistic selection of the material at hand. 
Otherwise, the unwary author could create too many expectations which he 
would never be able to satisfy. Newman’s lifetime spanned almost the whole 
 3 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, Louvain: Nauwelaerts, vol. 




century. He expressed himself in sermons, learned essays, theological treaties, 
letters, poems, and even novels. Edith Stein wrote philosophical and spiritual 
works, letters, and translations. Anyone who has decided to write about such 
authors must confine themselves to certain topics and omit others. In my book, 
I would like to focus primarily on Newman’s theory of knowledge in the area of 
the phenomenology of religion, how we reach certitude and recognize the bor-
ders of ratio, the importance of the person, and Stein’s conception of primeval 
life, the knowledge of the heart, and the science of the Cross. Both Newman 
and Stein stressed the importance of treating the person with their complete 
endowment, i.e. the personal capacity to know, a capacity that surpasses the 
limitations of intellectual cognition.
They were both, gradually, coming ever closer to the recognition of the 
mystery of the believer. He is called upon to assent to the truth that surpasses 
the confines of his rational cognition. The person is, therefore, a special point 
of reference, a being who can learn what cannot be demonstrated and what 
must be left untold. The person can learn the way of science and accept in 
faith the winding path of mystery. It is fascinating that the more Newman and 
Stein came to know, the less they felt obliged to talk about it. Newman found 
a secluded place in the Catholic Church; Stein embraced the cross as her last 
relief. I used the word “secluded” here, but let me be more specific, for secluded 
does not mean free from any trouble. Not in the least; secluded here means: I 
rejoice in the fact that I am in the place where I should be. And one further 
thing I find in common between them — they both remained faithful to them-
selves in a special way, despite their revolutionary, and incomprehensible to 
external observers, decisions. Not in the way that they were obstinate, stub-
bornly holding to their private views; on the contrary, they were open to rad-
ical transformations once they recognized the urge of the truth, the personal 
call of duty. Since they did not cherish any inflated ambitions to convert peo-
ple nor intended to save the world, and believed, rather, that their individual 
beings were in need of conversion and were more precious than proselytising 
on behalf of some tenets, even though they might “objectively” be true, they 
remained faithful to, and at peace with, those who surrounded them. Newman 
left his Anglican circles, but at the same time remained with them at a higher 
level, at the level of the supreme value of personal dignity and of exemplary 
truth to oneself. Stein left the members of her Jewish milieu, but never stopped 
respecting them; paradoxically, she valued them even more after her conver-
sion than before. After her conversion she came to respect the supreme value 
of each individual human being, and of personal experience that is individu-
ally granted as a gift and challenge. I think that this is their common trait, a 
thesis I am going to prove throughout this book. Obedience to a well- informed 
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conscience may not endear us to other people, as we make decisions they do 
not approve of, but it brings us closer to them as real persons.
The two minds were engaged in a symbolical conversation; Edith Stein met 
Newman through his writings as she embarked on translating them. It is my 
chief ambition to depict Newman and Stein — to use the words of Hanna- 
Barbara Gerl- Falkovitz from her Introduction to Edith Stein’s Letters to Roman 
Ingarden— as “someone much in demand.”4
Their separate paths are marked with some key issues. Each book is nat-
urally the author’s own choice on which to focus. Let us take a closer look, 
therefore, at the problem of knowledge (implicit and explicit), the question 
of assent (notional and real), personal certitude, the language of the cross, 
and, in general, the solitary personal path. I think that both Newman and Stein 
focused in their intellectual quest on the terms mentioned here in order to 
understand the human being and his actions; and they both realized that the 
person cannot be examined in the same way we examine inanimate objects, 
that a considerable amount of knowledge must remain untold. Therefore, ulti-
mately, when words abound but senses are wanting, there is their readiness to 
remain silent. The amazing and, indeed, miraculous fact is that being faithful 
to oneself has a much more inherent value than forgetting about oneself and 
being entirely committed to socializing. This faithfulness to oneself has noth-
ing to do with the egoism of the age of privacy or the gradually encroaching 
age of mass culture. Quite the opposite, Newman and Stein are illuminating 
examples that every person needs, first and foremost, to fulfil their own per-
sonal task, i.e. to carry himself forward through the meanderings of daily life 
strengthened by his personal integrity, no matter what others’ expectations 
are, or what kind of decorum demands are formulated.
I have said that both Newman and Stein illustrated what we deem to be espe-
cially important, i.e. a synthesis of the multifaceted human being. Intellect and 
morality, faith and reason, should go smoothly together, united in one being. 
Faith and reason in their mutual effort can guide a harassed being through a 
complicated forest of emotions, often at variance with what is due, for exam-
ple inclinations and disinclinations, predilections and animosities, talents and 
weaknesses, acts of loyalty and betrayal, memories and hopes, expectations 
and regrets, images and concepts, towards the clearing of certitude; Newman 
always has in mind the person in concrete circumstances, swayed by hesita-
tions and doubts, and yet capable of accomplishing certitude. The individual 
daily life does often resemble a journey through a densely overgrown and 
 4 See H.- B. Gerl- Falkovitz, Introduction in: Stein, Letters to Roman Ingarden, 2. 
 
xii Preface
barely lit ravine, with no sign with which to guide one’s way. As there are few 
things we apprehend completely, let alone understand perfectly, or recognize 
by virtue of clear intellectual inspection, we need to muster the faith of the 
whole of our person; we need to believe even in simple daily affairs, for we take 
for granted many things rather examine them in detail. We need the faith of a 
consolidated human being, a faith animated by genuine assent to the Christian 
tenets and emboldened by personal effort. Both Newman and Stein testify to 
the mystery of the person who, despite conceptual difficulties and cognitive 
incommensurability, can apprehend the truth and turn it into his or her guid-
ing principle and driving motor. They themselves were true witnesses to that 
mystery. And despite their different individual and historical contexts, they 
managed to fulfil their personal calling.
My principal method in this book, as in all other works I have written so far, 
is the same. It is to interpret and reinterpret what material there is in order to 
find some practical guidelines for an interpretation of our present condition. 
Each age begs for a solution to its mystery, of the way people live and why 
they live in such a manner. Perhaps it is a truism to say that philosophers have 
always sought to answer some fundamental questions, and their aspirations 
have only partly been satisfied. And as philosophy aspires to provide satisfac-
tory answers to the most general and vital issues, its answers indeed resist the 
flow of time, but the issues must be ever anew taken up and engaged with.
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 chapter 1
A Gloss to the Biographies
They that are whole can heal others […].
 John Henry Newman …
Only the person who renounces self- importance,,
who no longer struggles to defend or assert himself,
can be large enough for God’s boundless action.
 Edith Stein
∵
John Henry Newman lived in the turbulent period of the nineteenth century 
that saw the rise of socialism and communism, in an era that made people look 
with awe at the encroachment of science onto the time- honoured territories 
of, for example, religion (let it suffice to mention the theory of evolution that 
had seemingly undermined the hitherto beliefs). When analysing the nine-
teenth century, one cannot forget about two, apparently contradictory, trends. 
On the one hand, there are the high hopes awakened by scientific endeavours 
which, in turn, give rise in the romantic era to popular robustness, in political 
life characterised by the ideas of expansionism and nationalism; but, on the 
other, it is a time when the human psyche often feels at a loss, when it suf-
fers from emotional inadequacy and fragility. It senses an incongruity amid 
this inhuman technological milieu of the “brave new world.” The modern 
mind, deprived of the traditional fulcrums of stability and armed solely with 
individual choice, but no criteria as to which choices are good and which are 
bad, loses its course like a ship tossed about on a stormy sea. The theory of 
evolution added momentum to this feeling, especially since the authoritative 
voice of the institutional Church was long wanting.1 The British biographer of 
Newman, Meriol Trevor (1919– 2000), rightly observes that it “so shocked and 





alarmed the majority of Christians, who thought it contradicted the truth of 
the Bible,” but Newman was in no way disturbed, for “he had been ponder-
ing his own evolutionary theory— of the development of ideas, and especially 
those ideas which activate the Christian society within the larger society of 
mankind.”2 One English writer and newspaper columnist has said of Newman 
“that he was the only Victorian intellectual of the first rank who had not been 
disabused of Christian faith by the theories of Charles Darwin […].”3
Newman had long been reconciled with the idea of evolution, for the con-
cept of growth, and its attendant changes, were of utmost importance for 
him. He himself had experienced it in his own life and had long adopted a 
dynamic view of the world. Obviously, the dynamic nature of life must respect 
its constant ontic factor. If an octogenarian places in front of him two pho-
tos of himself: one aged five and the other aged eighty, he will naturally say: I 
have changed, but at the same time he must say: it’s me, it’s the same person. 
Therefore, should one try to stop and scrutinize some moments from one’s life, 
forgetful of its entire continuity or in isolation from others, one will surely fail 
to understand the person. If growth is the essence of human life, as Newman 
would often repeat, there is no point in directing one’s attention on a selected 
episode. Such a procedure may be true for the biologist who focuses his micro-
scope on a selected strain of bacteria. But human life in its entirety cannot be 
fragmented into tiny and disconnected pieces, but should be considered in its 
integrated whole, if we seek to understand individual human actions.
All of these revolutionary modifications in the scientific picture of the world 
had started with the birth of modernity. Descartes (together with Galileo and 
Bacon) broke with the medieval world of spirits and ushered in the mechani-
cal world of physics and chemistry; the world came to be understood as having 
been constructed rather than found. Just like then, so now in the romantic era 
it was a task for great minds to effect a religious, moral, and emotional read-
justment. We are describing here a world of disenchantment in which “there is 
no more ontological room” for “demons and spirits.” The human being is “in a 
sense super- buffered.”4 The decomposition of the world in which man and his 
earth had lost their central position must have been restored at a higher level. 
 2 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1962, 4. In one of his prayers, 
Newman acquiesces: “Through you the earth was brought into its present state, and was 
matured to be a habitation for man” (J. H. Newman, A Newman Prayer Book, Birmingham: The 
Oratory, 1990, 7). The phrases that the earth “was brought into its present state” and “was 
matured” undoubtedly suggest a certain evolutionary and temporal development.
 3 See S. L. Jaki, Newman’s Challenge, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000, 265.
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In the nineteenth century, the task was even more urgent, for the circulation of 
information was much faster due to the development of the press.
The nineteenth century is a fascinated period to study. I call it a laboratory, 
in which the intellectual and universal tenets of the Enlightenment clashed 
with the personal and idiosyncratic elements of Romanticism, creating a very 
dynamic amalgam. Some elements were modified, some eliminated, and still 
others formed a unique composite. The advent of Romanticism did not mean a 
total or immediate permeation by entirely new elements which began to dom-
inate from the start. It was rather a gradual process in which the two rushing 
currents— the intellect and imagination— flowed side by side, erupting from 
time to time with their menacing rumbles.
At the dawn of modernity we have two proposals: Cartesian disengaged 
reason and Locke’s punctual self. The first one puts forward the duality of the 
body and spirit and a distanced relation to the world of the senses; the sec-
ond carries further this mechanization of the world. In short, the point is that 
“a human agent […] is able to remake himself by methodical and disciplined 
action.”5 Disengagement and rational control became the main driving forces 
of modernity. In this new approach, the human being employs his instrumen-
tal reason to create himself. Disengagement here undoubtedly refers to us 
being non- judgmental, i.e. to suspend our judgment about reality. We thereby 
objectify reality and deprive it of its normative force. Reality no longer appeals 
to us in its aspect of being good or bad, but only as an object of curiosity, an 
object of investigation and experimentation.
Because Descartes had transferred our experience onto our mind, our sec-
ondary qualities are ideas in the mind caused by the properties of the organ 
or object. We want to gain control over our reservoir of ideas. Therefore “dis-
engagement involves our going outside the first- person stance and taking on 
board some theory, or at least some supposition, about how things work.”6 
Descartes then proposes what Taylor calls radical reflexivity. It is necessary for 
the reconstruction of the conceptual interior of the mind. Procedural reason 
is employed, that which suggests the right method. In the face of such con-
clusions, Newman proposes the restoration of the first- person stance instead 
of objectification. For Newman, the first- person stance cannot be objectified. 
Taylor’s words, that “it is not always true that the road to surer knowledge lies 
through disengagement and procedural reason […],”7 fit well with Newman’s 
 5 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989, 159.









message that— if I may paraphrase the previous quote— the road to surer 
knowledge lies through the person. Indeed, Taylor’s criticism continues: “an 
epistemology which privileges disengagement and control isn’t self- evidently 
right.”8 Newman, for his part, believed in a universe of meaningful order rather 
than in a mechanism, and God was the foundation of this order.
The main purpose of personal growth is to accomplish certitude. Newman 
defines certitude, of which we shall be talking at length, as “a deliberate assent 
given expressly after reasoning.”9 It is true that very often we give assent to 
things which later on, on reflection, turn out to be false. This fact, however, 
does not nullify the main purpose, i.e. that it is worthwhile to strive after cer-
titude. What is the difference between Cartesian certainty, when confronted 
by clear and distinct ideas, and Newmanian certitude? To my mind, the main 
difference is that, for Descartes, certainty comes, in a sense, from without. 
I have written “in a sense” because we know that the French philosopher based 
certainty on innate ideas, but we must remember that these innate ideas have 
nothing to do with the person’s innermost life in Newman’s sense. Rather, they 
respond to the inherent logic of a given proposition that strikes the mind and 
tolerates no objection; for Newman, certitude results from a personal process, 
it is the personal response to a given truth. The personal response provides a 
broader capacity for apprehension. It is not entirely dependent on the accu-
rate rigidity of a proposition. If Descartes sought certitude more geometrico (by 
mode of geometry), Newman sought it more personae (by mode of person). 
Therefore, innate ideas primarily do not belong to the person and his growth, 
but to the intersubjective structures of logical thinking, whereas Newman 
sought to ground knowledge on the person and what belongs to the person.
For Descartes, extension and motion became the fundamental reality in the 
world. Nature became a machine in his world, and spiritual significance was 
banished. As the American philosopher, John Herman Randall (1899– 1980), 
notes in his classic text on the history of philosophy, the Age of Enlightenment 
and Reason “led on naturally to the achievements of its predecessor, evolu-
tion and relativity.”10 The nineteenth century added Evolution to Nature and 
Reason, the leading ideas of the previous age. Locke sought to discover a social 
physics. He “stands as apologist and heir of the great seventeenth- century 
struggles for constitutional liberties and rights and toleration.”11 Newman, in 
 8 Ibid., 164.
 9 J. H. Newman, An Aid in a Grammar of Assent, Garden City: Image Books, 1955, 186. 
(Further in the text abbreviated as Grammar of Assent or Grammar).
 10 J. H. Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind. A Survey of the Intellectual Background of 
the Present Age, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926, 254.
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the nineteenth century, stood amid the remnants of this revolution in beliefs 
and habits of thought. He was not a revolutionary in any sense; nevertheless, 
we may still call his proposals revolutionary— revolutionary in the philosoph-
ical and theological sense.
When these rumbles had reached the twentieth century, they were mature 
enough to produce destructive ideologies. Edith Stein experienced the practi-
cal implementation of bold theories, when the human intellect— liberated, as 
it seemed, from the rigours of old morality— conceived new methods for the 
speedy destruction of ill- adapted individuals or sub- humans subjected to the 
self- acclaimed ruling masters. What the nineteenth century daringly proposed, 
the twentieth century eagerly applied, and the Nietzschean will to power 
found an appropriate spawning ground. The human mind, lost in the labyrinth 
of its own contrivances, fortified by the optimistic Kantian message that prac-
tical reason could create universal morality— at the transcendental level freed 
from the meanderings of ephemeral experience and obviously based on the 
autonomy of universal laws— would chant the hymn of indefinite progress, 
international brotherhood, and secular eschatology. The nineteenth century 
saw the birth of “new men” and “new women,” and the twentieth century saw 
the birth of a “master race,” yet another name for the social Darwinism of the 
previous epoch.
Newman sought to oppose the self- confident rationalistic subject not with 
yet another abstract theory, but with his analysis of the living person set in 
operation by faith, and taking a sure hold of the tenets not effected by formal 
reasoning, but impressed by the living mind. This sure hold relied not only on 
a personal adherence to the Word of God, but also on intimate contact with 
the dogmatic treasure of the Church. Such a hold is not satisfied with the mere 
implications of the formal calculations of the immanent world, but takes the 
personal being in his integrity. It suffices to mention Newman’s concept of 
conscience, of which we shall talk in greater length, as it opens the enclosed 
human being to stand in confrontation with the truth heard within, but whose 
sources, however, come from without. The pure intellect may feel at home 
amid the milieu of abstract concepts, but the human person should never be 
reduced to the intellect, for persons live among concrete beings. In his life, the 
idea of overall unity was the focal point of his intellectual endeavours. The 
commentator, Meriol Trevor, observes: “To an extraordinary degree Newman’s 
thought and his life were one; his own story is one of development, in ideas, in 
action and in personality.”12
 12 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 4. 
 
6 Chapter 1
Taking unity as a starting point, but in a dynamic combination of its individ-
ual aspects, he had set about studying the origins of Christianity. Christianity 
must also be one, or at one with itself, but revealed gradually over time as suc-
cessive generations interpret its message in keeping with the Revealed Word 
and with tradition. Only in its wholeness, as a unique system, can it be ren-
dered meaningful. And only in its evolutionary rendition can it essentially 
remain the same, while bringing ever new forms by which to accommodate 
the changing times. The figures of the intellect and the spirit, those who have 
managed to face the revolutionary turmoil, were those who stood firmly by the 
profound truthfulness to their own persons.
The decision to write about Newman must come as frustrating at first, or 
disconcerting, for many scholars, especially those who naturally expect a cer-
tain line of philosophical tradition. As Edward Sillem, the editor of Newman’s 
Philosophical Notebook affirms, Newman “belongs to no school,” and he “never 
hides himself behind the authority or the word of another he respects as <<the 
philosopher>>.”13 Of course, the last words refer to Thomas Aquinas and his 
special indebtedness to Aristotle’s philosophy. And a contemporary Newman 
scholar, Laurence Richardson, adds that Newman “[…] was not dominated by 
any single influence.”14 Such being the case, Newman apparently emerges as 
a solitary thinker who refers to no tradition, a thinker by his own merit. Such 
an interpretation is true only to a certain extent, as with all kinds of generali-
sations. In his texts, Newman refers to many other philosophers. Some refer-
ences are critical remarks, like the utilitarians of the nineteenth century, oth-
ers show sincere sympathy, i.e. Aristotle, Locke and Butler, yet with a note of 
the independent and lone traveller who knows that he must find his own way; 
in fact, each person must make his own efforts to arrive at certitude under the 
given circumstances. And Sillem concludes that “the very name <<Newman>> 
suggests to most people a personality rather than a philosophy and it scarcely 
occurs to English Catholic philosophers to ask themselves whether Newman 
had a philosophy worthy of the name to give them.”15 The twentieth- century 
French philosopher, Jean Guitton (1901– 1999), in fact published a book with 
the very telling title La philosophie de Newman [The Philosophy of Newman] 
which avowedly contradicts the claim that Newman had nothing to say on 
philosophy. Richardson entitles one chapter of his book on Newman “The 
Philosopher.” And he enumerates a long list of those “who have considered his 
philosophical views worthy of serious attention […].” This list includes Etienne 
 13 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. i, 3.
 14 L. Richardson, Newman’s Approach to Knowledge, Leominster: Gracewing, 2007,14.
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Gilson, Bernard Lonergan, Frederick Copleston, Ian Ker and Stanley L. Jaki.16 
Let us add to this list Alfred North Whitehead and Alasdair MacIntyre. As far as 
Newman’s reading list is concerned, it includes the following names: Aristotle, 
Joseph Butler, John Locke, Dugald Stewart, Samuel Clarke, and John Stuart Mill. 
Joseph Butler, for instance, “had sought the rational confirmation of Christian 
doctrine to which a large part of his own was to be devoted.”17
Placing someone under this or that category is often an arbitrary decision 
and, in general, it results from the selection of certain criteria. Newman, for 
instance, may be enrolled in the circle of realist phenomenologists. Among the 
members of this group, apart from Edith Stein, Sarah Borden lists Max Scheler, 
Adolf Reinach, Hedwig Conrad- Martius, Roman Ingarden, and Karol Wojtyła 
(John Paul ii).18 Realist phenomenologists rejected the epoché or transcen-
dental reduction, a method that was borrowed from Descartes. In order to dis-
cover the essential structure of an experience, Husserl recommended bracket-
ing from all judgements, preconceptions and assumptions. Phenomenologists 
also believed that, apart from empirical facts, the human being is capable of 
grasping essences that are objectively true.19
Indeed, Newman suggests no reduction. A person approaches reality 
together with all he is. The only point is whether he is real in what he says. 
One should not start with doubt, therefore there is no sense in bracketing 
claims regarding existence. In fact, what matters most is where the knowing 
subject is, not where the object is. Stein, as a realist phenomenologist, baulked 
at Husserl’s transcendental idealism. As regards empathy, “in affirming other 
people as such, empathy was immediate and assured, but their thoughts and 
feelings could never be directly encountered.”20 And John F. Crosby lists Stein, 
together with Romano Guardini, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Karol Wojtyła 
among Christian personalists, a category which may easily include Newman.21
Sillem comments further, that “Newman was not a theoretical logician” and 
his “way of thinking is more personal; it is inseparably and vitally connected 
with Newman’s original way of visualizing himself and his experience of living 
as a person.” And then he adds: “Instead of presenting his ideas and developing 
 16 L. Richardson, Newman’s Approach to Knowledge, 1.
 17 A. Duncan- Jones, Butler’s Moral Philosophy, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1952, 16.
 18 See S. Borden, Edith Stein, London- New York: Continuum, 2003, 26.
 19 See J. Galarowicz, Wstęp do antropologii filozoficznej. Podejście fenomenologiczne i per-
sonalistyczne [Introduction to Philosophical Anthropology. A Phenomenological and 
Personalist Approach], Kęty: Wydawnictwo Marek Derwiecki, 2017, 44– 45.
 20 M. Gubser, The Far Reaches, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, 118.
 21 J. F. Crosby, The Personalism of John Henry Newman, Washington D.C.: The Catholic 














them objectively and systematically for their own sake, he is ever present him-
self in all he has to say.”22 In these two characterisations, the verb “visualize” is 
especially of significance here. Indeed, for Newman the most important thing 
was to write about a personal experience, to primarily see and touch rather 
than understand, for understanding can suggest a mere notional apprehension 
without any impact on acting; and, in the concrete, we are always dealing indi-
vidually with something unique. On the other hand, however, Newman— as 
we shall see— stressed the importance of looking at our knowledge as a sys-
tem; building a system is important not in the sense of constructing something 
theoretical and artificial, but in the sense of making a complete and sensible 
whole of the data of experience. Therefore, even if we stick to the word “under-
stand” in Newman’s case, it would mean how the thing is practically compre-
hended by my own person in relation to other things. Henceforth, the system 
that is meant here is the integral grasp of the data of experience. Thus, it seems 
only natural that Newman, who speaks in favour of a system, should, himself, 
build a system. It is a special system in which universal and personal values 
overlap and coalesce. Moreover, only in the case of a system, i.e. a meaningful 
compound of data, can one speak about knowledge, not about a mere accumu-
lation of loosely connected bits of information.
One major problem with interpreting Newman is that— in accordance 
with his basic principles— he did not lay down in detail any instructions on, 
e.g. how to become holy; in other words, he avoided giving general counsel 
on what requires personal effort and engagement. Instead, he would say: such 
an elaboration that would be attractive and, by its very verbal force, enticing 
to anyone is impossible. There are so many exemplars of holiness, everyone 
should practice it for himself, adding yet another example of holiness to the 
collection of many others. In like manner, in our daily dealings with what we 
are facing, in practice the situation is the same— reality is our personal task. 
We may also be misled by those who claim that Newman was entirely non- 
systematic, a characteristic that might lead us also to the supposition that he 
was chaotic. How can an author who held, let us repeat, that Christianity is a 
system, be, himself, non- systematic?23 Furthermore, how do we understand 
the word “system”? When it comes to philosophy, there are perhaps as many 
paradigms by which to pursue it as there are philosophers.
 22 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. i, 1.
 23 Gerard Magill writes: “Seeking to systematize the work of a non- systematic writer can 
present significant difficulties” (G. Magill, Religious Morality in John Henry Newman. 
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We must admit that Newman had chosen a very difficult task: to grasp the 
dynamic nature of our fundamental choices. It is almost like counteracting 
Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy in physics. If we make man static and 
immobile for the sake of analysis, as botanists do when they pin down rare spe-
cies to observe them under a microscope, we are no longer dealing with a liv-
ing creature. And if we accompany man in his action, we feel our inadequacy, 
for his movements are not ours. We have only external access to them. And 
because there are so many patterns of the decision- making process, so many 
contexts and circumstances that build up one upon another, it is impossible to 
come up with one general theory which manages to embrace them all. To write 
that Newman’s way of writing was more personal is to say very little indeed. 
We might just as well say that Newman attempted a task that is not possible to 
carry out. Was Augustine not personal when he was writing his Confessions? Or 
Plato or Descartes, were they not personally involved in what they were writ-
ing? Despite these doubts, I would like to show that there is a core of attraction 
in Newman’s thinking and all his elaborations converge towards it. And this is 
his system, in whose centre one finds what Stein called primeval life, i.e. the 
mystery of the person hidden deep inside. If I were to sum up the purpose of 
Newman’s writing, I would call it personal encouragement to make individual 
efforts to enter the path to holiness, which, in his context, means to fulfil one’s 
personal calling.
Speaking about a dialogue of two hearts should not be understood as a 
temporal or geographical liaison in which, for instance, two people live in the 
same era or in the same country, exchange correspondence or remain in any 
form of intellectual contact. It was not the case with Newman and Stein; nev-
ertheless, when Erich Przywara asked Edith Stein in 1925 to translate some of 
the letters of Cardinal Newman it “was the beginning of a lively intellectual 
friendship between the two.”24 What I have in mind, therefore, is this spiritual 
relationship of understanding reality in a similar way or even having a similar 
experience. Their starting points are as different as the persons in question and 
their idiosyncratic circumstances. And notwithstanding the differences, there 
are things in common that must be stressed. Since we focus here on the indi-
vidual quest for the truth, the theoretical distinctions are less important than 
their practical results. The person can make use of any instruments (schools, 
doctrines), sometimes very distant from what we call orthodox, and yet arrive 
at the destination. The surprising thing is that a person, in his quest for the 





truth, may often take advantage of a very inappropriate instrument, one that is 
inadequate theoretically and according to established opinion inadequate, yet, 
strangely enough, turn it to good use. For it is the concrete person immersed in 
his own individual circumstances that has to decide. The starting point there-
fore may be, philosophically speaking, British empiricism and Anglicanism or 
phenomenology and Judaism, but the outcome, the personal result— to use 
Newman’s term— is the same.
In what sense can the experience of someone living in the nineteenth cen-
tury be similar to another person living in the twentieth century? In the sense 
that they both were confronted by the limits of their intellectual knowledge. 
When reality cannot be explained in simple terms of universal logic, we have to 
resort to the generosity of the personal, to his or her personal endowment and 
ability to overcome the difficulties that come to hand and cannot be dismissed. 
We need to assent to the mystery of reality, to the mystery of the human per-
son, to what Blaise Pascal— in his intellectual confrontation with his French 
colleague, Descartes— called the reasons of the heart. Is it not interesting, let 
us note in passing, that the same country, i.e. the same cultural ethos, gave rise 
to two entirely different languages: the language of reason and the language of 
the heart?
It must be noted, however, that the language of the heart, at least in the way 
it was understood by Newman, did not renounce the language of reason. What 
Newman did was to put reason in its right position, i.e. in a position inferior to 
the person, in subservience to the person. This is what I called the generosity 
of the human person.
As regards Newman’s and Stein’s unique experience, imbued with a sim-
ilar topos, we must say that they both faced opposition and exposed them-
selves to various kinds of difficulties. Once we embark on our individual way, it 
becomes only natural that, sooner or later, we shall be exposed to opposition. 
Now the point is to act, despite such opposition, and to carry forward— if I may 
put it somewhat metaphorically— our individual selves to the end, whatever 
this end might be.
They both had to reorient their long- held views and, as a consequence, 
found themselves in opposition to their relatives and social milieus: Newman 
to his Anglican family and intellectual circle; Stein to her Jewish surrounding. 
In this respect, obviously, Stein’s reorientation was considerably more radical. 
It was like going abroad to a distant country, unlike moving from one region to 
another within the same country, as was the case with Newman. On the other 
hand, however, if we look closer at the situation of nineteenth- century Britain 
and the hostilities between the Anglican Church and Rome from the schism of 
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Henry viii onwards, even Newman’s decision can be interpreted along more 
radical terms.
They both, before setting off upon a symbolical journey home, had gone 
through a short- lived fascination with rationalism, and Edith Stein had even 
identified herself as an atheist, before it dawned on them that narrow- minded 
rationalism is destructive to the human being and brings about scepticism 
rather than certain knowledge. And the thing perchance most important of 
all— despite their fundamental reorientation— is that they had mysteriously 
remained faithful to their former relationships, paradoxically even more faith-
ful than before, a point I have signalled in the Preface. This should lead us to the 
following conclusion: conformism is not the right solution, seeking one’s true 
self in the certitude of one’s person is the answer. In other words, the Socratic 
motto “know thyself” held true throughout their lives. A further idea related to 
this reads as follows: the improvement of the world begins with the improve-
ment of one’s self. I have already mentioned this in the Preface as well— the 
self- inspection, so typical of the romantic era, had gained a new dimension 
in the case of Newman and Stein. The journey inside is not a solitary striving 
for originality, the pretentious and pantheistic aestheticism of American tran-
scendentalists, the deification of Nature, the expressivistic endeavour, but it is 
a quest to find God inside.
The British historian of ideas, Anthony Gottlieb, put it beautifully when 
he commented on Augustine in his Dream of Reason: “First he looked in the 
Scriptures, but found that they did not yet speak to him.”25 This is a very 
Newmanian way of thinking. If there is an obstacle in my apprehension of some 
proposition, so the fault may be not on the part of the proposition, but on my 
part. The phrase “not yet” is of key importance here, for Newman and— as it 
turns out— St Augustine valued the significance of time and individual growth. 
We know the arduous journey the Saint of Hippo had to make through the 
meanderings of Manicheism until he arrived Home. Therefore, it is in vain to try 
to reformulate the message while leaving the agent where we have found him. 
The agent himself must take the trouble— such would be Newman’s conclusion.
In the case of such personalities as Newman’s, there are no marks of eccen-
tricity, no signs of enforced originality. He always sought to remain himself 
because— as he was well aware— if he had failed to be himself, who else could 
he have been? Currently, the term “innovation” is in fashion. We are taking 
 25 A. Gottlieb, The Dream of Reason, A History of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance, 




part in a special race: who shall win in originality? For Newman, the most 
important condition of originality is being oneself. Each individual is original 
in himself, hence we do not have to strain our faculties outrunning others. And 
Stein’s considerations on the individual form as the underlying ground of the 
personality came to prove this point.
1 The Modern Point of Departure
René Descartes (1596– 1650) took part in the Thirty Years’ War (1618– 1648). One 
may only wonder how this man with such a delicate constitution and poor 
health managed to bear the hardships of war. We know of that special moment 
which switched European philosophy onto another line of thought. It was 
during this war that Descartes stopped at an inn and there, while sitting in 
front of a fireplace, he would now and then doze off. And that was the moment 
of his revelatory cogito ergo sum, like the Augustinian amo et fac quod vis or 
the Einsteinian formula E=mc2. Descartes realized that he had no criterion 
by which to distinguish a real fire from an imagined one. And that was his 
turning point, the moment of intellectual revolution for future generations to 
come— he decided to turn away from the visible world, from sense data, and 
seek the criterion of reality inside the immanence of his mind. He doubted the 
existence of the external world, or at least suspended his assent to its reality.
Now let us imagine two armchairs placed in front of the Cartesian fireplace. 
One is occupied by the French philosopher and the other one by Newman. 
This picture is not that bizarre after all, since it is the concept of assent that the 
British clergyman studied in his philosophical writings. Descartes is watching 
the fire and thinking: does it exist or am I only dreaming? Newman, for his 
part, is asking: is it really mine? How do I find myself in the surrounding world? 
Descartes wanted to make sure by resorting to the universal rules of logical 
thinking, therefore he decided to reject everything that had at least the appear-
ance of doubt. The rational mind can assent only to what is clear and distinct, 
like geometrical ideas. Newman criticised doubt as the point of departure in 
thinking. Instead, he suggested a personal approach in which one should dis-
criminate between things that can be scientifically dealt with and things that 
must be believed. In either case the person remains rational.26 The well- tried 
philosophical dilemma— idealism versus realism— was not that important for 
 26 St Augustine is told to have said: “Now that the Saviour has come […] it is time for philos-
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him. It is not of primary significance to decide the reality of the world, as it is 
more crucial to find out whether I am real in the surrounding world, whether 
my words are real, i.e. words in harmony with feelings, whether I realize what 
I say, whether I do what I confess to be true, whether I am in consonance with 
my conscience.
In this sense, I can assent to a paradox, or, at least, to what for other peo-
ple sounds a paradox. The agent is called to cross over the barrier of imma-
nence, not to decide whether the world outside is real, but to go into the world 
with one’s own person as the centre of unity, and as the centre of certitude. 
Conversion is the key word and conversion is about a journey, that is, going 
from one place to another, e.g. from a false ethos to the true one.
2 The Cultural and Family Contexts— the Ethos
Both Newman and Stein grew up in orthodox religious communities. Newman 
was born in a happy family, his parents “were musical, fond of plays, of danc-
ing, of reading and of conversation.”27 His parents loved each other and were 
delighted with their children. They were tolerant and open- minded, allowing 
their children free development, without imposing on them some inflated 
ambitions. Therefore, “there was no forcing, moral or intellectual, no strain 
of living up to high adult standards.”28 Newman’s family were attached— 
according to some— to the Evangelical faith,29 which meant daily contact 
with the Bible, reading and commenting on passages and then putting them 
into practice. John Henry felt secure at home; indeed, his family circle was an 
excellent milieu for the development of an independent mind. As far as reli-
gion is concerned, his father “was conventional, conservative in habit, liberal 
but not radical in opinion, belonged to the established Church and disliked 
intensity in religion.”30 In view of such circumstances, Meriol Trevor opposes 
the commonly- held opinion that the Newmans were Evangelicals. This group 
of believers back in the day “frowned on theatres and dancing and would 
have considered the banker’s household worldly and frivolous.”31 One thing 
 27 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 7.
 28 Ibid.
 29 Or, at least, to some elements of Evangelicalism. Newman’s adolescent experience of con-
version can be interpreted along evangelical lines (cf. F. O’Brien, Not Peace but a Sword. 
John Henry Newman, St Paul Publications, 1990, passim.).
 30 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 7; cf. also M. Brian, John Henry Newman. His Life & Work, 
London- New York: Continuum, 2000, 10.













is certain, namely that we find some traces of Evangelicalism in Newman’s 
approach. This should not surprise us if we take into consideration the fact 
that Evangelicals struggled against the so- called “nominal Christianity,” and 
“presupposed a strong personal religious experience of faith in the atonement 
of Jesus Christ and the determination to conduct one’s life in the light of that 
experience and the reading of Scripture.”32 At the same time, it must be noted 
that such a description could fit any religious attitude that seeks authentic 
faith rather than theoretical deliberations or intellectual demonstrations.
Evangelicals stress the importance of personal holiness, the preaching 
of the Gospel in its fullness, the message of repentance and justification by 
faith in Christ’s atonement. These elements are more fundamental than good 
works. The American cultural and intellectual historian, Frank M. Turner 
(1944– 2010), concludes: “In all these respects the evangelical faith was a reli-
gion of the heart.”33 Whether or not the Newman family abided by the pat-
tern of Evangelicalism, one thing is certain: the heart was at the centre of the 
future Cardinal’s considerations, i.e. the proper personal disposition for what 
is required of him. It is evident that there are certain universal elements in 
Christianity, and it matters little which denomination we put under scrutiny. 
The British writer and Evangelical moralist Hannah More (1745– 1833) pub-
lished her devotional manual Practical Piety; or, The Influence of the Religion of 
the Heart on the Conduct of Life in 1811. Evangelical piety became the stronghold 
of reformed Christians. The Evangelicals willingly engaged themselves across 
denominational lines. They turned to “the institutional churches, […] to the 
family, Sunday schools, private prayer meetings, and a host of voluntary societ-
ies characterized by pan- Protestant memberships to further the world of vital 
Christianity in the world.”34
The British linguist, Elizabeth Jay, has distinguished between essential and 
non- essential Evangelical doctrines. The essential includes original sin, con-
version, justification by faith, and the authority of the Bible.35 Evangelicals 
preached the necessity to arouse the spirit of the faithful to a more vivid belief, 
to the religion of the heart. The English pastor, preacher, poet, and hymn writer 
Isaac Watts (1674– 1748) urged his fellow Dissenting ministers to “Try all meth-
ods to rouse and awaken the cold, the stupid, the sleepy race of sinners; learn 
all the language of holy jealousy and terror, to affright the presumptuous; all 
 32 F. M. Turner, John Henry Newman. The Challenge to Evangelical Religion, New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2002, 26.
 33 Ibid.
 34 Ibid.
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the compassionate and encouraging manners of speaking, to comfort, encour-
age, and direct the awakened, the penitent, the willing, and the humble […].”36 
Watts’ promptings resound in Newman’s writings, for throughout his literary 
efforts he wishes to have a more vivid response to Christian faith. Like the 
Evangelicals, Newman also sought to touch the heart or the affections of the 
faithful, to inculcate a love of the Holy Spirit. All in all, the purpose of preach-
ing was to revive an authentic belief, so that a person can respond with the 
whole of his being. At the same time, it must be noted that, unlike Evangelical 
preachers or Dissenting ministers, Newman distrusted formalistic contriv-
ances. For him, the power of response was not in the words, but in the recep-
tiveness of the listener. The speech is an opportunity, but not a determining 
factor. The result of teaching, therefore, was not in the method of preaching 
but in the free human heart.
Another aspect of the Evangelical doctrine was enthusiasm for the Cross. 
The British historian, Boyd Hilton, has commented that “Enthusiasm for the 
Cross, rather than mere repression of one’s own depravity, was the secret of 
moderate evangelical religion.”37 Inasmuch as the Tractarians38 perceived the 
need of spiritual revival, they decried the Evangelical belief that good works 
followed, and need not precede, justification by faith in Christ’s atonement. 
The focal point for them was subjective and personal religious experience. No 
doubt Newman’s spectacular “conversion” at the age of sixteen was of an evan-
gelical nature. Later on, however, he disavows the importance of such extraor-
dinary moments. It is, rather, good works that should result from profound 
personal belief, rather than subjective feelings. As we shall learn from what 
follows, real assent is not certitude. Generally speaking, the Tractarians were 
at odds with the belief in instantaneous conversion. It must also be noted that 
such conversions were not generally accepted, and even within Evangelicalism 
we have those who fostered personal and social discipline. The latter view 
would be much more in tune with Newman’s position. Moreover, it must be 
remembered, as I have tried to show, that there were many variations within 
 36 Quoted after ibid., 28.
 37 B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic 
Thought, 1795– 1865, quoted after F. M. Turner, John Henry Newman, 29.
 38 The term “Tractarians” refers to a group of Oxford dons engaged in the Oxford Movement 
(1833– 1845). Their main goal was to reform the Anglican Church. The expert in Church 
history Fr. Charles Connor notes that it was rather “a movement of the heart than the 
head, primarily concerned with the law of prayer and only secondarily with the law of 
belief” (C. P. Connor, Classic Catholic Converts, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2001, 29). 







Evangelicalism itself, so one can always find a variety with which to associate 
oneself.
Whatever was the truth— whether the Newmans were genuine Evangelicals 
or not— I think that the loving atmosphere of John Henry’s home and the 
unobtrusive (unimposing) character of his upbringing could have formed 
in the future convert and Cardinal this independence of mind, easiness of 
expression, and subtlety of phrase. Children were given free rein in the devel-
opment of their talents. His father was entirely unlike James Mill (1773– 1836), 
the father of John Stuart Mill (1806– 1873), whose manner of education was 
exceptionally oppressive and rigorous.39 I think that such a benevolent atmo-
sphere at the Newmans could have created in John Henry this cautious suspi-
cion of the danger of excess in religious profession, especially his belief that 
faith should be practiced without any ostentation, and his principle of reserve. 
He was irascible or even impetuous after his father, traits which he struggled 
to control. Despite the fact that he stressed the importance of personal experi-
ence and personal response, he was not a recluse, “he loved people and places 
with extraordinary tenacity; not just one or two, but many.”40 He was affection-
ate by nature. As Meriol Trevor notes, he “carefully recorded the influence of 
others upon him […].”41
Newman was a combination of many talents, some of them apparently at 
opposite poles to each other, for instance, he was “keenly observant of the 
external world and with the creative imagination which can express the mys-
terious union between what is outside and what is inside man […]” and “he 
had a mind capable of the clearest abstract reasoning, logical and mathemat-
ical.”42 Let us observe that such character traits were a splendid melange in 
someone who embarked on grappling with the most serious problems of his 
era. Indeed, it was an era of paradoxes and contradictions, which presented a 
real challenge.
The enlightened aspirations of science and the practical implementations of 
the Industrial Revolution clashed with the subtlety and delicacy of the roman-
tic mind. The vulnerable self seemed to have lost its sure hold on reality. The 
materialistic trends of the capitalist economy grew inconsiderate to spiritual 
needs, and the aspirations of scientism proclaimed the message of a totally 
secular world. From this point of view, John Henry was the right person in the 
 39 As his biographers state, John Stuart could read and write at three, and was fluent in Latin 
and Greek by the age of eight.
 40 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 9.
 41 Ibid., 5.
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right place and at the right time. He had a good command of logical apparatus 
and understood all too well that a person infinitely surpasses the narrow scien-
tific and materialistic view of the world. In his comment on evolution, which 
has already been mentioned in the Preface, Newman deliberates: “I mean that 
it is as strange that monkeys should be so like men, with no historical con-
nexion between them, as [that there should be] <the notion that there was> 
history <course> of facts by which fossil bones got into rocks. The one idea 
stands to the other idea as fluxions to differentials. Differentials are fluxions 
with the element <condition> of time eliminated. I will either go whole hog 
with Darwin, or, dispensing with time & history altogether, hold, not only the 
theory of distinct species but that also of the creation of fossil- bearing rocks. If 
a minute once was equivalent to a million years now relatively to the forces of 
nature, there would be little difference between the two hypotheses.”43
Such words could have come only from someone who was not afraid of 
scholarly speculation, a precondition of scientific work, and, at the same time, 
someone who was not afraid that his rigorous thinking could lead him astray 
from the truth of revelation. The fluxions in the above quote are Newton’s pro-
totypes of differentials (derivatives) proposed by Leibnitz, who came up with 
infinitesimal quantities independent of time. Once the infinitesimal quantity 
was introduced, the world of numbers could somehow be better adjusted to 
describe reality in its ever- changing form; the infinitesimal, if I may say so, 
opened up the world of numbers to the imagination. At least, there was a 
chance to render its dynamic nature and prepare for further development in 
such areas as quantum physics or theory of relativity.
Indeed, we have here reason in tranquil harmony with faith. Newman 
trusted reason according to Anselm of Canterbury’s principle fides querens 
intellectum. In this world of disengaged reason, as Taylor illuminatingly noted, 
“disenchantment and instrumental control go closely together.”44 Such an out-
come, however, does not satisfy man’s hunger for sense.
3 Newman— the Philosopher
There is an ongoing discussion as to whether Newman was a philosopher or 
not. I have already alluded to this dilemma, if one wishes to call it so. He him-
self had never displayed any ambitions to be called a philosopher. This debate 
 43 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 158.







reminds us of the two French luminaries of philosophy, René Descartes and 
Blaise Pascal. In his classic History of Philosophy, Frederick Copleston (1907– 
1994) wonders whether Descartes was a philosopher and Pascal an apologist. 
To be on the safe side, the historian adds the word “primarily.” They were both 
Catholics and mathematicians, that is for sure, but Descartes “was primarily a 
philosopher” and Pascal “was primarily an apologist.”45 Without risking a deci-
sive yes or no, let us say that, in the case of Newman, what was of utmost impor-
tance was the right hierarchy of things. Once this hierarchy has been realised, 
it matters little whether one is called a philosopher or an apologist. For if we 
call Newman a philosopher, we have to add that he did not aspire to arrive at 
some theoretical doctrine that would attend to the intellectual tastes of his era; 
now, should we call him an apologist, we must remember that he was at pains 
to express himself with the precision and rigour usually required of a scholar. 
This hesitation with regard to categorisation is only natural in the case of John 
Henry. The human being cannot be fragmented into bits and pieces. The way 
we define him depends largely on the aspect we have chosen for our analysis. 
The human being can be considered from the biological, chemical, electrical, 
and spiritual point of view. The moment a human being is conceived, all these 
processes gradually come to life. We observe certain chemical reactions, bio-
logical effects, even electrical conductivity, and— on top of all that— the spir-
itual factor. A question may now be posed: where is the essence of the human 
being? The physical magnitudes can be measured, but no one would claim that 
the essence of the human being can be expressed by the temperature of the 
body or the swinging of the needle of a gauge.
Newman enters the philosophical tradition primarily with his discussion on 
the grammar of “assent” to which he devoted his most philosophical work. Let 
us remember that in philosophical tradition, we find the Augustianian “assen-
tior,” the Cartesian “l’assentiment,” and the Lockean “assent,” terms denoting 
our judgements. And he is akin to Pascal by virtue of his personal experience 
and the language of the heart. Pascal’s spiritual experience took place in 1654. 
As Copleston notes, it “gave him a fresh realization of the personal God and 
of the place of Christ in his life.”46 Obviously, the difference is that Pascal was 
a mature man of thirty- one at the time of his special religious revelation, and 
Newman experienced his extraordinary revelation in 1816, when he was merely 
a lad of fifteen. Both experiences, however, left their indelible traces on both 
personalities. In the intellectual history of himself, Newman mentions some 
 45 F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy. Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz, Garden 
City: Image Books, vol. iv, 1963, 161.
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dates as important turning points in his life. Apart from 1816, we have 1833— 
the beginning of the Oxford Movement; the periods from 1833 to 1839, from 
1839 to 1841, from 1841 to 1845— the year when he eventually joined the Roman 
Catholic Church; and from 1845 onwards.
Copleston also presents an excellent recapitulation of the French philos-
opher that may fit the portrait of Newman. He refutes the charge that Pascal 
was a Jansenist. He was rather a critique of secular trends undermining God’s 
participation in human history. The historian notes: “In a society impregnated 
by deistic humanism and by rationalist scepticism and free thought he consid-
ered that it was above all the ideas of human corruption and of the necessity 
and power of divine grace which should be emphasized and that the highest 
Christian ideals should be maintained in their purity without any compromise 
or attempt to accommodate them to human weakness.”47 This description 
might serve just as well as a commentary on Newman’s life. The Briton also 
grappled with deistic humanism, rationalist scepticism, and free thought (free 
from religion and morality, that is). In the nineteenth century, these trends 
were translated into utilitarianism, scientism, and sentimentalism.
In his struggle against rationalism, Pascal proposed the language of 
the heart. Let us note that he does not depreciate reason when it comes to 
demonstration and deduction, i.e. reason in its narrow sense. Pascal sides 
with Descartes in this area, just as Newman is well aware that in the area of 
science, where rigour is required, one finds an appropriate area for the use 
of reason. The “heart” should not be interpreted in an exclusively emotional 
sense. Newman was all too aware of the dangers of sentimentalism. There is 
no room here for an extensive analysis of what is meant by the heart in Pascal. 
Let it suffice to quote Copleston’s summary of his meaning: “[Pascal] does not 
refer to mere emotion, but rather to the loving apprehension of God which is 
found in the sincere Christian believer.”48 This statement, again, perfectly fits 
Newman’s intention. Newman also held that a true believer might cherish a 
living picture of God without being aware of all the metaphysical arguments 
for His existence, or knowing “historical and empirical arguments in favour of 
Christianity.” And further we read: “the term ‘heart’ refers to instinctive, imme-
diate, unreasoned apprehension of a truth. And Pascal’s point is that we can 
have certitude (in his opinion legitimate certitude) even when the reason is 
unable to prove that of which we have certitude. For ‘reason’ is not the only 
 47 Ibid., 164.






way in which we come to know truth; and it is mere prejudice and pride on the 
part of the rationalists if they think that it is.”49
Such being the case, I might even venture to say that the heart could be 
compared to Newman’s illative sense, his method of personation, his natu-
ral reasoning and natural thinking, the key elements of his conceptual appa-
ratus. After all, they are all terms designed to render the dynamic nature of 
the human person. And as is the case with a being that eludes our clear- cut 
notions, one could hardly level a charge against someone who has proposed 
certain terms to approximate the human experience, even though not all of 
them are adequate.
It is not my intention in this book to present in detail a monograph of two 
personalities. Rather, I wish to dwell on some important turning points in 
their individual histories which make them akin, and which provide a lesson 
of human prowess, dignity, and independence. Writing about Newman and 
William George Ward (1812– 1882),50 the author of The Ideal of a Christian 
Church, Meriol Trevor observes that “Ward thought of the Church as an ideal 
to be realised, Newman saw it as a fact to be found.”51 Indeed, in his quest for 
the truth, Newman was open to any solution. He did not take anything for 
granted. He made a personal resolution to find the true Church as his personal 
experience, not a theoretical doctrine. To find the Church was a personal task. 
Let us note in passing that in Trevor’s interpretation Newman appears to be 
Aristotelian rather than Platonic.
We must remember that there were many trends within the Oxford 
Movement (also called Tractarians), e.g. Evangelicals (Symons), liberals 
(Whately),52 and Conservatives. A row was aroused by Tract xc in which they 
 49 Ibid.
 50 William George Ward was an English theologian and mathematician, and a Roman 
Catholic convert. He was especially talented in pure mathematics and the exact sciences. 
He joined the Tractarian Movement (the Oxford Movement). At first, he distanced him-
self from Newman, whom he regarded as an antiquary, but when he heard him preach 
he immediately fell for him. He urged the publication of the celebrated Tract xc, and left 
the Church of England in 1845 (in the same year as Newman). Let me remind the reader 
that in the aforementioned Tract Newman sought to prove that in the thirty- nine articles 
(the principal tenets of the Anglican faith) “there was nothing contradictory to traditional 
catholic belief.” Ward, called the enfant terrible of the Tractarian Movement, went even 
further, by maintaining “that the articles were protestant in intention and tendency, but 
that it was possible to give them a catholic interpretation.” (See: L. Woodward, The Age of 
Reform 1815– 1870, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962, 517, 518).
 51 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 344.
 52 Richard Whately (1787– 1863), an English rhetorician, logician, economist, and theologian; 
Newman recollects him in his Apologia as “a man of generous and warm heart […], par-
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spied too many Romanist elements. Newman himself aligned with the liberals 
grouped under the category of Noetics.53 It was under the influence of Noetics 
that, as he himself admits, he “was beginning to prefer intellectual excellence 
to moral […]” and “was drifting in the direction of the Liberalism of the day.”54 
Owing to his dynamic view of human nature, he did not tire of searching for 
further confirmation of his assents until the ultimate moment of certitude 
could be attained.
When he was approaching his decision to join the Roman Catholic Church 
in 1845, he felt very confused. He intimated to a friend from the Oxford 
Movement, James Mozley (1813 – 1878): “I am, as I was saying last week, […] as 
though a dead man […].”55 This confession can be understood in at least two 
ways: I am a dead man because I don’t feel any strength to fight against accu-
sations; I am a dead man because I know I shall have to leave you. This inner 
necessity for a final decision had grown within him.
4 The Decision
By 1843, when Newman was approaching his weighty decision, many things 
had crossed his mind. He admits that the “rule of [his] mind” was “to make 
converts,” by “finding disciples rather than seeking them,” which means that 
his primary purpose was to find people of a similar mindset. The picture, 
therefore, that is being painted before our eyes is the picture of people spon-
taneously joining one another. We can observe a sort of solidarity of the spirit. 
The date 1843 was a turning point in this respect, for it was then that he “gave 
up, as far as was ever possible, the thought of in any respect and in any shape 
acting upon others.” And he added: “Then I myself was simply my own con-
cern.”56 I think it was the turning point of his metaphysics in the singular.
encouraging instructor” who “opened my mind, and taught me to think and to use my 
reason” and “to think for myself.” At the same time, Newman admits that their minds were 
too different “to remain on line.” (J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1987, 7, 8) Whately took an important part of the revival of Aristotelian logic. At 
least two points must stressed here, when reflecting on Whately’s influence on Newman. 
He taught him “the existence of the Church, as a substantive body or corporation” and 
that the Church should be distinct from the State. If the functions of either institution are 
mixed, we are dealing with “a double usurpation.” (See J. H. Newman, Apologia, 8).
 53 The Oriel Noetics were a group of 19th- century dons at the University of Oxford. They 
could be called moderate freethinkers, who took a critical stance against Evangelicalism.
 54 J. H. Newman, Apologia, 9.
 55 M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 346.











John Henry’s brother, Frank, urged him to follow his conscience or even 
start his own religion. Frank’s thinking followed an entirely different line than 
John’s, because Frank was a child of modern times in which religion had begun 
to be considered a more (or entirely) private choice. It is true that the mod-
ernist thinkers in the nineteenth century often referred to the conscience, but 
understood it merely as a private opinion. They simply wanted to stress the 
claim that the individual has the right to decide in each case; that individual 
will is autonomous and sovereign, even in the sacred sphere. John Henry was 
interested in the question of truth and falsehood. He wrote in a comment: “That 
I could be contemplating questions of Truth and Falsehood never entered into 
his imagination!” and then went on to explain his position: “I think the English 
Church in schism. I think the faith of the Roman Church the only true religion. 
I do not think there is salvation out of the Church of Rome. This of course does 
not interfere with my thinking an exception is made for those who are in invol-
untary ignorance … I am no longer in such ignorance.”57 Obviously, Newman 
recognized that his moment was that of real assent, and it must be followed up 
with action on his part, or— to be more precise— not only of real assent, but 
of certitude.
He made efforts to prepare his family and friends for his final decision. They 
were bewildered and urged him not to take such a step. Their hostile reaction 
was due to a long period of persecutions, suspicions, and prejudices against the 
Roman Catholic Church. His sister Harriett lamented the fact, saying: “What 
can become of Anglicans when they have once joined it, I cannot imagine.” 
And Jemima said, “What can become worse than this? It is like hearing that 
some dear friend must die. I cannot shut my eyes to this overpowering event 
that threatens any longer.”58 Newman knew all too well that no matter what 
his friends and relatives said, the awakened duty within him spurred him on. 
He wanted them to be open, although he knew their openness would bring no 
respite, for they would oppose his decision. And the fact that other people are 
open to me does not relieve my personal tension that it is I who have to make 
the decision. It seems as if he wanted to feel the pain to the last drop, for he 
knew there could be no extenuating circumstances for someone who resolved 
to obey his conscience in view of such a radical outcome.
Jemima felt repulsion for the Roman Catholic Church and even feared that 
John Henry might have some bad influence on her. For his part, “he had never 
pressed his views on his family,”59 an attitude that is the best exposition of his 
 57 Quoted after M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 348.
 58 See Ibid., 349.
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doctrine on personal belief. The way of the conscience is the most personal, 
the man of conscience being a lone wanderer. No one can comprehend this 
lone wanderer; hardly anyone can give their notional assent to his decision, 
let alone real assent.
His only explanation was that he felt he was called to do so. And then, in 
his distress, he confesses to his sister: “I am distressing all I love, unsettling all 
I have instructed or aided. I am going to those I do not know, and of whom 
I expect very little. Oh, what can it be but a stern necessity which causes this? 
Pity me, my dear Jemima. What have I done thus to be deserted, thus to be left 
to take the wrong course, if it is wrong?”60 This inner urge thrust him forward. 
The Roman Catholic Church did not entice him with her splendour or a prom-
ise of social elevation. On the contrary, after years of persecution, he must have 
been ready for ostracism rather than consolation. And that from both sides, i.e. 
from the Anglican Church because he was going to join the most hated insti-
tution and from the Roman Catholic Church because he would come from the 
camp of persecutors. He might even feel that his salvation was at stake, but this 
inner urge kept urging him on.
When we read his personal letters, his intimate confessions, we are struck by 
the intense drama that was played out in their author, to the degree to which 
we are ready to exert our imaginative compassion. He wrote: “Of course the 
human heart is mysterious. I may have some deep evil in me which I cannot 
fathom. … Continually do I pray that He would discover to me if I am under a 
delusion; what can I do more? What hope have I but in Him? … All is against 
me — may He not add Himself as an adversary!”61 Eventually, the claims of 
truth appeared much stronger than those of human affection.
Newman renders this confusing process correctly in his essay on develop-
ment where we read: “At first men will not fully realize what it is that moves 
them, and will express and explain themselves inadequately.”62 And the author 
of these words, after a long and arduous quest, confessed in a letter to his sister 
Jemima: “I am giving up a maintenance involving no duties and adequate to all 
my wants. What in the world am I doing this for (I ask myself this) except that 
I think I am called to do so? I am making a large income by my sermons. I am, 
to say the very least, risking this; the chance is that my sermons will have no 
further sale at all. I have a good name with many; I am deliberately sacrificing 
 60 Quoted after ibid., 350.
 61 Ibid.
 62 J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, London New York and 









it. I have a bad name with more: I am fulfilling all their worst wishes, and giv-
ing them their most coveted triumph. I am distressing all I love, unsettling all 
I have instructed or aided. I am going to those I do not know, and of whom 
I expect very little. Oh, what can it be but a stern necessity which causes this? 
[…] What have I done thus to be deserted, thus to be left to take the wrong 
course, if it is wrong?”63
He also felt deserted and misunderstood by his friends and relatives. And to 
this we need to add a unique kind of temptation, which may be paraphrased 
by the primitive question from the Book of Genesis: “do you really think you 
are right?” In a letter to a Miss Giberne (who later also joined the Catholic 
Church), he deplores his bereavement: “Alas! can you point to anyone who has 
lost more in the way of friendship, whether by death of alienation than I have? 
[…] My mother gone; my sisters nothing to me, or rather foreign to me; of my 
greatest friends, Froude, Wood, Bowden taken away, all of whom would now 
be, or be coming to my side. Other dear friends who are preserved in life not 
moving with me; Pusey strongly bent on the opposite course; Williams protest-
ing against my conduct as rationalist and dying.”64
Such was the dramatic social context of Newman’s decision. No less dra-
matic and disconcerting were the circumstances of Stein’s experience. And 
here is another link with the Cardinal. The Roman Catholic Church was 
harshly criticized throughout his Anglican years. Nevertheless, he stood erect 
and assented to the truth he had found proclaimed in this Church. In Newman, 
such a moment of revelation was preceded by his spiritual quest and studies; 
and Stein had her moment of revelation as well. What I reckon to be the most 
essential thing here is that one should carry oneself in truth to oneself, in true 
accord with one’s words and feelings. According to Newman, we are not called 
upon primarily to change the world, but first to change ourselves, to grow, and 
to transform. Only then can such a centre of unity, of truth to oneself within, 
become a centre of transformation for the world without. Another thing 
brought home to the careful reader is that such a genuine centre of oneself, 
strangely enough, is more in unity with others than someone who is first of all 
focused on the external world. This regularity has already been mentioned in 
the Preface.
Newman brought into the Catholic Church an entirely different tradition. 
After centuries of suspicion and persecution, a gulf was wrought between 
the hierarchy and the laity. The new convert did not want to be treated like 
 63 Quoted after M. Trevor, The Pillar of the Cloud, 350.
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“ignorant children.”65 His intellectual background was steeped in the tradition 
of British empiricism, and in this tradition reason and experience prevailed. 
The working principle through the Reformation was expressed in the form 
“think for yourself.” At the same time, however, Newman was well aware that 
pure reason is far too an inadequate instrument to reach the truth. Man must 
confront it as a whole: the intellect and the heart. Consequently, it was not a 
theoretical exposition of philosophical or theological issues that made him a 
name in the world, “but far more than the books which he produced it was the 
personal spirituality of the man and the example of a life wholly imbued with 
the love of our Lord that made his impact on the religious world so great.”66 At 
the same time, we must remember, as Sheppard rightly stresses, that “Newman 
was not anti- intellectualist […] nor was he prone to scepticism. But he was cer-
tainly more intuitive than deductive […].”67 The last point also calls for a more 
detailed explanation, but in Newman this, let us say, intuitive bias can easily 
be misinterpreted, especially in unwary minds prone to hasty generalizations.
5 Edith Stein and Her Story
Edith Stein had very warm personal contact with her relatives, especially her 
mother. She was a lively and intelligent child and grew up into an indepen-
dent woman. The warm atmosphere of her home, as in Newman’s case, left an 
indelible trace in the form of an independent mind. Her biographer, Waltraub 
Herbstrith, observes that she was “basically unaffected by either her moth-
er’s piety or her family’s religious practices: any experience of God she had 
came in the form of her mother’s love.”68 Edith was born in Breslau, Germany 
(now Wrocław, Poland) into an authentically devout Jewish family. Religion, 
therefore, tasted of spiritual freedom. There was nothing oppressive in it, but 
rather a benevolent example of good behaviour, hence Edith could gradually 
recognize “the degradation in compulsive passions that are allowed to operate 
unchecked” and “developed an amazing frankness of character.”69 As a child of 
six, she decided to start her primary education, being “enthused about knowl-
edge.”70 This decision to attend school at such young age was just as definite and 
 65 See L. Sheppard, Spiritual Writers in Modern Times, New York: Hawthorn, 1967, 33.
 66 Ibid., 34.
 67 Ibid., 36.
 68 W. Herbstrith, Edith Stein: A Biography, 23.
 69 Ibid., 23– 24.
 70 M. L. Hill, Saint Edith Stein (Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross O.C.D.). Blessed by the Cross, 















irreversible as when, after graduation and four semesters at Breslau University, 
she resolved to study phenomenology in Göttingen under Edmund Husserl 
(1859– 1938), because phenomenology promised to “reach truth by studying 
reality around us” and “to prepare people who can see through all the errors.”71 
Her decisions illustrate a forerunner to the resolute personality of the future 
Doctor of the Church. This apparently smooth period of education was not 
without breakdowns.
At the age of thirteen, she suddenly decided to leave school due to mental 
exhaustion. To recuperate her health, she was sent to the home of her sister 
Else where she could rest from her school duties and devoted much of her time 
to practical occupations. Surprisingly, this promising scholar demonstrated 
commitment and diligence in simple daily chores, just as she was devoted to 
intellectual assignments. Herbstrith enumerates Edith’s traits of character: “a 
ready intelligence, an iron will, a strong sense of duty, and a natural desire to 
be of help.”72 We find here the same value of reality which can grow in persons 
who are allowed to mature amid kind- hearted relatives.
She was a nurse in the Red Cross during World War One and willingly vol-
unteered to serve her country because she felt authentic patriotism for her 
homeland. She helped the wounded and readily called at the ward for conta-
gious diseases. This practical engagement helped Edith Stein see life in all of its 
concrete challenges. The German writer and biographer, Christian Feldmann, 
rightly observes that “[t] he philosopher Stein has never been a mere theore-
tician. She is involved in the teachers’ association, working out the plans of 
reform and skilfully negotiating with the authorities. She encourages her aca-
demic colleagues to enter social problems, encourages them to shoulder wom-
en’s movements. She promotes pedagogy without gender- specific restrictions, 
but takes into account the nature of female nature. The teaching material must 
be chosen in such a way that it corresponds to the female inclination to the 
living reality and its interest in the concrete person.”73
We learn much about Stein’s trait of character from her Letters to Roman 
Ingarden. She was intellectually aroused to continue her own pursuits, but 
at the same time sacrificed much of her time for other people. She readily 
responded to her friends’ requests to evaluate their texts. This fact indicates 
that “her ability to critique, stimulate, clarify, and unselfishly follow someone’s 
train of thought shows itself, and this ability is later very often tested.”74 She 
 71 Ibid., 32.
 72 W. Herbstrith, Edith Stein: A Biography, 26.
 73 C. Feldmann, Edith Stein, Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2019, 82.
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was no rugged or isolated individualist and was ready to put “her own career 
on hold,” for, as she herself contended, “without community, without social life 
and therefore without the formation of individuals into members of a commu-
nity, the final end of the human being is not attainable.”75 Like Newman, she was 
very affectionate and considerate towards other people, an attitude that shows 
in practice respect for the other person’s incommunicable selfhood. And yet 
one thing is crucial here, namely the fact that we learn about others from close 
contact with them rather than from learned essays about people.
This focus on the concrete person and his experience is typical of both 
Newman and Stein; in both of them we have the same inclination towards 
the practical, towards action as a test of the truth residing in the person. 
Theoretical considerations are always more or less correct approximations 
to the given circumstances. They never render in a complete and adequate 
manner the intricacies of the concrete. One has to commit oneself, delve into 
concrete circumstances and, having done that, one should be aware that his 
knowledge of the other person is limited.
Stein received her doctor’s degree in philosophy in 1917 with the highest 
possible honours (summa con laude), and was then offered an assistantship to 
Husserl. After a while, however, she grew exasperated with all of this work, and 
then another opportunity for a profound reflection occurred. Adolf Reinach 
(1883– 1917), Husserl’s most outstanding student, died on the battlefield. Edith, 
who then considered herself an atheist, had surprisingly found Adolf ’s young 
widow not in despair or despondency. This example of the Christian testimony 
to hope in the face of death made Edith rethink her view of religion, in partic-
ular of the Cross in human life. It was at the house of her good friend and phe-
nomenologist, Hedwig Conrad- Martius (1888– 1966),76 that she came across 
The Life of Saint Teresa of Jesus. As she was alone there, for the host had left, she 
sat down to overnight reading. On completing the book on the very next day, 
she confessed: “This is certainly the truth.” This confession can be explained 
according to some Newmanian interpretation and, in fact, be interpreted as 
being akin to his moment of conversion. The book was a galvanizing moment 
for her. What was there in the book that made Stein assent to it with all the real-
ity of this assent? Was there something extraordinary in the sentences she had 
read? Taking into consideration the whole context, our answer should rather 
be in the negative. As Newman brilliantly noticed in his Apologia, “a book, after 
 75 See Borden, Edith Stein, 46; the quote comes from Stein’s essay Die theoretische Grundlagen 
der sozialen Bildungsarbeit, quoted after Borden, Edith Stein, 46.
 76 Hedwig Conrad- Martius is yet another example of a German phenomenologist who 






all, cannot make a stand against the wild living intellect of man […].”77 There 
must have been something in between, a certain dramatic tension between 
the reader and the contents she had learnt. Or, to be more precise, something 
inside Edith Stein responded to something inside Teresa of Avila, which the 
latter had expressed in words. Stein’s reality responded to Teresa’s reality. In 
Newman’s parlance, heart spoke unto heart.
Let us note in passing that this extraordinary experience was, in fact, yet one 
more element in a longer spiritual process that had taken place in Stein. First, 
she was surprised how Mrs Reinach reacted to her husband’s death, how she 
peacefully bore the blow; Edith was disconcerted by her equanimity in the face 
of her husband’s death. This experience, as Edith herself admitted, “spurred 
her on the path toward her own religious conversion.”78 Let me add that in 
1916, Adolf Reinach, a year prior to his sudden death, wrote the following con-
fession: “My plan is clear to me before my eyes— it is of course quite modest. 
I want to proceed from the experience of God, the experience of being shel-
tered in God, and do nothing more than show that one cannot object to it from 
the perspective of ‘objective science.’ I want to explain what is included in the 
sense of those experiences, to what degree it can claim ‘objectivity’- even if it 
presents itself as knowledge in a particular, albeit real sense— and finally to 
draw conclusions from this. Such a presentation can certainly not grant true 
piety. But it can bolster the weak that have wavered due to the objections of 
science, and urge those along for whom these objections have blocked the way 
to God. I believe that to undertake this work in all humility is today the most 
important thing, much more important than fighting in this war.”79 The Jewish 
Reinach and his wife were baptized Protestant.
Another episode happened at a church, where she once observed a sim-
ple woman deeply engaged in a spiritual conversation with God. This scene 
also moved her. Of course, such instances of the individual realization of the 
truth are elusive and difficult to grasp, but one thing is certain: in Newman 
and in Stein the moments of conversion were not revolutionary, but rather like 
persistent drops of an unknown and imperceptible light. In other words, they 
were not just emotional and shallow stirrings of their psyches, but arduous 
inner quests whose currents often went unnoticed. If we really wish to under-
stand the inherent drama of those biographical moments, we cannot forget 
the individual circumstances of their actor. A young Jewish intellectual, iden-
tifying herself as an atheist, is ready to give her real assent to the writings of 
 77 J. H. Newman, Apologia, 164.
 78 See M. Gubser, The Far Reaches, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, 117.
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a Christian mystic or is confused by the picture of a simple person’s prayer. 
Her biographer writes that Edith herself “acknowledged years later that from 
thirteen to twenty- one she could not believe in the existence of a personal 
God.”80 This acknowledgement does not make it impossible for the person in 
question to be open to a new experience that may bring about some radical 
change of attitude. Such a moment of realization cannot be passed by in haste. 
I shall talk about notional and real assents further on. Here, let it suffice to 
observe that Edith Stein must have been true to herself throughout her former 
life, must have been real— to use Newmanian parlance— so that she became 
ready to really assent. Metaphorically speaking, the real81 person is like a clean 
mirror that is always prepared to reflect a clear picture of the image that falls 
upon it. We have to bear in mind at the same time that some hidden processes, 
unperceived for bystanders, are taking place inside the subjects of experience. 
Newman called them “unperceived impressions,” of which discussion will be 
continued further on. Stein was baptized in 1922, and in 1933 decided to enter 
a Carmelite monastery.
Edith Stein went to great pains to break the news about entering the 
Carmelite order to her family, especially to her mother. She had already seen 
her mother Augusta in tears when the woman had learnt about her daughter’s 
resolution to become a Catholic; such a reaction, naturally, had evoked a sense 
of guilt in Edith. Her close friends rejoiced when, on April 15, 1934, she received 
the brown habit. Let us note the context. This doctor of philosophy, a person 
with a subtle intellect naturally inclined to distinctions and debates, proved to 
be a very cooperative, friendly, and, above all, obedient sister. When Husserl 
had learned about her clothing ceremony, he remarked jokingly: “I should have 
been there as a proud father to give her away.”82 The Father Provincial appreci-
ated her previous occupation and her love for books, so he willingly agreed to 
release her from other occupations and allowed her to continue writing.
In 1933, Edith Stein enters the Carmelite monastery in Cologne; in 1933, 
Adolph Hitler becomes Chancellor of the Third Reich. Stein is preparing herself 
for martyrdom; Hitler is preparing the setting for martyrdom. Then the paths 
of the victim and the perpetrator cross according to some inscrutable plan. 
Such dramatic lives must be understood as telling examples of our responsibil-
ity for individual choices. They are pregnant with further consequences.
As the persecutions of the Jews grew more intensive, Edith Stein was sent in 
1938 to the Carmelite monastery in Echt in the Netherlands. After the German 
 80 W. Herbstrith, Edith Stein: A Biography, 26.
 81 And the word “real” means here “honest,” “true to herself,” “sincere,” “transparent.”








invasion of the Netherlands in 1940 Edith’s safety became very uncertain, so 
she set about making preparations to escape to the monastery in Le Paquier in 
Switzerland, for she did not want to expose her fellow- sisters to danger. In this 
period, she was working on her important text The Science of the Cross. Edith 
was getting ready to leave together with her sister Rosa, who had meanwhile 
settled in Echt where she had become a Third Order Carmelite. The situation 
for Jews was becoming worse and worse. They were obliged to wear a bright 
yellow Star of David on their outer clothing, and many other restrictions were 
being imposed on them.
During the Nazi occupation, Jews were the only nation persecuted for the 
very fact that they were who they were. There were many ways to relieve their 
predicaments; one of them was to forge baptism certs. Some of them learned 
Christian prayers, so that they could recite them when caught. In some quar-
ters, baptism could have been interpreted as a way to find safe refuge. But this 
kind of safety was illusive, for even Jewish Catholics were not safe or protected 
from deportation. Baptism did not help in their case. Edith Stein experienced 
here a unique trial: to deny her origin and save her life or to show her origin in 
order to demonstrate her kinship with her brethren.
On July 26, 1942, an Episcopal letter was read out that condemned the 
inhuman practice of deportation. The Dutch bishops decided that they 
must protest.83 Edith Stein in vain waited for a Swiss visa. Instead, the secret 
police called at the gate of the monastery. She was arrested together with 
her sister. Let us pause for a while at this tragic moment. Edith thought she 
was going to obtain her visa to freedom and safety, but her hope was extin-
guished. From her place of detainment, Sister Benedicta sent a telegram to 
Mother Prioress, which read: “It is only possible to learn the Science of the 
Cross by living it.”84
In a time of inhuman circumstances and drastic scenarios of calculated 
elimination, everything is so tragically illusive. Indeed, the world is out of joint. 
When the distressed passengers descended from the freight train, they must 
have felt relief after their long and tiring journey. Soon afterwards, however, 
the fresh August air had brought to their nostrils the nauseating scent of the 
nearby crematorium. And they were bewildered, and they wondered what 
could that scent mean. In a world that is reversed, one can never trust one’s 
feelings.
 83 See ibid., 106.
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6 Conversion and Its Personal Sense
For Newman and Stein, the most important thing is to be real, i.e. to be gen-
uinely authentic and in accord with their innermost selves. No wonder, then, 
that Stein had found in the British Cardinal a soulmate. Because, indeed, to 
really assent to something that transcends one’s actual conceptual world is to 
go beyond the narrowly understood ratio. This also means unconditional obe-
dience to one’s conscience. Their lives were true evidence that one can do so, 
and that real assent is not certitude yet, but it is the beginning of an arduous 
journey towards certitude. The destination is worth the trouble. In fact, one 
has to set off on such a journey if one wishes to obtain personal peace.
What do we learn from these moments of conversion? We learn that real-
ity, honesty, and truthfulness are of utmost significance, therefore we can con-
clude, for instance, that one can be a Saul persecuting Christians and yet, at 
the moment of trial, cling to the truth. And one can be a Judas, one of the 
Apostles, and betray. The point of departure, as I have already said, is of minor 
importance. Evidently, it is better for the integrity of the human person to 
be the honest persecutor Saul than the hypocrite and double- dealer Apostle 
Judas. In the former case, man retains, so to say, a personal transparency, his 
integrity. I am convinced that this moment, in a special way, illustrates what 
Newman called the situation when a heart speaks unto a heart, i.e. beyond 
and above what is otherwise highly probable. It is easier to return from reality 
than from unreality, and the world of hypocrisy means unreality. Therefore, 
Saul returned, and Judas did not.
Introspection and careful examination of one’s conscience helped Newman 
realize whether he was real (i.e. honest to himself) throughout his life; intro-
spection and purity of motives helped Stein reach her destiny. When one is 
accused of falsehood and ambiguity, the best way to disavow the accusation 
is to examine for oneself whether one was real and true in one’s intentions. 
Newman’s Apologia pro Vita Sua perfectly served this purpose and imparted a 
deadly blow to his accusers.
Let us observe the following elements. In nineteenth- century Britain, 
Roman Catholics were still ostracised. Anyone who decided to join their reli-
gion was thereby doomed to a second- class category. It was no longer a time 
of very harsh persecution however, or even the danger of losing one’s life, 
which was the case at the time of the reign of Elizabeth i. Religious persecu-
tion was fashionable in Europe. When Newman made his decision to convert, 
he wanted to join a religious community that had been persecuted since the 
schism of Henry viii. Obviously, the emancipation of Catholics relieved their 
situation to a point. I think that, again, we find here some element of similarity. 
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When a resolution comes from personal certitude, the person is ready to join 
the losers, the accused, and the outcast. For Newman, it was the fold of the 
Roman Catholics, for Stein the community of her persecuted brethren. She 
was a Christian, it is true, but her personal choice did not close her to the suf-
fering Jews.
John Henry Newman died on August 11, 1890, Edith Stein is said to have died 
on August 9, 1942. Both died in the season of fruition. John Henry died revered 
by Anglicans and Catholics alike. Everybody, no matter what religion they 
adhered to, cherished the precious memories and bemoaned the death of this 
delicate personality that had endeared himself to the hearts of Christians of all 
denominations. In one of his last photographs, we can see him portrayed clad 
in his Cardinal’s vestments with a gentle smile of inner joy and fulfilment on 
his face; Edith died thwarted, amidst the terrified mass of her dear, if unknown, 
brethren. She could have shouted “Why hath thou abandoned me?” and she 
had learnt the way of the cross. The logic of the cross is so difficult to under-
stand and accept, as varied as its varied reflections in multitudinous lives. No 
one is like the other. The ripe fruits of their lifetimes are still with us, waiting 
for our ever new interpretations and inspirations for the generations to come.
Let us now ponder these two pictures: one real, taken by a photographer, 
the other only imagined. An elderly man is seated in an armchair with joy on 
his face. And Edith Stein standing in a gas chamber, surrounded, yet lonely and 
abandoned. There is one feeling that should accompany us, that should result 
from our reflection upon these two pictures— that the person can be fulfilled, 
the circumstances notwithstanding. Newman said in one of his sermons that 
life provides only the circumstances; they do not determine us, but only try us 
and provide various opportunities. The circumstances are varied; that which 
is important is the person integrated, united, perfected and immersed in tran-
sitory, tragic, fortunate events, or sad predicaments. And it does not matter 
much whether there are extraordinary feats of courage, like when one has to 
face the choice of life and death, or whether it is just the faithful day to day 
observance of one’s duty. The culminating moments come to the same point 
and can all become an elevation of that person; their value depends on what 
has preceded them. What is important is whether they come from the depths, 
from the innermost heart of the person, i.e. whether they are authentically 
realized. In order to arrive at such conclusions, it is not enough to evaluate 
external circumstances and judge appearances, rather, we have to delve into 
individual lifetimes and individual biographies. Trying to understand them 
we shall never be able to grasp everything as a clear- cut definition, or math-
ematical formula. We can only approach, we can only reach up to a certain 
probability. There is more to be imagined and felt than to be demonstratively 
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penetrated. There are layers in the person which elude the curious eye of the 
onlookers. The person has his secret dimensions.
What is there significant in personal certitude that we feel admiration and 
awe when confronted with this person? Newman seated in an armchair, a 
gentle and peaceful smile on his face; Stein standing amid the dying mass of 
her brethren, amid faces contorted with pain. Indeed, it almost amounts to 
an impossibility when one tries to understand the situation, to come round 
to Newman’s understanding of the circumstances. The only thing that should 
right now stand before us is the great dignity of the person, the power of the 
integrated person. Newman’s biographers tell us that students would lower 
their voices out of respect when seeing him strolling the corridors of Oxford 
University. One audience member at Stein’s 1930 lecture in Salzburg wrote: “For 
here one sensed a great power of mind, a rich, yet disciplined inner life, born of 
utmost self- assurance.”85
7 Secretum Meum Mihi86
The main reasons for conversion were hidden from the eyes of external spec-
tators, or even from the eyes of the convert himself. If human knowledge is 
composed of explicit and implicit elements, of demonstration and tacit 
presuppositions— as Newman claimed— one would have to live a certain way 
of life rather than explain it. There are many important elements that must 
be left unsaid and unexplained. This may lead some to frustration, but on the 
whole it is a very realistic approach. No individual life can be treated as a uni-
versal prescription for others to follow. Even the acting agent cannot explain 
why he or she has chosen this particular moment for conversion if we consider 
this act, for it is the whole person’s preparation that matters here, rather than 
an intellectually appointed moment of time. One feels it, rather than calcu-
lates it as a distanced observer.
This famous quote “my secret is mine” was repeated by Bernard Clairvaux, 
St Philip Neri, and John Henry Newman. The latter quoted it in his conversion 
account Apologia pro Vita Sua and Edith Stein responded in the same when 
asked about her decision to convert.87 A biblical quote would have been very 
much to the point at that moment. Here we live still in the land of shadows, we 
 85 See S. Borden, Edith Stein, 10.
 86 “My secret belongs to me.” With these words (taken from Is 24:16) Newman opens his 
Apologia pro Vita Sua (p. 1).








see things distorted, “indistinctly, as in a mirror […],”88 therefore we should not 
pretend that we have complete command of our lives, a full plan for whatever 
happens.
Both Newman and Stein had to make a very personal, fundamental, and 
existentially important decision, they both faced the unpleasant consequences 
of their decisions, and they both, naturally, felt compelled to meditate on their 
own lives. Therefore, no wonder, that phenomenology appears to be the most 
appropriate and helpful method of philosophy. For it focuses on human experi-
ence and seeks to grasp its essence. In his Philosophical Notebook of John Henry 
Newman, Edward Sillem notes: “Newman always aimed at situating another 
person’s «prepared position» in experience, and then opening a discussion 
about it with him, so that, while reading him, we readily feel that we are being 
forced to examine critically many philosophical theories we have in the light 
of what Newman shows our human experience of knowing and thinking really 
is. Newman’s genius, in fact, lies in this field of the phenomenological investi-
gation of experience.”89 What we find in Newman, and what I gather as being 
of utmost value, is his defence of the person’s individual path to the truth. In 
no way is Newman trying to lay down any general and universal rules to a com-
mon destination. He is not seeking a transcendental sphere. Rather, he is an 
indefatigable proponent of one’s personal struggle for truth in personal unity 
in which all the dissipated parts of the personality are brought together in the 
reality of the conscience’s judgement. Therefore, Newman is not an ultramon-
tane defender nor is he even a defender of the Catholic Church, a fact that 
may sound paradoxical. What he is saying more correctly is this: look at my 
life; I have examined it carefully and I have found truth in the Catholic Church. 
In all honesty to my conscience, I have to say that this is the only true flock of 
Christ. Each person writes his or her own personal history.
In terms of the time, for Newman, it was a longer process to assent to the 
truth of the Catholic Church. For Edith Stein, apparently, it was something 
much shorter, something more momentous, but only apparently so. Of course, 
we are not aware of all these lengthy soliloquies that resulted in this decision, 
in the assent that this is the truth. From the outside, it looks like a spur of the 
moment, a blink of an eye, a flash of the intellect, but internally this is the 
most mysterious element of maturation, of the human decision. Obviously, 
we may look at such decisions, at such moments as a certain list of chrono-
logical events, but then on second thoughts we come to consider them more 
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A Gloss to the Biographies 35
profoundly, we ponder them. Then, we can only stand in surprise. We know 
well that it was preceded by the often- feverish quest for the truth, by a series 
of explicit and implicit elements of human thought. Who can detect all the 
moments of demonstrative apprehension and revelational (enlightening) epi-
sodes hidden even to oneself? Who can trace the dark alleys of hesitation and 
uncertainty which one has trodden alone, looking for a glimpse of light?
Both Newman and Stein had gone through a spell of rationalism, as I have 
said, in which they firmly believed in the prowess of the human intellect— 
absolutely free in its quests. Then Newman, for his part— as Sillem observes— 
set his whole mind against any form of radical rationalism.90 There are 
many misinterpretations of his position. Franz Willam, in his article Die 
Philosophischen Grundpositionen Newmans [Newman’s Basic Philosophical 
Positions], quotes a long list of labels: “anti- intellectual gnostic, secret sceptic 
and nominalist, hidden rationalist, wise logician and sophist, sensitive artist, 
poetic romantic and classic of the English language, religious individualist, 
liberal Catholic, pioneer of modernism, Christian Platonic, Augustine of the 
Modern Times, modern mystic, the saint and Church Father of the Modern 
Times.”91
Some of these categories are sheer misunderstandings. Others are true. 
They simply prove that the human person cannot be enclosed within neat cat-
egories like an inanimate object of investigation. The rich abundance of the 
person provides a plethora of aspects. One- sided or reductive interpretations 
are bound to fall short of a true picture. Obviously, Newman was called a mas-
ter of English prose, but he was in no way a religious individualist or liberal 
Catholic— although he valued human liberty— if by these terms we mean a 
disregard for the authority of the Church or tradition. When Newman stressed 
the utmost importance of the individual assent to the truth, it in no way meant 
that everyone was free to interpret the truth in his own way. The main thing 
he had in mind was the personal effort to assent to the truth and make it the 
enlivening principle of one’s life, the inherent moving principle.
The renowned French historian of philosophy, Étienne Gilson (1884 – 1978), 
notes: “The method of demonstration followed by Newman is characteristic 
in this respect. From more than one point of view it carries the mark of his 
personal experience as plainly as the works of St Augustine bear witness to 
the spiritual history of their author. […] If this method seems somewhat sim-
ple, let us remember that what makes its force in the mind of Newman is the 
 90 Ibid., 21.






supernatural power of persuasion with which Christian dogma is endowed, 
when it is taught in its fullness […] and in the very words of God Himself 
or of His Church.”92 Indeed, these two elements are extremely important in 
Newman’s thinking, i.e. God and the tradition of the Church. We are called to 
respond personally, which is obvious, but it is safe to do so when we are con-
templating such important matters as those which concern human nature and 
the destiny of the human being in the bosom of the Church.
Edith Stein died in utter solitude, the Individual turned into an anony-
mous number squashed amid other panic- stricken Individuals. Individuals 
doomed by the unrelenting ideology to annihilation. I do not think it was 
her Jewishness that she had never renounced that “sentenced” her to death. 
Rather, it was her personal decision to stand firmly by what she had deemed 
as right; Jewishness was only her circumstance. The place is a God- given cir-
cumstance, as Newman would say. But the circumstances are not determin-
istic, for it is the person that decides about their role. Thus, the person, in a 
sense, is always alone, for he always leaves his individual imprints behind. 
There is no need for extravagance, as John Stuart Mill proposed in his anxiety 
about the death of individuality in the age of mass culture. By choosing his 
individuality, that is, by choosing his own person as a self- sufficient point of 
departure, Newman had long before his death sentenced himself to solitude. 
Sillem rightly observes “though he was a man who had a peculiarly deep 
need for human friendship and affection, which he found in the numerous 
friends who surrounded him throughout the whole of his life, intellectually 
he was as solitary as a hermit in desert.”93 The person who is aware of his 
sovereignty and his own responsibility in life is always, in this sense, alone. 
There are decisions that only I can make, I cannot shoulder the blame onto 
others.
John Henry Newman, like Edith Stein, accused no one personally. They 
could have grown despondent and become critical of the political system and 
institutions, but not of persons. They both knew all too well that, no matter 
what the circumstances were, they were making personal decisions in which 
they could not be replaced by anyone else. In other words, they were well aware 
that the person, placed on his or her own unique stage, acts out an individual 
role assigned only to this concrete person and not to anyone else. John Henry 
Newman started his journey towards certitude, that is, towards the truth that 
he could make his own personal one, in the Anglican Church in which the very 
 92 E. Gilson, Introduction, in: Grammar of Assent, 18.
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mention of popery was uttered with disgust. The Roman Catholic Church was 
despised as a “schismatic erroneous sect” by people the like of Gladstone.94 
Then, gradually, Newman began to realize that his Church was not the true 
fold. In 1845 he joined the Roman Catholic Church,95 and in 1879 was promoted 
to the rank of cardinal. In 2010, he was declared blessed by Benedict xvi, and 
in 2018 Pope Francis signed the decree of canonization; he was canonized on 
13 October, 2019 by Pope Francis. It would seem that Pius xii’s words are tak-
ing flesh. As the Pope once said to the French philosopher, Jean Guitton, “you 
may be assured, Mr Guitton, that Newman one day will be declared Doctor of 
the Church.” The beatification process of Edith Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the 
Cross) began in 1962; she was beatified in 1987 and canonized on October 11, 
1998, by Pope John Paul ii.96
The Polish philosopher, writer, and literary critic, Stanisław Brzozowski97 
(1878– 1911), an ardent admirer of Newman’s writings, wrote, with a tone of apol-
ogy: “May the name of my teacher and benefactor be blessed. I almost fear that 
I insult him in his light by this company of my wretched soul. I do not dare to 
write more, I do not dare to spin this train of thoughts into words; I entrust my 
future and my soul to his prayers; I ask the protective spirit for intercession, for 
understanding mercy and enlivening power. I believe in His existence, I believe 
that he lives in the blessed sphere of the mighty construction, I believe in the 
power of intercession, in the blessed power of prayer and communing.”98 It is 
all the more amazing to read such a confession from someone who identified 
himself with the leftist movement.
In his encyclical Fides et Ratio, John Paul ii noted: “We see the same fruit-
ful relationship between philosophy and the word of God in the courageous 
research pursued by more recent thinkers, among whom I gladly mention, in a 
Western context, figures such as John Henry Newman, […] and Edith Stein. […] 
Obviously other names could be cited; and in referring to these I intend not to 
 94 A. N. Wilson, The Victorians, London: Arrow Books, 2003, 101.
 95 His decision was preceded by activity in the Oxford Movement (the Tractarians). Wilson 
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densome the strain of defending the indefensible” (A.N. Wilson, The Victorians, 101– 102).
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endorse every aspect of their thought, but simply to offer significant examples 
of a process of philosophical enquiry which was enriched by engaging the data 
of faith. One thing is certain: attention to the spiritual journey of these masters 
can only give greater momentum to both the search for truth and the effort 
to apply the results of that search to the service of humanity. It is to be hoped 
that now and in the future there will be those who continue to cultivate this 
great philosophical and theological tradition for the good of both the Church 
and humanity.”99
Both Newman and Stein were acute observers of political life and critics of 
political abuse, excellent proof that, profound thinkers and spiritual writers 
as they were, they did not lose contact with social reality. And they retained 
sound judgement of the system in which they lived. Stein personally experi-
enced the practical results of National Socialism, an ideology she “adamantly 
and consistently” criticized.100 Newman, for his part, did not suffer the same 
kind of persecution (the times of Elizabeth I had long gone), although, phil-
osophically, they stemmed from the same modern reorientation. Each time, 
however, has its own practical implementations. He was well aware that, once 
he decided to join the Catholic Church, he would be ostracised and deprived of 
academic positions. It seems, however, that the choice of a political system was 
not so important for him. The Anglican system could be oppressive, but it was 
not life- threatening, at least not in the period of Newman’s life. Anyway, both 
Newman and Stein experienced opposition and rejection on the part of either 
anti- Catholicism in Britain or anti- Semitism in Germany.101
In her own private crusade, Edith would greet German officers by saying 
“Praised be Jesus Christ” instead of the official “Heil Hitler.” This modest act 
of resistance can be interpreted in two ways: 1) it was an example of religious 
confession, and 2) it was an act of individual freedom, dignity, and courage. 
Newman referred to the practical consequences of political systems in a gen-
eral way. He did not have to apply any expedient measures, as there was no 
state of emergency. The cruel hand of the totalitarian regime lay heavily on 
the citizens in Nazi Germany. One thing must be stressed, however, that no 
matter whether we are analysing the situation in nineteenth- century Britain 
 99 John Paul ii, Fides et Ratio, par. 74, www3.nd.edu/ ~afreddos/ papers/ fides- et- ratio.html 
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or twentieth- century Germany, since we are dealing with the individual, he is 
always out of place, always alien to any political system. The individual, viewed 
as a natural and supernatural being, will never be at home in any system. In 
other words, no human contrivance can fulfil his destiny. This perception must 
be born in our minds when pondering over these things. Thus, the human 
being is forever alienated from all political systems. Obviously, as human 
beings, we must be somehow politically organized. What National Socialism 
apparently promised, and failed to fulfil, was the vision of something more 
than a mere political system. National Socialism was indeed a promise of sec-
ular eschatology, with its quasi- religious entourage and ceremonies. All polit-
ical systems that attempt to redefine and reorganize people, in fact to change 
human nature— be that socialism, communism or liberalism— promise sim-
ilar values.
Two biographies, two personal histories, and two meandering paths to the 
same destination. It was a destination they could hardly discern at the begin-
ning, at times intellectually confused, but accepted with the assent of their 
very persons. There was one guiding principle, i.e. to be true to oneself, and 
the rest unfolded gradually. Let us look at the intellectual and spiritual con-
cepts they held as true, and the circumstances under which they rejoiced and 
suffered, examined and analysed their unique dilemmas, and eventually gave 
their personal assent to the challenges of their lives. John Henry Newman and 
Edith Stein have left their writings behind, but primarily their exemplary lives 
which appeal to us more than the written word. The person, development, and 
change were strong themes in both of them.
Having outlined these essential moments of their lives, let us proceed now 
to what I gather to be the key contribution to our understanding of the human 
being. We shall discuss in turn Newman’s theory of knowledge, i.e. how we 
come to know something and how this knowledge is translated into action, 
and then we shall focus on Stein’s language of the heart and her science of the 
cross. Let us look at this intriguing interplay of common intuitions in these 
great personalities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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 chapter 2
The Grammar of Knowledge in the Concrete
Egotism is true modesty.
 j. h. newman …
Each one must examine his own work,
and then he will have reason to boast with regard to himself alone,
and not with regard to someone else;
for each will bear his own load.
 Gal 6:4
∵
I think that the most important contribution of Newman to European tradi-
tion was that, firstly, he sought to redefine the modern tradition, reaching back 
to British empiricism and drawing on Christian antiquity. This redefinition 
meant a revolt against the mechanistic vision of the world in which the indi-
vidual, within the confines of the independent intellect and limited only by 
sheer logic, expands the space of his absolutist choices; the individual must 
subdue himself to the metaphysics of reality and the metaphysics of his own 
being. There are rules which have not been conceived by the agent and so must 
be respected. At the time when the applied sciences ruled, traditional views 
were being undermined, and the revolutionary turmoil seemed to have spread 
over all the continents, Newman stood up first in defence of the person, and 
then of the Church with her transcendent claims and her dogmatic structure. 
Philosophical reflection made him come up with an extended conception of 
what is rational and personal; a historical reflection on Christianity brought 
him to the gate of the Catholic Church. It was indeed an enormous task in the 
nineteenth century, which I have called in this book a laboratory to demon-
strate, that the human person can peaceably march the paths of intellectual 
and moral developments and, above all, be actively engaged in the fascinating 
world of scientific endeavours and firmly stand by traditional values. In other 
words, that there is no contradiction between faith and reason, modernity 
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and tradition, assuming they are properly understood. Newman had no fear 
of the “brave new world”. The human person in his rich abundance covers all 
dimensions and, in fact, is an inexhaustible source of variety. Generally speak-
ing, as Meriol Trevor stresses, Newman was especially predestined to confront 
modernity, he “was an expert, perhaps the greatest Christian expert of the 
modern age.” And the author explains why: “All his ventures were undertaken 
to assist the formation of a truly Catholic mind — the University, the School, 
the Magazine itself were all part of this campaign; so was the Oratory, since 
it was meant to mediate to the people understanding in the practice of their 
faith.”1 I would summarise that as follows: to build a citadel of certitude inside 
the human person, indeed, inside the Catholic mind. To build a citadel amidst 
the maelstrom of the rapid panorama of successive events.
The British historian William A. Clebsch counts John Henry as one among 
the apologists who “expanded the capacity of self- conscious people for assent-
ing to and apprehending a complex of Christian doctrines whose develop-
ment he traced back to the original, simple idea of Christianity evoked by 
Christ’s incarnation.”2 There were two pillars of this new approach, two pillars 
designed to buttress the new construction of religious belief in the nineteenth 
century: real assent (including: personal assent) and historical development. 
The human person is neither an expressivist paradigm nor Locke’s punctual 
self. Each approach that would assume some individualistic elements and sub-
ject them to analysis is bound to fail to comprehend him. The person is capable 
of amassing all sorts of data and creating a system. Therefore, in this chapter 
I would like to devote much time to Newman’s concept of assent. It must also 
be noted that in the numerous debates held with a view to decide whether 
Newman was a philosopher or not, it is the category of assent that should be 
taken into consideration. With his analysis of assent, Newman enters into the 
philosophical tradition.
Modernity, as we know, ushered into the history of mankind the problem 
of certainty of knowledge. How can we make the process of knowing certain 
and indubitable? The dilemma of rationality- irrationality pertains primarily 
to our mode of acquiring knowledge. Here the key term since at least the time 
of Augustine has been “assent.” It is at the moment of passing judgements that 
we are exposed to our errors. And our interpretation of judgements decides 
our definition of rationality. This is a very crucial point, since the kind of ratio-
nality we propose brings forth weighty consequences in the area of religion 
 1 M. Trevor, Light in Winter, London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1962, 201.






and morality. If, for instance, “rational” is reduced to “demonstrable,” religion 
gets whittled down to a mere naturalistic approach and private opinion. The 
world becomes an area of mechanistic manipulation in which— as Hegel 
predicted— the rational can be identified with the real. Therefore, to put it in 
somewhat simpler terms that may speak to the reader’s imagination, as long as 
something can be logically justified, it can be accepted. The individual history 
of a single person can then be explained away and ignored by the History of 
humankind. The age of intellect and the machine naturally has no empathy 
for the devious paths of personal fortunes. It is in the steady and unrelenting 
currents of History that our individual histories are immersed and made sense 
of, but individually and privately they are of no consequence.
As I have already remarked in Chapter 1, we can trace the concept of assent 
from Augustine’s assentior, through Descartes’ l’assentiment, down to Locke’s 
assent. In Augustine’s works, especially in his dialogue De Magistro (On the 
Teacher), we find this oft- repeated statement “assentior et video” (I assent and 
I see, I agree completely). The way we define human judgements is informative 
of our theoretical position: whether we are rationalists, empiricists, or realists. 
In other words, whether we reduce human freedom to intellectual cognition 
or we are open to broader personal knowledge. Newman’s main problem was 
not “to pursue the definition, organization, and systematization of theologi-
cal truth, but, rather, to study the birth, the life, the death, and the revival of 
real assent to dogmas in the minds of concrete and existing men.”3 In other 
words, the question was how people really arrive at judgments in the concrete. 
Indeed, it is worth examining how come, to repeat Stein’s example, that a 
young Jewish intellectual, and an atheist at that, was so ready to assent to the 
truth of a Christian text, and one written by a mystic. One thing must be noted 
here: Stein’s assent to what she had read in Teresa of Avila was not yet certi-
tude, a remark that is very much in accordance with Newman’s explication of 
real assent. It is not certitude, but may lead to it. This moment of assent can be 
understood as an initiation in a certain way. It is then followed by reasoning, 
by scrutinizing what I have assented to, i.e. I examine the object of my assent. 
Newman went on a path towards the source of his assent, testing whether he 
could find more confirmation. And Stein, having assented to the truth of the 
text, set off on a journey to the source of her— most probably even unexpected 
to herself— assent. At the moment of this assent, she could not yet embrace 
all the consequences of her decision. She did not yet know what it was to be a 
Christian, let alone a Carmelite sister, that is, a very committed Christian.
 3 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 20. 
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A radical position on assent is presented by the rationalist (Descartes) and 
empiricist (Locke) traditions. In the view of these traditions, assent must be 
well- grounded or else it can be censored as irrational. The history of philos-
ophy calls this process “disenchantment”. It is true that a certain amount of 
disenchantment is found in the Aristotelian- Thomistic tradition, but Locke’s 
disenchantment is radical and thoroughgoing. We read his ferocious criticism 
of what rationalists called enthusiasm: “How a man may know, whether [he 
is a lover of truth for truth’s sake], in earnest, is worth inquiry; and I think, 
there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any proposition 
with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant. Whoever goes 
beyond this measure of assent, it is plain it receives not truth in the love of it; 
loves not for truth- sake, but for some other by- end.”4 Newman, for his part, 
respected Locke and did not feel like arguing with his fellow- citizen, retorted 
in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine:
It does not seem to have struck him that our ‘by- end’ may be the desire 
to please our Maker, and that the defect of scientific proof may be made 
up to our reason by our love of Him. It does not seem to have struck him 
that such a philosophy as his cut off from the possibility and the privilege 
of faith all but the educated few, all but the learned, the clear- headed, 
the men of practised intellects and balanced minds […]. The ‘enthusi-
asm’ against which Locke writes may do much harm, and act at times 
absurdly; but calculation never made a hero.5
It follows clearly from the above that, for the author of these words, man can-
not be reduced to a kind of inductive- deductive creature who is triggered to act 
only by the force of arguments and would never accept anything that cannot 
be demonstrated. Newman was alarmed by what was happening in the Church 
of his birth. Religious truths being diluted to several principles of gentleman’s 
conduct and comprehensive belief ended up with a shocking realization: man 
can establish a church in which there is no need for God. All such danger-
ous processes of enlightened modernity induced Newman to come up with 
his own theory of knowledge. The author of Apologia seems to be saying: you 
must be talking about man in general, one that does not exist save in books, 
but let us actually look closer at what man in concrete circumstances is doing.
 4 J. Locke, Works, Repr. Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963, vol. iii, chap. xix, par. 1, 147.






In the Introduction to Newman’s Grammar we read: “If it is a question of 
achieving a scientific knowledge of the Christian faith, theology alone, as 
being notional, can do it; but religion is both personal and real, and, unless 
we content ourselves with a vague religious sentiment, the only way to restore 
Christianity in the hearts and minds of men is to teach them how to assent to 
dogmas as to so many real and particular objects. This lack of real assent which 
Newman was already deploring in England and in Europe […] does not seem 
to have grown less common in our own days. On the contrary, it frequently 
happens that, in nominally Catholic countries, countless baptized men and 
women not wholly ignorant of their religion seem to live, to behave and to 
think as though they were wholly foreign to the truth of Christian dogma. This 
is precise the evil which Newman has attempted to define and for which he has 
sought a cure in the notion of assent.”6
1 Notional versus Real Assent
Before I embark on a characterization of assent (notional and real alike), 
let me first define its basic trait, which is substantially contradistinctive to 
the empiricist view. According to Newman, and contrary to Locke, assent is 
unconditional. As we know, the British empiricist admitted to a gradation in 
assent: one can assent to something insofar as one is persuaded to it by respec-
tive arguments on the part of the object of assent. In the rationalist- empiricist 
sense therefore, assent would be coequal to inference, whereas for Newman, as 
we shall see, assent is distinct from inference. Such is the rationalist- empiricist 
position: a rational man cannot accept more than he can comprehend (i.e. 
explain, demonstrate), therefore, here is the essential divergence from Locke’s 
rationalist- empiricist view of assent, and the essence of the personalist per-
spective. Assent (notional and real), in Newman’s view, as an act is one and 
indivisible, and differs essentially from inference. The latter is stronger or 
weaker, depending on its premises. Externally, for instance, it is difficult to 
distinguish a notional act from a real one, since, as we consider them from 
the outside, they look similar, i.e. the subject’s verbal response sounds similar. 
Therefore, in order to examine the true nature of an assent, one would have to 
embark on introspection, and— naturally— on the practical effects. And this 
introspection must be carried out by the self itself.
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Let us stress this point of absent gradation in assent, for, if such is the case, we 
realize that there is an essential discrepancy between the knowing subject and 
the known object; in other words, the subject can accept more than he can com-
prehend, and his assenting is not entirely exhausted by the amount of arguments 
brought forth on behalf of the object presented for comprehension. This is a very 
important statement because it protects human expanded rationality from a nar-
row rationalism (in which only argumentation and demonstration are valuable 
instruments of rationality), and, obviously, it provides rational grounds for the 
Catholic belief in dogmas. Dogmas, as we know, are not objects of free delibera-
tion, but tenets of faith.
All in all, there is no contradiction between Newman’s criticism of the 
Lockean gradation of assent and his claim that assents are unconditional, 
although they can be weaker or stronger. For Newman, assent either is or is 
not. Two elements converge here: antecedent probabilities and the agent’s 
personal preparation to assent to them; the agent is not determined by the 
probabilities. It is like shaking someone’s hand. There is no denying that I have 
shaken someone’s hand if I have done it. But I can still do it in a stronger or 
weaker manner.
In this case even mistakes play, paradoxically, their constructive function. 
They simply prove that the whole construction is grounded on solid foundations 
because despite centrifugal forces it still persists and resists diverse disruptions. 
The Church persists despite the so- called modernizing attempts and schisms and 
apostasies (and defections). So if we cannot assent to something we do not com-
prehend at first, this is because we are not prepared to fill in this surplusage with 
personal readiness.
2 Notional Assent
Human beings are very active in formulating opinions, holding views, and 
declaring something; all such kinds of activity belong to the world of notions. 
This is how we commonly understand our rationality, i.e. the rational being 
should be ready to express opinions and hold views on any matter. Notional 
assents are the weakest types of assent. Among these, Newman enumerates 
profession, credence, opinion, presumption, and speculation. A notional 
assent lacks the power to possess the mind, which can distance itself and 
become disengaged, analyzing the matter at hand the way a scientist looks 
at an interesting species through a microscope. As Newman rightly observes, 
while comparing the notional with the real, “It is in human nature to be more 
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affected by the concrete than by the abstract.”7 Moreover, there is a parallel 
between the thing apprehended and apprehension, an interrelation that we 
know from our personal experience.8 At this point, let us note that because 
of this nature of notional apprehension, it is Newman’s manifest intention to 
investigate the process of translating the general into the concrete. How and 
when does the general turn into the concrete? The point is that when a man 
translates the general into the concrete, he makes it personal; as I have men-
tioned dogmas above, the question is how a dogma can become a personal 
principle.
Notional assents are often confused with inferences and, judging from with-
out, we do not know whether one has no doubts about something or whether 
one is certain. Notional apprehension is congenial to inference, and real appre-
hension is congenial to assent. And at this point let it be noted that there is 
a profound discrepancy, even an inverse proportionality, between inference 
and assent. Newman calls it the true paradox, “that, when Inference is clearest, 
Assent may be least forcible, and, when Assent is most intense, Inference may 
be least distinct […].”9
I have already mentioned this basic discrepancy between the knowing sub-
ject and the object of knowledge. We could also call this moment a moment 
of human freedom, or a gap of uncertainty in which a person, confronted 
with an indubitable inference, gives only a weak assent; and when the same 
person is presented with a weak inference, his assent is surprisingly stronger. 
Therefore, Newman concludes in his Grammar that we do not automatically 
assent to something when given a reason, or else that we abstain from assent 
when strong reasons are provided. On the contrary, assent may be “withheld in 
cases when there are good reasons for giving it to a proposition, or may not be 
withdrawn after it has been given, the reasons remaining, or may not remain 
when the reasons are forgotten, or must always vary in strength, as the reasons 
vary; and this substantiveness […],” as Newman calls it, “of the act of assent is 
the very point which I have wished to establish.”10 In other words, our minds 
are not always inclined to the conclusions to which inferences point; and there 
are numerous cases when they incline to conclusions not pointed to by our 
inferences.
Professions are very weak. Assents are made here upon habit. We follow cer-
tain tastes or surrender to stereotypes. We hold that we are behoven to conduct 
 7 Ibid., 50.
 8 Cf. J. H. Newman, ibid., 49.
 9 Ibid., 52.









The Grammar of Knowledge in the Concrete 47
ourselves well in good company, or we choose the kind of literature that is fash-
ionable in our day. We tend to share the most popular views because others do 
the same, or we want to be regarded as sophisticated and well- educated. The 
beliefs we thus hold are transitory; we take them up one day, and then aban-
don readily, sooner before we have even realized what they mean. Here comes 
what Newman called formalism, which happens when one asserts and accepts 
a view on authority. It is “professing to understand without understanding,” 
and words are used as “war- cries, nicknames, and shibboleths” without a more 
profound apprehension.11 The multitude keeps repeating them because they 
want to be regarded as men of the world or sound well- bred. They are mere 
assertions.
In credence, we spontaneously assent to the many messages we receive 
from our daily contacts, from reading newspapers or consulting other media 
(in Newman’s time the press was in its heyday). The kind of assent that is pres-
ent here furnishes our minds with respective cultural information. It is char-
acteristic of the social milieu in which we grow up. This kind of information 
makes up our national uniqueness, for instance, by which we can be distin-
guished from other social and cultural groups. Such assents are notional and, 
consequently, superficial, because the ideas thus provided are too complex. 
They provide some practical information for conversations on various topics, 
but do not make us professional, for their range is too broad. The reality is frag-
mented into too many pieces for us to master.
While analyzing notional assent, we must be all the time aware of its basic 
characteristic, i.e. its theoretical distance to reality. In this sense, for instance, 
religion, just like theology, can be regarded as notional. Theology is a science, 
therefore it provides theoretical knowledge, but even religion can be a subject 
of notional assent. In like manner, even here we can find a superficial (a merely 
theoretical) attitude to religion. Newman approves of Evangelicalism and 
other denominations which practice the reading of the Bible. Nevertheless, 
he deems it insufficient to be content with reading and living a correct life, for, 
as such, “it is not a religion of persons and things, of acts of faith and of direct 
devotion; but of sacred scenes and pious sentiments.”12
Opinion is a similar assent to that of credence. It is an explicit assent to the 
probability of a proposition. Being an assent, it is independent of premises. 
Therefore, unlike credence— which is implicit— opinion is explicit. We are 
 11 See J. H. Newman, ibid., 53, 54.






forming an opinion when we reflect upon our credence. It is notional because 
we assent to abstract probability.
In presumption, we assent to first principles. We know that we have cer-
tain faculties of reasoning and memory. Newman writes: “We are what we are, 
and we use, not trust our faculties. […] Our consciousness of self is prior to 
all questions of trust or assent. We act according to our nature, by means of 
ourselves, when we remember or reason.”13 Therefore, trusting the faculties 
of reason or memory cannot be regarded as a first principle. We simply use 
ourselves— and this element of his, let us say, realistic theory of knowledge 
will often be repeated. Therefore, he undertook this meticulous task of exam-
ining how a single person comes to know something concrete, or under con-
crete circumstances. The existence of things external to ourselves can be con-
sidered a first principle and such that “is founded on an instinct.”14 We have an 
instinct that informs us about the existence of the world without. This instinct 
accompanies each object that is given to us in experience. We then generalize 
the collection of such instincts and come up with a general statement that the 
external world exists.
General names are abstractions as they are conclusions from particular expe-
riences. Likewise assents to the so- called first principles are notional assents to 
the propositions containing abstracts terms. When the question of Newman’s 
alleged nominalism is raised, one must be aware of the fact that he was hardly 
interested in deciding on behalf of idealism or realism. The problem appeared 
to him to be fairly theoretical and— as he frequently repeated— his principal 
interest was man’s conduct in the concrete circumstances. In the concrete cir-
cumstances, the acting person never considers the reality or unreality of the 
world, but rather has to grapple with what is good or bad, what is proper or 
improper to do. From this point of view, we may easily understand that even 
the first principle of our conscience, i.e. “there is a right and a wrong”— well- 
known as the principle of synderesis— is notional and theoretical, unless it is 
followed by a personal struggle towards a concrete choice under given circum-
stances. Therefore, Newman has a point here, for the general principle does 
not confront us with the practical choice of a good or a bad action, unless it is 
potentially, until we are actually confronted with some existential dilemma. In 
other words, the principle of synderesis is abstract for us before we start to act. 
We know, theoretically, that there are these two fundamental aspects of reality, 
but we realize their presence when we are called upon to act.
 13 Ibid., 66, 67.
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As we learn about the external world through our senses, likewise we learn 
about God through the dictates of our conscience. Here is an analogy between 
the knowledge thus gained about the external world and the knowledge of 
God gained through the dictates of conscience. We learn about the existence 
of a world external to us by way of induction from a recurring experience of 
objects. In like manner, we realize that there must be a Being superior to us 
from the recurring dictates of our conscience.
And Newman provides an adequate explanation of the abstract (notional) 
nature of this principle when he writes that “in proportion as we obey the par-
ticular dictates which are its tokens, so are we led on more and more to view it 
in the association of those particulars, which are real, and virtually to change 
our notion of it into the image of that objective fact, which in each particular 
case it undeniably is.”15 Indeed, this is one of those wonderful ways in which 
Newman brings home to his readers his true meaning of such confusing state-
ments. We may be aware of good and evil in theory, but only our adjustment 
to the practical claims of our consciences, when theory is translated into an 
image, makes us actually realize good or evil. Obedience to the dictates of con-
science in the aforementioned quote is an excellent example of Newman’s key 
interest, namely, the practical translation of a theoretical tenet into a practical 
principle of action.
Another example of a notional assent— presumption— is the belief in 
causation, an example which Newman might have taken from Hume’s exposi-
tion of the problem. We can understand causation in two senses: when some-
thing causes something else to exist and when something follows something 
else, i.e. when A is prior to B, or when B follows A. We observe a sequence of 
antecedents and consequents and we “confuse causation with order,” but we 
should rather speak about “a cause to be an effective will; and, by the doctrines 
of causation […] or first principle, [Newman means] that all things come of 
effective will; and the reception of presumption of this notion is a notional 
assent.”16
The same goes for causation understood as a temporal succession of 
antecedents and consequents. If they belong to the order of nature, and we 
have approved of the thus established causation, there is a notional assent to 
the repetitive pattern of certain events. On the basis of this homogeneity of 
nature physicists construct general laws. Naturally, Newman is still referring to 
the Newtonian vision of nature in which the laws are universal. For the sake of 
 15 Ibid., 70.






our considerations, let us note that it suffices for his argumentation, namely, 
that he wants to say that, inasmuch as the laws in question are universal and 
embrace all phenomena that fall under their operation, the phenomena them-
selves are always unique and individual. Therefore, he claims that the doctrine 
of the uniformity of the laws of nature is an abstract conception, which is 
“more perfect than the recurrent phenomenon itself […], and the variations 
which accompany the repetition are of the nature of exceptions.”17 His argu-
mentation exhibits the consequence in his thinking. The point he is driving 
at is to show that there is an essential discrepancy between the general laws 
and the concrete events which these laws have been designed to describe. 
Concrete events are always different in their detail from the general outlines.18 
We may speak only about approximations rather than adequate descriptions. 
Obviously, science accounts for these aberrations by the interaction present in 
nature. We must not, however, confuse facts with reasoning, for “the confusion 
is a fact, the reasoning processes are not facts.”19
We are dealing with hypotheses rather than with experienced phenomenal 
facts. We take the unfailing uniformity of nature for granted. For Newman, it is 
not a cause that makes things happen but Will, for “we have no experience of 
any cause but Will.”20 In view of this, speaking about moral luck is even more 
absurd. A cause implies a will, and the order of nature implies a purpose. The 
order of nature can be changed by “that which willed it, […] and the invariable-
ness of law depends on the unchangeableness of that Will.”21
It follows from the above considerations that general laws are never ade-
quate tools for the descriptions of individual facts. Rather, they are simplified 
approximations and should be regarded more as probabilities than exact rep-
resentations of experienced facts. Particular events happen not by the scheme 
of some deterministic laws, and yet they still happen, hence they must have 
been willed by Someone. Newman denounces the modern vision of mecha-
nistic laws that rule over nature; for him, the Creator of nature is ever present 
in His creation. Is our situation as Newman describes it? We have a network of 
laws and a complex agglomeration of facts. And now we seek to express these 
facts by means of those laws. As the network is inadequate, we resemble a 
fisherman who is trying to catch small fish with a net whose grids are too big.
 17 Ibid., 73.
 18 From the point of view of contemporary physics, Newman’s conclusions are obvious. 
Today, physicists speak merely about the probability of physical events.
 19 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 73.
 20 Ibid., 74.











The Grammar of Knowledge in the Concrete 51
In speculation, which is another kind of notional assent, we include our 
conscious acceptance of propositions as true. Here we list some general truths, 
maxims, mathematical investigations, legal judgements “the determinations of 
science; […] the principles, disputations, and doctrines of theology.”22 Because 
they are expressed as general propositions, they are subjects of notional appre-
hension. This does not mean that they cannot be received by real assent as 
well. Generally speaking, all of our notional assents can be made real and 
assented to in our experience, as I shall try to demonstrate further. Let us now 
turn to real assent.
3 Real Assent
What is notional and what is real exert a force on the mind, but the real, being 
concrete, exerts a much more powerful force. In the case of the real, our appre-
hension is stronger than in the case of the notional. Mere abstract terms or 
some general knowledge do not stimulate the mind in the same manner and 
to the same degree as a concrete influence does. General deliberation about 
death does not have as equally potent an impact as the concrete (and actual) 
death of a close relative. Inference and notional assent are often treated as 
one class of concepts, with the exception that assent is always an uncondi-
tional acceptance of a proposition, whereas in inference we must first accept 
its premises and only afterwards the conclusion. In notional assent, the mind 
contemplates its own creations. In real assent, the mind is directed towards 
things. They inculcate impressions on the imagination. Things create images, 
which, in turn, exert influence on individuals. Here, we are talking about 
minds which have long acquainted themselves with certain subjects. Images 
need not be true, but they exert a vivid apprehension. Images evoke something 
in us, they call for a prompt response. They are like anchors holding us fast to 
a certain reality, like seals on our minds. Come and see for yourself, touch me 
and see.23 Images are witnesses to what we have gone through; it does make a 
difference when we say “I understand it,” and “I know because I have seen it.” 
Images leave behind some indelible traces that will not permit us to forget. 
Images admit no room for deliberation. Let us consider an example.
Several years ago Randy Pausch, the late computer science professor at 
Carnegie Mellon, published a book entitled The Last Lecture (2008). And this 
 22 Ibid., 76.







book is indeed about his last lecture; it was literally his last lecture. The word 
“last” was not only the last element in a set of like terms in which there is not 
any “next.” The word “last” meant that the lecturer would not give any further 
lectures, for he would not exist any longer. Thus, it took on a very radical mean-
ing. The reason was not his retirement (he was still young) or his decision to 
move to another university, as one might expect, but the diagnosis of his termi-
nal condition (he had been diagnosed with a very malignant type of pancreatic 
cancer). I think that Pausch’s book (and his very idea to deliver this lecture) is 
a splendid recapitulation of what we are talking here about. Existential phi-
losophers say that the human being is a Being- toward- Death (Heidegger), in 
itself a clever term that covers our gradual passing away, but the connection 
between being and death rendered by this term is merely theoretical, and 
therefore abstract. Likewise, one may consider the death of any representative 
of homo sapiens as a consequence of biological development (birth, growth, 
and decay). The situation takes on an entirely new turn when one is struck by 
the sudden realization that his or her death is indeed imminent, that it is— so 
to speak metaphorically— standing at the threshold. A diagnosis is a visible 
sign of something concrete, something that has almost been calculated. At 
that moment, words implode, they appear desperately inadequate to com-
prehend that truth, they fail to render the meaning, when, safely embedded 
within semantic and syntactic wholes, they are dimmed by the unknown; 
do not we express this feeling by saying that we are desperate for words, that 
words fail us, that we are short of words? Indeed, this is the situation when 
I learn that it is I who am about to die. And this is what Newman meant by real-
izing, by assenting to something real. The truth speaks itself, it shines through 
the human being; we experience the fact that the time for guided discourse has 
ended. Only real assent is meaningful and effective, although one may hope-
lessly search for words to describe it. And real assent at such moments may 
also denote silence.24
General truths and great maxims, as Newman says, float on the surface of 
society. They are waiting to be born, i.e. to be given life by some individuals. 
First, they are regarded as abstract truths with self- evident acquiescence, but 
then transformed into practical expression. They are hardly ever realized by 
society at large. Usually, there is an individual mind, like that of Wilberforce’s, 
that becomes operative in translating the notional into the real. And William 
Wilberforce (1759– 1833), as we know, won a successful battle over the abolition 
 24 When Job’s friends had realized their friend’s enormous suffering, they remained silent 
for seven days and seven nights.
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of slavery in Britain in the nineteenth century. Of course, there was general 
outrage against slavery among many, but only Wilberforce was practically 
inspired to take concrete steps that proved so successful in Britain.
Many classes of people acquiesce in general truths, but only some minds 
are aroused to action. To these minds, words speak of things, not merely of 
notions. Hence, they serve not merely for embellishing our speeches, but for 
acting. The first thing for something to be real, Newman claims, is that it must 
be presented in the form of an image. The question as to the reality of images 
is another matter, for, as we have said, an image may be very impressive yet 
without being real. Very often we deviate “from the line of reason and duty,” 
especially in the case of “an idiosyncratic sagacity,” that is, in the case of men 
with outstanding intellectual gifts.25 Such people are prone to be carried off 
by the lively productions of their concepts. Imagination, let us stress, does not 
produce assent, but only intensifies it. An image is like, say, a connatural reflec-
tion in someone’s mind; it is a response of the person, not merely an acquies-
cence of the intellect.
4 Imagination and Images versus the Response of the Person
The role of the imagination in the nineteenth century became proverbial; it 
was set in opposition to the intellect of the Enlightenment. Imagination does 
not cause action, but only stimulates our motive powers “by providing a supply 
of objects strong enough to stimulate them.”26 When we consider such things 
as future life, reward or punishment, it matters much whether these objects 
create some images in us or whether they are mere notions for the construc-
tion of propositions. There is a correspondence between a future action and 
the thought about this action. The latter is initiated on condition that in our 
minds there is something “congenial to it” or, as Newman explains it, if “there 
is that preparation of mind, the thought does lead to the act.”27 This is what 
I call “a connatural reflection.” No wonder, then, that we may have a group of 
people exposed to the same contents, and yet only some of them, or, in fact, 
only very few of them, are ready to give their real assent. We hardly ever come 
across a situation in which all the subjects are affected in the same manner. 
Ultimately, however, it is the person’s fiat that causes action, not a clear and 
distinct concept or persuasive reasoning. And this conclusion agrees perfectly 
 25 See J. H. Newman, Grammar, 81.










with Newman’s understanding of causation, in which the will is the motivating 
factor.
Another important trait that has a bearing on real assent is its personal 
nature. Unlike notional apprehension, which corresponds to our common 
nature, real assent is always personal. When we turn to abstractions, we can 
easily establish a common measure between two minds. Thus, learned discus-
sions are plausible because the object of discussion is made intelligible and 
intersubjectively comprehensible. Real assents in which we assent to images 
are unique, but we cannot secure the same images in experience for any two 
persons, or, we should more correctly say we cannot assure the same responses 
to equivalent images.
The problem of imagination in Newman causes certain doubts. We know 
that, for him, imagination does not determine action, but can stimulate the 
agent to action. It provides images and they are more powerful than mere the-
oretical concepts in initiating action. Insofar as this point is relatively clear, 
it is difficult to understand the role of imagination in belief and knowledge. 
In his philosophical notes, the Cardinal writes that “imagination is the habit 
of the act of making mental images.” Imaginations, however, “cannot be mat-
ter of judgment, i.e. of assent or dissent, because you cannot affirm or deny 
without grounds— and hence there is no basis of knowledge at all. What one 
cannot assent to &c, one cannot believe or disbelieve; is not the subject of 
faith.”28 He then makes a distinction between Imagination and Conception. 
The two should not be mistaken, for “we can imagine things which we cannot 
conceive.”29 So far so clear, but later on we learn “we can believe what we can 
imagine, yet cannot conceive […], you can believe what you [- imagine] <can-
not conceive>; «understand» means «imagine» and certainly I do not believe 
(except implicitly) what I do not imagine.”30 Are these two pages contradic-
tory? First, we learn that if we cannot assent to imaginations, they cannot be 
the subject of faith; now we learn that we cannot believe what we cannot imag-
ine. The conclusion is all too clear: we can assent to what we can imagine; and 
there is another conclusion: we cannot believe if we cannot imagine. Is belief 
possible at all? We may account for this apparent contradiction by referring 
to a passage from Newman’s Grammar. Here, the author relates imagination 
to experience. Perhaps the best answer to this difficulty would be Newman’s 
method of arriving at the truth, which is a process of development. In the 
Grammar of Assent, the author explains the intrinsic discrepancy between 
 28 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 152.
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notion and image in favour of the image. Although an image can be incompre-
hensible, we can still assent to it. This is the case in which indeed “understand” 
can mean “imagine”, but not “to explain.” Therefore, when a person says “I see,” 
he, in fact, acquiesces: “I understand.” And this is how the phrase is understood 
in the English language. The interesting fact here is that the verb “see” is natu-
rally used in another context in which it is related to the sense of sight.
Of course, the question is how abundant our imagination is. If our imagina-
tion is subdued to the intellect, it is limited only to what can intellectually be 
conceived. If it is guided by the heart, it is open to much vaster vistas of real-
ity. The heart can see more than that which can be explained, it goes beyond 
the world of concepts. As if to confirm our suggestions, Newman hastens to 
explain this in his Grammar: “As notions come of abstractions, so images come 
of experiences; the more fully the mind is occupied by an experience, the 
keener will be its assent to it, if it assents, and on the other hand, the duller will 
be its assent and the less operative, the more it is engaged with an abstraction; 
and thus a scale of assents is conceivable, either in the instance of one mind 
upon different subjects, or of many minds upon one subject varying from an 
assent which looks like mere inference up to a belief both intense and practical 
[…].”31
Indeed, I can imagine what I can experience. Does the Cardinal reduce 
knowledge to the empiricist view? I think he is simply saying that experience 
broadens our horizon, and if I want to understand religion in its real— not 
merely notional— form, I must be deeply immersed in religious life, I must 
be open to religious experience and religious practice. Religion and moral-
ity are not primarily areas of theoretical knowledge. This is what Aristotle 
understood so perfectly in his exposition of virtue: we need not know what 
virtue is, but we need to be virtuous people. I can see what I understand, 
and I can understand what I can see. To be open to religious experience 
means to be fully aware that, in this encounter between the transcendent 
and infinite Being on the one hand and the finite on the other, there is much 
to accept without comprehension. In any case, even the finite being— and 
I shall elaborate on this— has, deep down, an immeasurable and incommu-
nicable reservoir of mystery. This requirement of being real crops up all the 
time in Newman’s writings, i.e. instead of being satisfied with knowing what 
virtue is, one should practise virtue. How can a man talk about virtue if he 
has never sought to be a virtuous man? How can a man talk about religion 
if he has never attempted to be religious? Therefore, the American Newman 
 31 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 47. 
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scholar, John Crosby, is right in saying that Newman “sought rather to make 
people realize the truths that they were so fruitlessly professing. He sought to 
make the sources of religious experience flow for them again. He sought to 
awaken the religious imagination. He sought to appeal not only to the intel-
lect but also to the heart, and in this way to stir up his listeners to action. He 
preached in a way that ‘pierced’ the existence of his hearers, which means 
that he energized them existentially. That was the secret of his power.”32 I can 
only enhance one of these points by adding that Newman primarily sought 
to appeal to the heart, this enlivening centre of images that may stimulate 
action. For instance, instead of just talking about suffering we should see 
those who suffer and rush to their aid.
It is not the act of assenting to something that should be the focus of 
our criticism, but the object to which we assent. In general, it is good that 
we are capable of assenting, especially that we are capable of assenting to 
things we do not comprehend. The fault is in the object, not in the assent-
ing. When we assent to bad things, it is not the act of assenting that is at 
fault— an act which was the object of criticism for Descartes made him sus-
pend his judgement— but the object to which we assent. The fault is not 
in the assenting itself, so that it should be self- evident, as if we could with-
draw from assenting and become non- judgemental. This is the surest way to 
non- commitment and scepticism. The rationalist suggests suspending our 
judgement until the object presents itself as a clear and distinct idea, i.e. as 
an intellectually clear object. In such a case, we could remain in withdrawal 
and suspension forever. Assenting has its source in the person as a whole, 
not only in his intellect; the task of our reason and conscience is to analyse 
the object of assent. The more integrated we are, the more spontaneous and 
intuitive such processes are.
When the undivided person is assenting to something, he stands a chance 
of finding the truth. Therefore when Newman was criticised for being hypo-
critical, he set about writing “the closely reasoned pages of the Apologia where 
he shows his unerring logic at the best advantage.”33 Its purpose was to prove 
that he had never intentionally made a mistake, adding simultaneously that 
he had never “sinned against the light,” that is, he had never sinned against his 
conscience, that his words had never been unreal.
 32 J. F. Crosby, The Personalism of John Henry Newman, 34.
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5 Realization
How can we communicate if there is no common measure between us? Let us 
repeat that we are now talking about real assents in their capacity for commu-
nication; in the case of the notional, communication is far more plausible— 
often superficial, yet plausible; we can observe how scholars notionally com-
municate. It may happen that their understanding of the terms in question do 
not match, but they can make up for this by providing respective definitions. 
What we are doing here, then, is to translate the individual and idiosyncratic 
into words (into abstract notions), i.e. into a shared linguistic system of com-
munication. Here we have to mention another key word in Newman’s “system,” 
namely the word “realize.” In notional assents we readily assent to contents 
we do not realize. In his Parochial and Plain Sermons, Newman describes this 
situation as follows: “When we are told a thing, we assent to it, we do not doubt 
it, but we do not feel it to be true, we do not understand it as a fact which 
must take up a position or station in our thoughts, and must be acted from and 
acted towards, must be dealt with as existing: that is, we do not realize it.”34 
In notional assents, we express many lofty words, but “we do not in any good 
measure realize them.”35 We need to see the reality behind the notions, we 
need to gradually gain knowledge of ourselves and the world until we realize, 
that is, until “we shall give up shadows and find the substance.”36
Obviously it is difficult to grasp what is meant here and put it into a compre-
hensible definition, for realization will mean something different in each par-
ticular case. Our real assent is always personal in terms of its intensity and of 
its time. The process of growing is of utmost importance for Newman. It must 
also be stressed that the word “personal” should not be taken to be synonymous 
with the word “private.” If our understanding of a religious matter is personal, 
this does not mean that everybody can have their own private judgement on 
religion. Such an outcome would mean that, in fact, religious truth is relative. 
No, the personal means here that I have to make religious truth my own, and 
as such it must always be adjusted to my individual life, not in the sense that 
I tailor it to my life, but that I shape my life according to this truth; such is the 
ultimate meaning of realization. And this is what, in Newman, can be called 
subjectivity, as distinct from subjectivism. In other words, the general religious 
tenets should be apprehended in an individual manner in a concrete person.
 34 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987, 1236.
 35 Ibid., 1238.









Accidents happen to us according to general laws, but why they happen 
to this or that person is a mystery. Individual accidents fall within a scheme 
of contingency we do not understand. Therefore, the same contents may be 
attached with different images because we have different backgrounds and 
upbringing, the individual circumstances of our lives. Hence, “the image in 
the mind, with the experiences out of which it is formed, would be a personal 
result […] would in each case be so idiosyncratic in its circumstances, that it 
would stand by itself, a special formation, unconnected with any law; though 
at the same time it would necessarily be a principle of sympathy and a bond of 
intercourse between those whose minds had been thus variously wrought into 
a common assent […].”37 Newman is all the time referring to the fact that, in 
the process of knowing, we use ourselves as we are, while the universal logical 
rules are only a part (oftentimes not so decisive) in our personal endowment. 
At the same time, general schemes are always inadequate instruments to ren-
der precisely what is concrete and individual.
Real assents, inasmuch as they are individual and unique, can bring about 
a common understanding. By way of illustration, we may be attracted by the 
same view, i.e. a splendid waterfall, and yet in each case the experience is 
unique. The beauty of the water cascading down a rock is reflected in a hun-
dred mirrors. And the sight of this waterfall is much stronger than a mere liter-
ary description of the same event read by a hundred people. Descriptions are 
abstractions, and “an abstraction can be made at will, and may be the work of 
a moment; but the moral experiences which perpetuate themselves in images, 
must be sought after in order to be found, and encouraged and cultivated in 
order to be appropriated.”38 The teaching of the New Testament is told in sto-
ries appealing to listeners. The Samaritan took the wounded traveller, put him 
on his donkey, then carried him to an inn, and eventually paid for his recovery. 
All the listeners present could imagine the whole situation. This is an excellent 
example of a moving story turned into a moral lesson that appealed to the 
imagination of the listeners.
Real assent, also called belief, can affect our conduct, although it does not 
lead to action directly. Newman calls it “an intellectual act” whose “object is 
presented […] by the imagination” and, as such, can stimulate “those powers 
of the mind from which action proceeds.”39 Not abstractions or hasty gener-
alizations, but real assents or beliefs have the means to stimulate the mind to 
action. Real assent or belief lives in images. It is the power of the concrete that 
 37 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 85.
 38 Ibid.
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appeals to us. The concrete allows for no hesitation, i.e. this concrete suffering 
human being is in need of help. Belief is like presence, for faith is enlivened by 
presence, faith lives and feeds on presence. In real assent, we need to appre-
hend the things believed (apprehension is presupposed), unlike in notional 
assent or inference. In the latter case, we are dealing with mere surfaces or 
aspects. In inference, for instance, we simply proceed from premises to con-
clusions and it suffices to satisfy the formal requirements for an inference to 
occur. We proceed from premises to conclusion by virtue of the inherent logi-
cal procedure of the inference.
The question of what is real would be of particular interest to scholars of 
the phenomenology of religion, a phenomenology of religious belief. I mean 
in particular this special, peculiar relationship between a proposition and real 
assent. What makes us really assent to a proposition? Is it in the proposition, 
in its formulation, in the recipient of the proposition or in the utterer of the 
proposition? And, of course, real assent to a religious proposition is entirely 
different than other propositions, for instance a mathematical proposition. Let 
us assume that someone tells us that, in a right- angled triangle, the square of 
the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the two squared legs. The fact of assent 
depends to a large extent on the recipient of this message. Usually, there is a 
sort of tension between the proposition and the recipient. Here are the basic 
conditions for assenting. (1) Let us assume further that I have some general 
knowledge of mathematics and am acquainted with its basic principles, espe-
cially such basic formulae as the Pythagorean theorem. I was a diligent student 
in college and have a good memory. Therefore, I can simply assent to the truth 
of this proposition. (2) I am totally ignorant in mathematics, yet at the same 
time I know that the statement comes from someone who is a well- known 
mathematician, someone who is knowledgeable about its theorems. In the 
latter case, I can assent to the theorem on trust, on the grounds of someone’s 
authority. (3) Now let us consider yet another case. This time I meet someone 
within the premises of an institute. In our example, this may be an Institute of 
Mathematics. Therefore, it is the authority of the institution that impels me to 
assent to the given formula.
Now, which of the above conditions is used in the case of a dogma? The 
situation is more or less similar to the second and third examples. In other 
words, its truth is guaranteed by the authority of the person and the Church. 
In the case of mathematics, I may feel encouraged to assent by the authority 
of a specialist or the authority of an institution. When a dogma is at stake, it is 
the testimony of a believer and the authority of the Church that provide sup-
port. What is originally only felt by many believers as true is later translated 
into a dogmatic form. Obviously, in the case of religious truths we take into 
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consideration not only their theoretical wording, but also we look at the lives 
of those who live them. It follows from the above examples of assent that— as 
Gilson rightly observed— “real assent does not automatically follow from valid 
notional inference” and this statement “opens a wide and fruitful field to phe-
nomenological investigation.”40
The big question that arises in this context is how to turn theoretical prin-
ciples into living guidelines in individual human beings. In the case of math-
ematics, we are ready to trust someone who is familiar with mathematics; in 
the case of a religious truth in a dogmatic form we have the authority of the 
holy men and the authority of the Church. Of course, there is yet another step 
that we have to take. And this is something in which Newman is fundamentally 
interested. Obviously, the acceptance of the Pythagorean formula may have lit-
tle significance to our real life, whereas the acceptance of certain moral truths 
is vitally important for us.
In example (1) it is the sheer logic of the proposition that appeals to us. We 
do not need to refer to other sources. It is enough to understand the catego-
ries in question in order to assent to a proposition. Rationalism follows this 
narrow path. The point is to reduce all the formulae to their most simple con-
structions, so that their inherent clarity impels us to assent to them. Dogmas 
have their history, living human principles have their personal circumstances. 
Therefore, it would be far too little to reduce their force of impact to only 
their theoretical formulations. More often than not they even lack formula-
tions. The main reason for Newman’s opposition was that rationalism, espe-
cially narrow rationalism, relies entirely on the speculative products of the 
immanent self. In this personal quest, when intellectual prowess is the only 
criterion for investigation, the ultimate outcome is most uncertain. Lost in the 
intricate interplay of premises, the individual may arrive at any solution, but 
hardly at the truth.
Thus, we apprehend propositions in two ways: notional and real. 
Newman says that real apprehension is closer to assent: “Now assent to a 
real proposition is assent to an imagination, and an imagination, as supply-
ing objects to our emotional and moral nature, is adapted to a principle of 
action […].”41
 40 E. Gilson, Introduction, in: Grammar, 20– 21.
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6 Theoretical Knowledge and Action
Newman discussed this issue at length in his Discussions and Arguments on 
Various Subjects, in which he argued that being enlightened by bookish knowl-
edge does not suffice for moral improvement. A mere theoretical acquaintance 
with various subjects on ethics does not create an ethical man. Contrary to 
the positions held by ethical intellectualism, whose source— as we know— is 
traditionally attributed to Socrates, and the enlightened views of the French 
philosophes, Newman disavows a mere notional apprehension as sufficing for 
human edification, let alone sufficing for moral action.
Let us observe that such rationalistic views fit well into the picture of a dis-
enchanted world, a world of free choice based on the hypertrophy of the intel-
lect and the atrophy of morality. In this deistic and naturalistic milieu there is 
no need for any personal conversion or transformation, any personal effort at 
obedience, let alone liberation from sin. Sin does not exist in the rationalistic 
vision of the world; there are only errors in reasoning, which can be reme-
died by the employment of the appropriate method. The human being is for-
mally prepared to think for himself and absolutely free to choose whatever 
values come in handy. Education is all we need in order to learn about our 
whereabouts.
The Cardinal summarizes their arguments as follows: “Education is the cul-
tivation of the intellect and heart, and Useful Knowledge is the great instru-
ment of education. It is the parent of virtue, the nurse of religion; it exalts 
man to his highest perfection, and is the sufficient scope of his most earnest 
exertions.
Physical and moral science rouses, transports, exalts, enlarges, tranquilizes, 
and satisfies the mind. Its attractiveness obtains a hold over us; the excitement 
attending it supersedes grosser excitements; it makes us know our duty, and 
thereby enables us to do it; by taking the mind off itself, it destroys anxiety; and 
by providing objects of admiration, it soothes and subdues us.
And, in addition, it is a kind of neutral ground, on which men of every shade 
of politics and religion may meet together, disabuse each other of their prej-
udices, form intimacies, and secure co- operation.”42 The ironic overtones are 
evident here, and the quote perfectly recapitulates the secularized and deistic 
heritage of the Enlightenment.
 42 J. H. Newman, Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects, London: Longmans, Green, 





The description of the “brave new world” reads like a joyful message concern-
ing the person’s puzzle. If the knowledge of our duty suffices in order to be dutiful, 
everything else becomes redundant. Knowledge induces us to fulfil our duties. 
Apparently, Descartes’ dream, i.e. the right method, has thus become a reality. 
Theoretical knowledge elevates us. Indeed, the prospect that is unfolding before 
our eyes resembles a situation in which a man placed amid a collection of books 
becomes enlightened by the very presence of this noble company. Newman’s crit-
ical remarks were actually a reaction to Sir Robert Peel’s43 address on the opening 
of a reading room at Tamworth in 1841. Newman’s critical edge is primarily aimed 
at Peel’s enlightened thesis that, while becoming wiser, we are automatically 
becoming better. One thing is obviously presupposed in the description above, 
namely that the human self is a theoretical construction that is ruled by some 
external, common, universal, and intelligible rules; and in the case of disobedi-
ence and unruly behaviour, only sufficient knowledge is wanting. And these rules 
exhaust whatever we need to know in order to understand the human person. 
Therefore, the key to learn the self is outside, not inside. Both Newman and Stein 
held contrary views. It is true that there are certain aspects of the self that can be 
viewed from outside, analyzed and expressed in some general terms, otherwise 
we would not be able to say anything sensible about the person at all, but such 
knowledge is never exhaustive and can never aspire to a complete view of the 
person.
In such desperately foreshortened beliefs not only is knowledge the key to 
understanding the person, to know his or her duties, but it also becomes the 
safeguard of social peace. Religion is definitely deprived of its supernatural 
dimension, unless it provides some practical rules for the sustenance of social 
decorum. Useful Knowledge is its nurse. We can understand that the rational-
ist needs religion as a kind of embellishment. If it fails to play this role, it may 
be abandoned. After all, what is religion for, if knowledge is designed to cater 
for all social needs? Indeed, in the enlightened perspective religion becomes 
co- equal with knowledge, and the latter is sufficient for moral improvement. 
Human nature has no need of conversion, it suffices to acquire respective 
knowledge. The latter secures cooperation, forms intimacies, and eliminates 
prejudices. Newman rightly observes that “to know is one thing, to do is 
another; the two things are altogether distinct […]” and “the consciousness of a 
 43 Robert Peel (1788– 1850), British prime minister in the years 1834– 1835 and 1841– 1846; in 
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duty is not all one with the performance of it.”44 Autonomy furnished by mere 
theoretical knowledge is insufficient.
Providing different theoretical contents in the form of education will not 
automatically bring about any practical changes in human conduct, because 
“the human mind is at best in a very unformed or disordered state; passions and 
conscience, likings and reason, conflicting,— might rising against right, with the 
prospect of things getting worse.”45 This is what I shall later call chaos; therefore, 
the first step is to examine one’s own self and its circumstances. We may call this 
introspection or diagnosis of the individual situation. What is significant is inward 
change, not a change of external objects, “the mere lulling of the passions to rest 
by turning the course of thought; not a change of character, but a mere removal of 
temptation.”46 One should not wonder at this proposal by the utilitarians, if their 
major belief is that true excellence comes from without, not from within. Now 
that we are living in a culture of advertisements, this “philosophy of expedients”47 
has become even more popular. Once the criteria of good and bad are removed, 
and each lifestyle finds its proponents, all obstacles must be removed from its 
path. There is a remedy for every problem.
7 Examples as the Sources of Proper Conduct
In addition, Newman argues that mere theoretical knowledge, notional appre-
hension, is incapable of changing man. Expedients are no good here; we need 
to renovate the heart and the will. In our education, we should begin with 
faith, conscience, and practice. We need common sense and practical experi-
ence. We must approve of differences, because differences are the backbone of 
Christianity, i.e. of faith, but they are subject to judgements. Differences mean 
to learn to be judgemental. Contrary to the modern trend towards uniformity, 
man must learn to evaluate. Since we cannot prove every single aspect of our 
daily lives, since our knowledge is imperfect, we must begin with faith. And 
faith also means reliance on someone else’s words or examples. Examples 
appeal to the imagination. There is no power in deduction; we must reach the 
heart, and the heart is reached “through the imagination, by means of direct 
impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, the description. 
 44 J. H. Newman, Discussions and Arguments, 262.
 45 Ibid., 263.
 46 Ibid., 264.











Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us.”48 And 
Newman repeats his ever recurrent argument, namely that it is not enough to 
know something, we must be certain of it, we must realize it. It must not be 
“a thing which is, but which we are ‘certain about’ […],” people must “realiz[e] 
their high maxims in the concrete.”49 We can be indifferent to what we know; 
we must be touched by it from within in order to be moved. We must realize 
what we are certain of.
Newman ridicules what he calls “a religion of inferences,” for “man is not a 
reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal. He is 
influenced by what is direct and precise.”50 This does not mean that the author 
of these words is against reason. He is simply saying that mere intellectual argu-
mentation is insufficient in dealing with such a complex being as the human 
person. Moreover, we find here the same affective element that is consistent 
with Edith Stein’s writing. As her commentator writes, “The center of the indi-
vidual […] lies in the personal layer, the home of the personal care, the will, 
and our affective life.”51 Therefore, each person is so complex and no external 
observer can help him, if he does not make efforts to retrieve all the discordant 
elements of his very being. More often than not, there is no evidence on which 
to proceed. In his action he cannot start with proof, rather he must act on faith. 
We should rather rely on images that come from impressions, and these can be 
drawn from commitment. If we insist on proofs, we shall be doomed to reason-
ing ad infinitum, whereas we are called to act and “to act you must assume, and 
that assumption is faith.”52
In line with the new (romantic) spirit of the age, Newman focuses on 
the concrete, on images that lead to action. Faith is the first principle of our 
action, something self- evident that the author is not going to demonstrate. 
We read: “Why we are so constituted that Faith, not Knowledge or Argument, 
is our principle of action, is a question with which I have nothing to do; but 
I think it is a fact, and if it be such, we must resign ourselves to it as best we 
may, unless we take refuge in the intolerable paradox, that the mass of men are 
created for nothing, and are meant to leave life as they entered it. So well has 
this practically been understood in all ages of the world, that no Religion has 
yet been a Religion of physics or of philosophy. It has ever been synonymous 
with Revelation. It never has been a deduction from what we know: it has ever 
 48 Ibid., 293, 304.
 49 Ibid., 293.
 50 Ibid., 294, 295.
 51 S. Borden, Edith Stein, 41.
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been an assertion of what we are to believe. It has never lived in a conclu-
sion; it has ever been a message, or a history, or a vision. No legislator or priest 
ever dreamed of educating our moral nature by science or by argument.”53 
Examples help us emulate others by giving images and by stirring emotions. 
As the British writer and playwright William Somerset Maugham (1874 – 1965) 
astutely observed, “emotion speaks a language that all may understand.”54
This is indeed a very profound recapitulation of Newman’s main message. 
We should rely on instances and patterns, on examples and testimonies. 
Christianity is a supernatural history, it is almost scenic— as Newman puts it 
beautifully— in order to appeal to human imagination, in order to touch the 
human being in all the dimensions of his being. Interestingly enough, Newman 
is also referring to the dissenters— those Protestants who would not join the 
Anglican Church. Those radical believers left Britain and set sail for the New 
World, i.e. America. He rightly observes that dissenting teaching was dissipated 
because it was based on the speculations of logic rather than on the dogma-
tism of faith. If there is no centre, no common point, speculations diverge in 
various directions. They succumb to the centrifugal forces of various centres of 
attraction. Speculations that have no unifying centre— like the dogmas of the 
faith— are propagated away in their independent circles and revolve around 
some temporary forces of attraction. Such transitory centres are, again, short- 
lived because they are ruled by the same principles of speculation. Newman 
sets the instruction of the Church in opposition to this pathetic outcome, 
because this instruction, “with all its defects and mistakes, comes to some end, 
for it started from some beginning.”55
8 The Power of the Particular
Science, as it is, does not lead to religion, although in some particular cases 
it may. This, however, does not come from the nature of science, but from 
the nature of a concrete human being whose mind is of a religious turn. 
Henceforth, the science of nature may lead to religion just as much as to athe-
ism. A speculation is ruled by its inherent cohesion of antecedents and conse-
quents, and, as such, can serve any kind of argumentation, for its only criterion 
is exactitude.
 53 Ibid., 296.
 54 S. Maugham, The Moon and Sixpence, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963, 6.









If we consider a dogma, it can be assented to, and appropriated as a reality 
“by the religious imagination; it is held as a truth, by the theological intellect,”56 
for theology is primarily occupied with notions. What we need for action is 
not a mere notional knowledge, but imaginative apprehension. We have a 
representation of things which is true, but not adequate. We learn about the 
existence of things that leave impressions on us “by instinct.”57 In this instinc-
tive manner, the existence of physical objects is brought home to us. We learn 
about the Creator through the sense of moral obligation. It is from our mental 
phenomena that we deduce the existence of the external world. And from the 
experience of moral obligation we deduce the existence of some first principle, 
and this first principle is, for Newman, the fact “that we have by nature a con-
science”58 with its attendant judgments of approbation or blame. And here is 
the room “for the real apprehension of a Divine Sovereign and Judge.”59
Newman outlines his position in the Grammar of Assent when he attempts 
to define the difference between theology and religion; in other words, between 
notional and real assent. We read the following: “Religion has to do with the 
real, and the real is the particular; theology has to do with what is notional, 
and the notional is the general and systematic. Hence theology has to do with 
the dogma of the Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but 
religion has to do with each of those separate propositions which compose it, 
and lives and thrives in the composition of them. In them it finds the motives 
for devotions and faithful obedience; while theology on the other hand forms 
and protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not merely one 
by one, but as a system of truth.”60
Behind propositions there must be enlivening principles, and it is to 
these principles that the believer should assent. Newman decided to quit 
the Anglican Church when he realized that “she had no life.”61 Theology can 
help us attain a scientific knowledge of the Christian faith, for in theology we 
acquire notions, “but religion is both personal and real, and, unless we content 
ourselves with a vague religious sentiment, the only way to restore Christianity 
 56 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 93.
 57 Ibid., 96.
 58 Ibid., 98.
 59 Ibid.
 60 Ibid., 122.
 61 Edith Stein, in her remarks on civilization, also notes that “it owes its existence” to indi-
vidual people and their authentic response to values. When we say that civilization 
“withers away,” we mean that it is individual people who have betrayed “the souls upon 
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in the hearts and minds of men is to teach them how to assent to dogmas as to 
so many real and particular objects.”62 Rather than to propositions, we assent 
to realities, to images, to people.
The question now is obviously whether we have this religious imagination 
as our natural endowment or whether we can develop it. Religious imagina-
tion makes one capable of grasping theological truths and keep them alive in 
the novelty of individual expression “by habits of personal religion.”63 In other 
words, when we practice religion. There is no immediate relationship between 
religious imagination or the vivid apprehension of supernatural objects 
and theoretical knowledge; that is why absorbing a considerable amount of 
knowledge does not necessarily bring about an experience. On the contrary, 
theoretical speculation may blunt its sharpness, as reflection often does. The 
same proposition which is expressive of a religious truth may serve two pur-
poses: notional and real. Theology, being a theoretical knowledge, “deals with 
notional apprehension; religion with imaginative.”64 Hence, there is no con-
tradiction between a dogma and personal belief, even though the rationalists 
claimed there is, because the real apprehension is in the recipient, not in the 
proposition. A dogma is only a mediatory stage that proceeds to a vivid grasp 
of the reality hidden behind the notion. We have no other way but to use prop-
ositions in our intellectual intercourse. Otherwise, we would not be able to 
communicate at all. And, contrary to those who might argue that Newman 
was an anti- intellectualist, let us put it bluntly “that in religion the imagination 
and affections should always be under the control of reason.”65 Indeed, this 
is the Anselmian fides querens intellectum. I may admire the lofty and awe- 
inspiring ceilings of cathedrals with the most solemn and rapturous words, 
but emotional reaction does not contradict the marble solidity of the columns 
upon which the ceilings rest. The intricate shapes of the Baroque style must 
be supported by solid frames. Religion and theology go hand in hand. In other 
words, we could say that those people who claim that they would accept reli-
gion without its institutional garb are naïve.
It is interesting to note that, after so many appreciative words written on 
behalf of the imagination and its importance for real apprehension, Newman 
should protect reason. He does this to the extent that he writes that imagina-
tive or emotional sentiment falls “back upon the intellect for its stay, when 
sense cannot be called into exercise; and it is in this way that devotion falls 
 62 E. Gilson, Introduction, in: J. H. Newman, Grammar, 19.
 63 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 106.
 64 Ibid., 108.










back upon dogma.”66 The lofty rib- vault ceiling or fan vaulting are our senti-
ments, and the dogma is the pillar. Or, to take another example, let us consider 
late medieval altarpieces. For the onlooker, they present a complicated net-
work of geometrical figures, facial grimaces and bodily postures expressive of 
emotions (e.g. the Veit Stoss altarpiece in Kraków, Poland). They seem to be 
hanging in the air and living an independent existence, yet their sculptor has 
pinned them down to their background of larch wood. We have long noticed 
that Newman uses the words “intellect” and “reason” alternately. In some con-
texts he treats them synonymously, in others as being different.
Before proceeding further, I would like to turn the reader’s attention to a 
linguistic example which I myself find especially illuminating. This time I shall 
have to refer to another language. The word “assent” in the Polish language is 
translated as “przyświadczenie.” This word is, in fact, composed of two com-
ponents: “przy” (at) and “świadczenie” (testimony). Because these two compo-
nents are, in themselves, meaningful, let us separate them and write it with a 
separating hyphen, i.e. “przy- świadczenie,” and define real assent as “being at 
something in order to testify to it.” Such a definition, I am convinced, renders 
exactly the meaning of real assent. If we really assent to something, we are 
ready to testify to it, since we are drawn to it; the intellect and emotions are 
united in one action. And here is the power of the particular, the enticing force 
of an edifying example, of a history, of a message, for they encourage their wit-
nesses to imitate them. And their force surpasses that of arguments.
9 Assent versus Inference
As we have said, assent is unconditional and inference is conditional. This dis-
tinction is of the utmost interest, for inference, being conditional, precedes 
assent, which is unconditional. How come that something that is conditional 
can precede that which is unconditional? If we wish to carry out a logical proof 
of Newman’s exposition, we shall easily understand it, and the reasoning may 
run as follows: assent is not the last moment in a series of inferential steps, 
hence it does not automatically result from a string of antecedents and con-
sequents, but is the agent’s own decision, or— to repeat Newman’s phrase— 
is the personal result. Ultimately, it is the person who decides, not the logi-
cal processes. Inference is a conditional proposition in which, on the basis of 
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of implication: if p, then q, which in logical notation is written as p > q. If p 
occurs, then q takes place; if it rains, I’ll take an umbrella. Inference is condi-
tional, because the certainty of the conclusion is measured by the certainty 
of the premise.67 Newman makes a definite distinction between inferences 
and assents. Inference, being conditional, allows for degrees; assent, being 
unconditional, does not allow for degrees. We have already mentioned that, 
for Newman, there is no gradation in assent. If assent had degrees, it could 
only ratify demonstration or induction. And if that were the case, one would 
be permitted to assent only to such propositions which had strong evidential 
proof attendant on them, i.e. based either on rationalistic grounds (some self- 
evident truths) or intuition. Let me put it this way: if there is no gradation 
in assent, and assent is distinct from inference, then it could be metaphori-
cally understood as a picture of the person at the moment of decision. At the 
moment of assent the person reveals what he is; it is like a momentary reflec-
tion in a mirror, but, of course, preceded by the personal history of maturation.
When man is acquainted with a particular area, his imagination opens up to 
cover what cannot be demonstrated. Thus, we can speak about mathematical, 
physical or poetic imagination. Naturally, we are not expected to be specialists 
in mathematics, physics or poetry, unless we have long been acquainted with 
the areas in question. No- one is expected to predict what happens when mer-
cury is immersed in water if they do not have respective knowledge. What is 
interesting to note in this context is the fact that familiarity with some areas 
expand our imagination. Inasmuch as mathematics and physics can be treated 
as areas fairly limited to some groups of people, and no- one feels guilty if he 
cannot answer questions which pertain to these areas, the situation is entirely 
different when they concern what commonly belongs to all. And such is the 
case with moral and religious matters. One element, however, is common to, 
say, physics and morality. In both of them, one needs practice, but of a differ-
ent kind. Generally, we are not expected to have a specialized knowledge in 
mathematics or physics unless we are employed as mathematicians or phys-
icists. We lack the respective keenness of the ratiocinative faculty. But, con-
versely, we are expected to know what is good or bad conduct with our fellow 
citizens in daily matters.
An interesting example is presented by Jacques Hadamard (1865– 1963), a 
French mathematician and psychologist, in his book An Essay on the Psychology 
of Invention in the Mathematical Field. He refers to a report on Friedrich Gauss’s 





experience that was mentioned in a Poincaré’s68 lecture. This German “prince 
of mathematicians,” as Gauss (1777 – 1855) is commonly called, had unsuc-
cessfully been trying to prove an arithmetical theorem. Seeing all his efforts 
in vain, the mathematician abandoned his ventures. Then, as Gauss himself 
reports, “two days ago, I succeeded, not on account of my painful efforts, but 
by the grace of God. Like a sudden flash of lightning, the riddle happened to be 
solved. I myself cannot say what was the conducting thread which connected 
what I previously knew with what made my success possible.”69 I think Gauss’s 
example excellently shows what Newman meant, namely that the human 
mind always thinks in its own way. Owing to his long acquaintance with the 
subject, the German mathematician found a solution at the level of his tacit 
ratiocination. It is not the brain alone, empowered by logical structures, that 
thinks, but the person. And assent, indeed, was not the last stage of inference. 
There was rather a gap between the last antecedent and the final conclusion. 
This is what happens to a mind immersed in a concrete reality— it acquires the 
ability for a special kind of intuition, the elements of which have no explicit 
form, of supra- logical judgement, of unperceived impressions. In other words, 
the mind is drawn into a silent dialogue— if I may express it metaphorically— 
the ingredients of which unfold to the degree to which it is engaged, being 
found rather than constructed. These points will be dealt with further on.
Gauss’s example exemplifies not only mathematical minds in which “the 
truth flashes at once […] and [they] see the truth all of a heap, by one act.”70 
In like manner, we think in our own individual way, therefore it is difficult to 
establish one measure between two minds. The reason why person A views a 
fact in his own way depends on how he looks at it. Newman identifies reason-
ing with intuition. He is even willing to relate intuition to our internal acts, 
to relate it “to our own operations.”71 In this sense, Newman follows Dugald 
Stewart rather than Locke. What Newman is driving at is the kind of unity that 
is unmediated. I grasp something with one act instead of being divided into a 
string of reflections: I think A and reflect on the one who thinks A. Now, if we 
recall again the example of Gauss, we may come to a similar conclusion. The 
solution appeared as a flash in Gauss’s intellect, but it was preceded by an ardu-
ous process of ratiocination. It is an open question and, apparently, impossible 
 68 Jules Henri Poincaré (1854– 1812), French mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher of 
science.
 69 See J. Hadamard, An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, 
New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1954, 26.
 70 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 73, 75.
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to answer: what is the relationship between the process and the flash? Is there 
any causality? The only thing we know is that the process was prior to the flash. 
We may, certainly, claim that the flash was caused by the process but we would 
not be able to demonstrate this. As I repeat here and elsewhere, we have these 
two elements at work: intuition and process (reflection). Intuition seems to be 
safer and more reliable (depending on the intellectual and moral character).
In abstract matters, it is easier to imagine conclusions that must be uncon-
ditionally accepted, but in concrete matters we are dealing with probabilities. 
If I am going to sign a business contract with person X, I can never be a hun-
dred percent certain that X will agree, or that he interprets the conditions of 
the contract in the same way as I do, let alone his future conduct.
Locke’s view of what is rational is limited to inference, in which the tran-
sition from premises is strictly guided and controlled by reason. Let us note 
in passing that this approach is typical of enlightened modernity, i.e. to have 
everything under control, to be the master and author of one’s life. This guid-
ance and control is, in fact, reduced to a mechanical process in which the con-
clusion is implied by self- evident premises. Thus, inference is an event within 
an immanent logic, and there is no effort on the part of the acting agent. 
Newman criticizes Locke in that he approves of absolute assent only when 
premises inevitably lead to an infallible conclusion, and he calls someone who 
would accept something that has no such grounds an enthusiast, but on the 
other hand he allows a conclusion which rises to the degree of assurance on 
the basis of probabilities near to certitude. Whatever is added to the conclu-
sion on the part of the agent that rises above evidence is called surplusage.
Leaving the details aside, let it suffice to pinpoint the main difference 
between the rationalist- empiricist approach and Newman’s personalist 
approach. For Newman, the human person is not determined by the prem-
ises in his assent, principally because— as we have said— assent is distinct 
from inference. It must be separate from the latter if it is not to be merely a 
superfluous act. For if the person is called upon to assent to something, there 
must be— and I think we feel it— a kind of effort on the part of the agent, oth-
erwise agreement comes automatically from the mere sequence of premises. 
Moreover, as we have said before, we often give assent to opinions and views 
that become the furniture of our minds. Such activity is frequently devoid of 
any reflection; they are “self- sustained in our minds, and have been so for long 
years; they are in no sense conclusions; they imply no process of thought.”72 
 72 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 142. 
 
72 Chapter 2
Newman’s basic contribution to our theory of knowledge is his thoroughgoing 
analysis of acquisition.
Contrary to the rationalist- empiricist view, the depository of our minds is 
not composed of clear- cut concepts for which we can always account, thus 
being acquitted of enthusiastic censure, but rather it is a deposit of living 
moments of our lifetime that gradually (and often imperceptibly) accumulate. 
We are not perfect or impartial constructivists of our own minds who reign 
supreme over them and can account for every idea they hold true or are much 
attached to. We may have clung to some concepts and then discarded them 
when new reasons appeared. Newman has observed a certain regularity with 
regard to inference and assent, and if we evaluate his observation in an unbi-
ased manner, we shall admit that he is right. Indeed, we often assent to many 
things before we deign to examine them. Quite frequently, we stick to views 
that are contrary to what we otherwise theoretically hold or practically imple-
ment. And, in practice, inference works differently than assent. As we know, 
inference is composed of premises and conclusions, whereas in daily life we 
assent to propositions, images, persons, and testimonies. Such is our abundant 
inheritance. And, contrary to Locke’s view, the ideas we hold in our minds are 
not all a close- knit network of elements the self can account for. Each time we 
rather contact the person who holds certain ideas. The only thing we can say 
is secretum meum mihi.
If we consider this matter historically, we indeed find examples of philoso-
phers who defended views that contradicted their philosophical positions. And 
I think that this is an evident argument that contradicts Locke’s view, namely 
the fact that we find in our mental repository ideas which are at variance with 
one another. Plato and Aristotle approved of slavery, and Locke himself sup-
ported Britain’s imperial ambitions. Even his Letter Concerning Toleration, that 
was supposed to defend religious freedom, in fact only ossified religious intol-
erance, for he proposed the State Church and the ruler’s denomination as the 
mainstay for social peace, a view that resulted from the rationalist tenets, i.e. 
one ruler and his religion are like the same idea held by all citizens’ minds. It 
took quite a while for Americans to come to grips with racial discrimination 
and slavery. Many a time Christians could be accused of hypocrisy throughout 
their history, and the scribes and Pharisees were called outright hypocrites. 
In our own twentieth- century, Stein’s colleague and Husserl’s disciple, Martin 
Heidegger (1889– 1976), was an ardent proponent of Nazi ideology.
Such being the case with inference versus assent, therefore Newman right-
fully underwent a careful study of the grammar of assent, i.e. how we come 
round to accepting certain truths and how we hold them in our minds. It is not 
so rare a case when the inferential reasons for the recognition of our assent 
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remain, but the assent dies down. We seem to have lost our belief in what can 
still, logically, be defended. Sometimes our convictions change impercepti-
bly, so even we cannot account for this rapid change. In this context, let me 
make a digression that is very supportive of the heroes of my book. In view 
of what I have said so far about the distinction between inference and assent, 
it seems clear that both Newman and Stein had to reformulate their assents. 
They arrived at a turning point in their lives where they had to take an entire 
new direction much to their surprise, and yet in line with their inner calls. 
As new circumstances appear, the reasons for the old arguments remain the 
same, nevertheless we feel obliged to make a new assent. There are frequent 
cases where people loudly profess truths they have never thought of practicing. 
They “may believe without practising.”73 Ratiocination does not always lead to 
a belief. Arguments may be as strong as ever, but they do not secure assent. We 
hold a truth, for we do not find arguments to refute it, or, conversely, we may 
refute a truth, but cannot muster arguments to explain why, or else we come to 
accept it after a long while.
All the time, therefore, we have been talking about a certain inherent incon-
gruity between arguments and minds. There is much more to an argument 
to be assented to than its mere logical cohesion. For Stein, we remember, the 
moment when she might have started to ponder Christianity was the way 
Reinach’s wife reacted to her husband’s untimely death. She demonstrated no 
despondency or despair, yet braved the predicament with composure. Stein 
did not know what it was, or whence this unexpected and dignified peace 
came from.
Even strong arguments may prove futile in inclining our minds to assent to 
them, even though we can find no fault with them from the logical point of 
view. In the area of mathematics, we come across truths that are irrefutable 
for the sake of their self- evidence (as, for instance, in geometry). Nevertheless, 
one can find people who still resist assenting to them, although they cannot 
counter them. In the case of elementary mathematical theorems, the situa-
tion is much simpler, and it usually elicits our prompt assent. Newman sug-
gests, however, “long and intricate mathematical investigations” in which 
“every step […] requires a specially sustained attention and an effort of mem-
ory to have in the mind all at once all the steps of the proof, with their bear-
ings on each other, and the antecedents which they severally involve […].”74 At 
this point we may refer to Gauss’s example. I have been constantly repeating 
 73 Ibid., 142– 143.






Newman’s perception that the nature of assent, unlike as Descartes believed 
it to be, is primarily personal, not logical. I do not want to say thereby that it 
is straightforwardly illogical, but that it calls for some personal logic, a subjec-
tive context, an implicit mode of thinking, not merely its explicit form for its 
explanation.
Let us take another example. We may find some primitive tribes who 
still hold to their own belief, long refuted by modern science. Medieval 
man believed that the Earth was flat and that the stars were quite near. The 
Copernican revolutionary ideas, despite abundant and convincing evidence, 
were long opposed by those who had assented to the view that the Earth was 
in the centre of the universe. Or let us think about the advent of new tech-
nology in farming. The new equipment that appeared undoubtedly facilitated 
the job, but was opposed due to the attachment to manual work. Distinct 
though inference and assent are, it is true that they have something in com-
mon. Arguments in favour of a certain conclusion, which naturally lead to 
the latter, naturally facilitate assent; they do not determine it, but facilitate it. 
Newman himself is in favour of such a view, that there must be some prelimi-
nary reasons for assenting. Therefore, he makes a distinction between appre-
hension and understanding; we can apprehend things we do not understand. 
But assent may be withdrawn despite the fact that the reasons still remain 
and hold water, or may be sustained, as I have already mentioned, when the 
reasons are missing.
And then we arrive at the final definition of assent, which reads that “assent 
is the acceptance of truth, and truth is the proper object of the intellect, and 
no one can hold conditionally what by the same act he holds to be true, here 
too is a reason for saying that assent is an adhesion without reserve or doubt to 
the proposition to which it is given.”75 I think this definition is clear. We hold 
something as true, which does not mean that our belief is infallible, and that 
when new evidence comes the old beliefs may be abandoned. Newman is sim-
ply trying to illustrate the activity of life in which we are performing numerous 
acts of assent, some of them are just passing experiences, others stay longer 
in our minds. Frequently, we do not reflect upon our acts; we behave sponta-
neously, rather than, like in inferences, ponder on the premises. Indeed, we 
adhere “without reserve or doubt” to a given proposition, although, naturally, 
we submit those acts of assent to reflective evaluation. It appears, then, that 
they can either be confirmed, or must be abandoned on a careful analysis; they 
do not hold up to criticism.
 75 Ibid., 145. 
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There are many cases where we do not assent at all. Hence, Newman claims 
that assent, if it does exist, is always unconditional, as I have already said. We 
naturally assent to things which are reasonings, not demonstrative, for our 
nature makes us “think or act [with] the acceptance of truths, not intuitive, 
not demonstrated, yet sovereign.” They “lie outside the narrow range of con-
clusions to which logic, formal or virtual, is tethered; nor has any philosoph-
ical theory the power to force on us a rule which will not work for a day.”76 
Thus, we can daily assent to things which do not follow from intuition or 
demonstration; we naturally take them for granted. We need to distinguish 
between a mental act— the unconditional assent— and a scientific rule, e.g. 
a reflection on the act of assent. Newman is trying to grasp and elaborate on 
what the mind is actually doing when assenting. And he holds that there is 
nothing mediating between the mind and the object of assent. There is only 
a dynamic tension between the person that is supposed to acquire a belief, 
and the belief itself. Therefore, the most important thing is the position of 
the mind towards the proposition, not the relationship between a conclusion 
and its premises. In any case, there are concomitant circumstances atten-
dant on each assent, but these should be distinguished from assent itself. 
When assent is associated with some strong emotions, like love or hatred, we 
express it respectively, but the attendant emotions have nothing to do with 
the alleged degrees of assent.
We assent to propositions differently, which does not mean that there is a 
gradation in assent, but that assent is relative to our preparation. This prepa-
ration may result from external circumstances or concomitant factors of our 
character, e.g. “in the emotions, in the ratiocinative faculty, or in the imagina-
tion.”77 We may, for instance, be prejudiced towards certain things presented 
for our assent. After all, as Newman summarizes his stance on human nature, 
“man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting 
animal. He is influenced by what is direct and precise.”78 Therefore, assenting 
is not merely an intellectual act, and if so, it is an intellectual act of a special 
kind. Even in the case of notional assent, we, living in concrete circumstances, 
are surrounded by a complicated network of sentiments and resentments, lik-
ings and dislikings, so that the outcome can never be taken for granted and 
must at each time be attempted anew.
 76 Ibid., 150.
 77 Ibid., 154.








10 Simple Assents versus Complex Assents
Simple assents are distinct from complex assents, and the force of assent 
depends very much on whether it is impressed upon the imagination or enter-
tained by the intellect. Newman summarizes what he understands by simple 
assent as “the mental assertion of an intelligible proposition, […] an act of the 
intellect direct, absolute, complete in itself, unconditional, arbitrary, yet not 
incompatible with an appeal to argument, and at least in many cases exer-
cised unconsciously.”79 It turns out that many of our assents result from habit, 
from our nature. We agree to proposals because they are conducive to our self. 
Newman is not satisfied with that stage of assenting. Many assents are uncon-
scious because we are ignorant of our selves, i.e. we have not reflected yet on 
what truths we are going to hold. One might say that, for instance, we mechan-
ically agree to numerous things which we find pleasurable. Here, again, the 
ancient principle “know thyself” acts as a precondition for comprehending 
assent. In other words, know yourself if you wish to understand why you assent 
to A rather than B.
Complex or reflex assents are made consciously and deliberately. In com-
plex assent, we reflect upon something we have previously assented to. We 
investigate our assent, trying to prove it. The whole structure that Newman is 
now laying open before our eyes reminds us of Locke’s primary and secondary 
ideas. Inference may lead to an assent and may follow it as a kind of feedback 
upon its truth. There is no incompatibility between assenting and demon-
strating, but there is a distinction between inquiry and investigation. Inquiry 
contradicts assent, for it denotes doubt. We cannot doubt something we are 
assenting to. We may assent to something, which we hold as true, and then 
investigate the grounds of our assent. Eventually, we can reflectively assent 
again to that which we have previously spontaneously assented. Hence, there 
is no inconsistency between assenting to something as being true and trying 
to prove it at the same time. Indeed, when Edith Stein assented to the truth 
of Teresa of Avila’s book, she embarked on investigating it afterwards. Let us 
observe that the first step is assent, although I may not yet know why. Then, 
I take the next step and ponder over what I have read and found myself com-
pelled to assent to.
What is typical of Newman’s exposition here, is his stress on impression and 
image. Firstly, I can see the truth, or I find myself obliged (though I do not 
yet comprehend the cause of my obligation) to assent to it, and then I feel 
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naturally compelled to ask: what is it that has stirred my emotions? I found it 
true. What is the nature of this truth? Why do I feel obliged to pay attention to 
it? It is all the more interesting when we assent to propositions we would have 
not even considered worthy of our slightest attention before. What is in them 
that we find so appealing?
We cannot be, as Newman writes, “believers and inquirers” at the same time, 
we cannot “be both inside and outside of the Church,” and if we are “seek-
ing” we have “not found.”80 This point is interesting in the context of com-
paring Newman with Stein. In a sense, he was in a more complicated situa-
tion because, when he began to doubt that the Anglican Church was the true 
Church, he was an insider and outsider simultaneously. Stein’s position was 
entirely different. She was not a Christian; therefore, she was a radical outsider, 
even more radical for her declaration of disbelief. Perhaps Newman was an 
inquirer when he began to doubt the truth about the Anglican Church. And 
when the truth about the Catholic Church gradually began to dawn on him, he 
turned from an inquirer into an investigator.
I hope that the reader will understand my reservations that I am constantly 
making when positing some conclusions about Newman’s intentions. He him-
self is full of such reservations, knowing that when we are considering some-
thing in theory, i.e. abstractly, focusing on certain aspects, we are always in 
danger of simplifications and generalizations. Such being the case, then it 
is possible that there are people on the borderline in individual cases, both 
inquirers and investigators, as if they were standing on the threshold without 
making any resolution either to enter or to leave. It seems to me that the situa-
tion of being in- between is becoming all too common a case, rather than a rar-
ity. We are living in a world where inconsistency and hesitation have become 
the rule; there are many people who state something one day and deny it 
another. Being non- judgmental has become the rule, for such a position seems 
to satisfy political correctness.
The truth and the conclusion are two aspects of a given proposition. A con-
clusion does not need to be true, and we may try to find the conclusion of 
a true proposition. Newman is constantly reminding us that inference and 
assent are distinct acts, for he proposes a nineteenth- century paradigm aimed 
against its enlightened predecessor; nevertheless, they are not contradictory or 
exclusive, i.e. we may set about inferring a proposition in order to prove it to 
someone who disagrees with us, while at the same time we assent to its truth. 
Thus, inference and assent are two aspects of the same proposition, consistent 
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with each other. Only “inquiry is inconsistent with assent,”81 whereas investi-
gation is a plausible procedure.
The individual is often besieged by incompatibilities and inconsistencies, 
so this is why Newman rightly considers observing the individual in concrete 
circumstances. We may investigate the credibility of a doctrine whose truth 
we assent to, for, in an investigation, there are no doubts as in an inquiry. It 
seems that we need to realize what we have assented to, and realization can be 
carried out through investigation. What is characteristic of belief is “the utter 
absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing” and “a spontaneous 
resolution never to change is inconsistent with the idea of belief; for the very 
force and absoluteness of the act of assent precludes any such resolutions.”82 
In like manner, Newman consistently defends his idea of development and 
evolution, because to live means to change. And we must remember that 
throughout all this Newman does not want to solve a merely theoretical prob-
lem, but is constantly probing into the phenomenon of assent; he is constantly 
wondering what we are actually doing when we are assenting to something. 
We need to revise our first assents; such is the logic of our growth, to examine 
their grounds, since they are very often nothing more than prejudices. A com-
plex assent, i.e. an assent to an assent, becomes a conviction.
11 The Lazarus Case
In order to exemplify once more the distinction between inference and assent 
and to demonstrate that there is no gradation of assent, i.e. we either assent 
to something or we do not, but assent can be stronger or weaker, I propose the 
following illustration. Let us consider the three sentences below:
 1) Lazarus came to work very early today.
 2) Lazarus did not come to work today because he died yesterday.
 3) Lazarus died yesterday, but Jesus visited his home and brought him back 
to life, so he came to work today as usual.
We can assent to all three sentences, but the force of our assent varies accord-
ing to their attendant probabilities; we, at least, apprehend them. Naturally, 
our assent is strongest in sentence (1) because here the antecedent probabil-
ities are the most numerous. We know Lazarus, we know that he is very com-
mitted and conscientious; he likes his job and he usually arrives early. He is 
 81 Ibid.
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a punctual person with a natural sense of duty. Sentence (2) is still probable, 
though subjectively less plausible. We only saw Lazarus yesterday and he was 
in good form. Generally, he is not obese and we have no information of any 
history of crippling or dangerous diseases in his family. He loves sport and has 
healthy eating habits. When we saw him yesterday, he emanated enthusiasm. 
He was full of energy and kept telling us about his future plans. He could not 
help waiting to see them realized. Now, sentence (3) to which we are invited 
to assent, seems least likely. It is true, human beings are mortal, so that— even 
though we know that Lazarus is very fit— we can still accept the message as 
probable, but very unlikely. Therefore, we think it highly incredible, as our gen-
eral knowledge concerning human nature tells us that people die, their other-
wise healthy constitution notwithstanding. The fact, however, that someone 
came to Lazarus and brought him back to life is very improbable. People do 
not rise from the dead after they die. We have not heard of any like events. 
Nevertheless, we can still assent to it, but this assent presupposes our belief in 
Jesus’ power over death, His power restoring other people’s lives.
Let us take other examples that we know so well. I am constantly trying to 
show this specific character of notional apprehension versus real apprehen-
sion. There are numerous mysterious encounters in the New Testament which, 
however, are understood only notionally. Otherwise, they should bewilder us 
rather than create a comfortable acquiescence. It suffices to visualize one such 
scene. A stranger approaches two men casting their nets into the sea. And he 
addresses them thus: “Come, follow me,” and they immediately leave their nets 
and follow him, just like other two who are mending their nets— they leave 
their job and their father at the stranger’s calls and comply with the proposal.83 
Is this not amazing? Should it not be read with one eyebrow raised? They 
might have heard about the stranger. There have been widespread rumours 
about his extraordinary deeds and his outlandish teaching; nevertheless, this 
all seems insufficient for such a radical decision. The moment we assent to it, 
and perhaps whisper in bewilderment “I don’t understand,” this is paradoxi-
cally the moment of real apprehension. In all other cases, we try to rationalize 
and extrapolate some events we know about that particular encounter from 
before the ages. And it is in such cases that we begin to comprehend the differ-
ence between notional and real assent. When one ceases to argue and begins 
to feel, imagine, and see the event, then one is open to accepting the reality. 
In such cases, we can observe the essence of real assent, and that it is distinct 
from notional assent, i.e. from speculation and from inference.
 83 See Mk 1:16– 20. 
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In one of his university sermons, Newman writes: “All is dreary till we 
believe, what our hearts tell us, that we are subjects of His Governance […].”84 
We must bear in mind that Newman understood the term “believe” in a very 
broad sense, not merely reduced to the sphere of religion. For him, believing 
was the fundamental element of our being in the world, our basic attitude in 
knowing the world. Inasmuch as our knowledge is imperfect and our ignorance 
irremediable, we need to take many things for granted, i.e. to believe that they 
are as they present themselves to us. This “belief attitude” is not in the least 
our surrender to some kind of irrational or antirational positions. On the con-
trary, it is merely the result of the sober estimation of our human condition. 
Let us observe in passing that we find this kind of attitude as the anthropo-
logical foundation of the twentieth- century Austrian School of Economics. In 
the writings of one of its prominent representatives, the economist Friedrich 
von Hayek, we read these memorable words: “our whole civilization in con-
sequence rests, and must rest, on our believing much that we cannot know to 
be true in the Cartesian sense.”85 In other words, Hayek, like Newman, pro-
pounds the modification of the enlightened paradigm of human knowledge. 
Let us note that they are both opponents of the authoritarian vision of soci-
ety. If each person is the special centre of his own actions and master of his 
own knowledge, any external attempts at general planning should be regarded 
as unjustified usurpations. Such is the romantic heritage and remodelling of 
seventeenth- century rationalism. The person is a centre in himself, striving to 
gain knowledge, and making use of all his personal endowments. Limited as he 
is, he can still possess certitude.
12 Certitude— the Goal of Personal Effort
There are two conditions with which to prove certitude: a priori— from the 
nature of the case, and a posteriori— from experience. As regards the former, 
certitude results from a reflex act of assent which pronounces that the prop-
osition is “objectively and subjectively true:— then the assent may be called 
a perception,” it “is the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a 
truth, or the consciousness of knowing, as expressed in the phrase, ‘I know that 
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I know’.”86 We arrive at the moment of seeing something, of which mention 
has already been made. I cannot deny what I have seen with my own eyes or 
heard with my own ears. On the other hand, we are all too familiar with the 
not- so- rare experience that the same fact is interpreted in entirely different 
ways. At times, we are even shocked that others baulk at what we take as only 
obvious and natural; they find it hard to understand or believe. There are four 
elements that come to point at certitude: perception; the one who perceives 
(I perceive something to be true); conviction that a proposition is certain; and 
knowledge (I know that it is true).
Newman characterizes the true nature of certitude in the following man-
ner: its characteristic is that we are “confident indeed that that certitude will 
last” and “if it did fail […] [,] the thing itself, whatever it is, of which we are 
certain, will remain just as it is, true and irreversible.”87 Thus, if we shrink away 
from any speculation on the topics we hold as false or even dangerous, it is not 
that we are uncertain about their being false or dangerous, but because we are 
afraid of ourselves lest we should be fooled into accepting them. Therefore, 
it is not a mark of certitude if we hold on to something, but then, when con-
fronted by the opinion of another person, we hesitate and become unsteady 
in our views. One basic feature of certitude is tranquility of the mind and an 
unwillingness to become engaged in controversies, or to be drawn into proving 
that which we hold to be true. People who are certain are reluctant disputants. 
The intellectual anxiety that we may feel, however, is the opposite of certitude. 
If we are really certain, we do not have to assure ourselves by multiplying ever 
newer arguments on behalf of our alleged certitude.
Newman emphasizes the role of the imagination, but in his argumentation 
he seems to assign a greater role to the intellect. The imagination is powerful, 
but the intellect is more reliable. Here is how he beautifully describes it, in 
words worthy of sublime poetry, there are vacillations of someone who has not 
yet reached the stage of certitude: “anxieties and alarms may be merely emo-
tional and from the imagination, not intellectual; parallel to the beating of the 
heart, […] that trembling of the limbs, of even the bravest men, before a battle, 
when standing still to receive the first attack of the enemy […], that palpitating 
self- interrogation, that trouble of the mind lest it should not believe strongly 
enough […].”88 All these symptoms are evident proofs that the individual mind 
has not yet reposed in certitude. Newman calls them “the meteorological phe-
nomena of the mind,” which interfere with certitude because “to be certain of 
 86 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 162, 163.
 87 Ibid., 165.








a truth is to be careless of objections to it […].”89 Such being the nature of our 
certitude, we may legitimately ask whether Newman, at the time when he was 
an Anglican, was certain of the truths he held and which were in contrast to 
his later views. One explanation that can be proposed would read as follows: it 
was a time of assenting, not yet of certitude, and we know that assent is dis-
tinct from certitude. Thus, the fact that Newman joined the Oxford Movement 
is the best proof that he had not found certitude yet, the many truths he kept 
assenting to notwithstanding.
Certitude is different from assent, as we have noted. It is more like a reflec-
tion on assent, or a complex assent, a series of assents. Like in a mathematical 
series, we come closer and closer to the ultimate conclusion, a conclusion that 
is unlike the conclusion in inference. In certitude, not only do we assent to 
something, but we are aware of ourselves as assenting. Apart from tranquility, 
of which mention has already been made, there are other symptoms of certi-
tude, such as “a feeling of satisfaction and self- gratulation, of intellectual secu-
rity […], a sense of success, attainment, possession, finality”; it is “united to a 
sentiment sui generis in which it lives and is manifested.”90 Therefore, certitude 
is not spontaneous, on the spur of the moment; rather, it is an arduous process 
of going somewhere, travelling to an unknown harbour. Through a tangle of 
successive assents followed by reflections, I eventually reach my goal. We have 
this double meaning in certitude, i.e. reaching something and the awareness 
of having reached it. I arrive at a goal and feel satisfaction from having arrived. 
In other words, I have not reached the truth until I feel satisfaction, but satis-
faction in the form of intellectual security is entirely distinct from the truth. 
I do not seek the truth in order to feel satisfaction, for the latter is attendant 
on my having arrived at the truth. We can see, therefore, in certitude both the 
intellectual and emotional moments. This conclusion is important, especially 
when we consider Edith Stein and her concept of empathy. For the Carmelite 
saint, our intellectual life depends on how we respond to values. Therefore, as 
Sarah Borden notes, “It is not our thoughts which reveal most intimately our 
person, but our affective life.”91 This is an excellent recapitulation of Newman’s 
heritage in Stein’s doctrine, or at least could be understood as such. And I have 
already alluded here to the importance of the affective side of our personhood 
as being a strong theme both in Newman and Stein. The person unites the 
mental and sensate levels in his cognitive relationship with the world.
 89 Ibid., 168.
 90 Ibid.
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And here is the difference between certitude and mere knowledge. Certitude 
is “the repose in self and in its object,” it is “the consciousness of having that 
knowledge.”92 In other words, I am certain of something, and I know that it is I 
who am certain of it. For Newman, then, the subject is present in the moment 
of knowledge; certitude is not an external relationship and correspondence 
between the object and the subject. It is not a theoretical distance from the 
object under consideration, but rather a commitment to what I am certain of. 
In the classical philosophy of Thomism, the proper object of the intellect is to 
know the truth, and Newman goes further: the second element is the sense of 
possession. I perceive the truth and this truth becomes mine; I can see the truth 
and I am in the truth. This is like being embraced by the object of knowledge. 
It is interesting to note that Newman also uses such terms as “a half- assent,” 
“a faint and languid assent,” phrases which seem contradictory to his claim as 
to the unconditional character of assent. We must remember, however, that 
when we call something “a half- assent” we mean the circumstances of a given 
assent rather than its nature. It is the specific condition of the knower, not the 
object.
There is yet another issue that calls for a commentary. One may wonder 
what is the difference between the acquisition of ideas in Locke’s empiricism 
and Newman. Locke argued that man could furnish his mind only with such 
ideas that he can account for, i.e. the ideas that can be elicited from inferences. 
And because indubitable premises lead to certain conclusions, the rational 
man must be aware of what he allows to enter the composition of his mind. 
In both Locke and Newman we are masters of our mental possessions. The 
main difference between the two British scholars we find in the nature of our 
acquisition. In Locke, the appeal is made to some universal logic, whereas in 
Newman we refer to a personal acquisition. Therefore, if, for Locke, those who 
hold something they cannot prove are censored as enthusiasts deprived of tol-
eration, for Newman, they are governed by their personal logic, the logic of 
the heart in which the acquisition is more subtle and hidden, and therefore 
hard to expose. To sum up, there is this experience of possession in Locke and 
in Newman, but there is a marked difference when the mind is considered to 
be a universal construction or a personal centre. In Newman, the person not 
only possesses the truth, but is also possessed by it, or in fact primarily pos-
sessed by it.
The main point of Newman’s analysis of certitude was that it is a natural 
state of mind. At times, he seems to be inconsequent in his claim that certitude 
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is distinct from assent. In the Grammar of Assent we read: “That Certitude is 
a natural and normal state of mind, and not (as sometimes objected) one of 
its extravagances or infirmities, is proved indeed by the remarks which I have 
made above on the same objection, as directed against Assent; for Certitude is 
only one of its forms.”93 How can assent be distinct from certitude if it is “only 
one of its forms”? On the other hand, Newman would have a point here, if we 
say— following his way of thinking— that there are some common elements 
between assent and certitude. We know that certitude is the endpoint of many 
assents, therefore although assent as such is not certitude, an accumulation 
of assents is. Certitude, therefore, is an assent at the meta level. Numerous 
assents followed by reflections, hence a complex assent, bring about certitude. 
To be precise, assent, especially complex assent, is the core of a certain net-
work of reflections. They revolve around this assent, feed on it, trying to raise 
something solid on its grounds. Assent is not yet certitude, nevertheless there 
are some common traits. The person who has assented to something real is 
then on a quest for the source of this object of assent.
13 The Power of Simple Assent as Confronted with Certitude
Simple assent, for instance, may also be called virtual, material or interpretative 
certitude.94 It is true that assents can turn into certitude, but it is also true— 
Newman argues— that certitude is of a permanent nature, whereas assents 
may come and go. They may disappear when subjected to reflection. Then we 
can withdraw our assent. At the same time, we have to observe that simple 
assent, although it is not certitude, is more powerful than complex assent, 
which is notional. Newman is therefore inclined to approve of simple assent 
as the more apt to lead to action because “the force of simple assent can be, 
viewed apart from its reflex confirmation,” a real operative force when it is, for 
instance, “exemplified in the primitive Martyrs, in the youths who defied the 
pagan tyrant, or the maidens who were silent under his tortures.” Here we have 
assent, “pure and simple, which is the motive cause of great achievements; it 
is a confidence, growing out of instincts rather than arguments, stayed upon 
a vivid apprehension, and animated by a transcendent logic, more concen-
trated in will and in deed for the very reason that it has not been subjected 
to any intellectual development.”95 I think that we find here a very important 
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phenomenological moment, which, for Edmund Husserl, meant to “get at the 
being of things through an intuitive perception of their essence.”96 Of course, 
the crucial addition introduced by Newman is the aforementioned “transcen-
dent logic.”
We must admit that Newman has indeed taken us through the very complex 
labyrinth of his intricate thoughts. We can even feel somewhat confused. He 
suggests that we aim at certitude and that the person is capable of attaining it, 
and it is true that simple assent is not certitude, it calls for a reflex act, and only 
the latter leads to certitude, which seems to be the proper purpose of our men-
tal activity; nevertheless we now learn that simple assent is the most suitable 
and efficient state that leads to action. This apparent contradiction notwith-
standing, we may attempt to account for it. I think that Newman’a reasoning 
runs as follows: rather than relying on the capacity of our minds for reflection, 
we should strive towards the prompt readiness of our persons. Reflection can 
blunt this readiness and lead us astray from respective action. We learn from 
the above quotation that we need an instinctive knowledge, a “vivid apprehen-
sion” and a “transcendent logic,” phrases that are very imprecise. They appeal 
to our intuition rather than demonstrative argumentation or to a kind of spiri-
tual readiness when illumined by the splendor of the truth. There are different 
kinds of definition. Here, we can propose a demonstrative (ostensive) defini-
tion, i.e. the kind of definition in which we define something by pointing at 
examples.97 Our apprehension of suffering is most vivid when we are dealing 
with concrete people who suffer. The suffering of humankind, for that mat-
ter, is most vague because the object of suffering is too large and anonymous. 
The suffering of a close relative is more vivid. And the suffering of someone 
who is lying in front of me, and at the same time is my close relative must be 
most vivid. We are called to respond to these circumstances; and we respond 
to them to the degree we are engaged in them. Now we may have problems 
with defining “transcendent logic.” In our postmodern and disenchanted world 
transcendent logic would denote the use of terms that go beyond the explicit 
form of argumentation, or, rather, transcendent logic is akin to such a mode of 
conduct which cannot be accounted for by reference to well- tried schemes of 
behaviour.
To use a negative example, Locke’s criticism of enthusiasm smacks of anti-
transcendent logic. I think the Bible is full of such transcendent logic in which, 
for instance, to save one’s life means to lose it, and thus it is apparently illogical.98 
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Simple assent, when given to an imagination, is real. Such is Newman’s main 
message, as we already know. The reflex assent, “which is characteristic of 
certitude, does not immediately touch us; it is purely intellectual, and, taken 
by itself, has scarcely more force than the recording of a conclusion.”99 The 
vividness of an assent is personalized and usually takes place in the case of 
those who are well- acquainted with the subject. As regards religious matters, 
Newman observes that those who approach them in a theoretical manner are 
often “too intellectual to be spiritual,” although we may find examples to the 
contrary.100 It seems that we cannot have both, i.e. depth and vividness; that is, 
to be occupied with reality rather than with a theory of reality.
Newman is indeed undertaking a very difficult task, for on the one hand 
he encourages introspection, but on the other he seems to be saying that too 
much introspection is misleading. He is trying, so to say, to reconcile fire with 
water. Simple assent is not certitude, yet we need complex assent, i.e. reflec-
tion upon simple assent, whereas it is simple assent that exhibits more per-
sonal alertness to a positive response. Certitude is to be sought after, but it 
seems to blunt the force and freshness of simplicity. The question arises: how 
to reach certitude and retain this readiness for simple assents? Especially since 
that certitude is a result of reflection and argumentation. Newman is wary of 
too much reflection and argumentation, for he is writing about “the litter of an 
argumentative habit” which “may beset and obstruct the intellect,” and, when 
we are thus beset, we need “the exercise of good sense and […] strength of will 
to put down [difficulties] with a high hand, as irrational and preposterous.”101
14 The Conditions of Certitude— Indefectibility versus Infallibility
Certitude is important because it gives us persistence; assent is crucial because 
it signifies freshness. Or, to attempt yet another interpretation of Newman’s 
analysis, we could say that certitude should be like preparation for a vivid 
assent, “a lifelong belief should be changed into sight, and things should be so 
near me, which hitherto had been visions.”102 Assents change, but certitudes 
endure. What we are talking about here is a special kind of dialectic which 
is composed of two elements: assent and certitude, i.e. change and duration. 
Assent is the readiness to respond to a truth, and certitude is the repose in 
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possessing it. Certitude is indefectible; once certitude, always certitude. 
Certitude, as we already know, is not a spontaneous reaction but a thinking 
process related to respective faculties. And Newman, as previously mentioned, 
is not precise in this respect; sometimes two different terms mean the same. 
Once, he writes that the human mind is made for truth, and on the same page 
we find that it is the intellect that is made for truth.103
Indefectible as certitude can be, the problem is that there are true and false 
certitudes. It is impossible to discriminate between true certitudes and appar-
ent certitudes. First of all, certitude is not the same as infallibility. Certitude 
is concerned with some concrete propositions, but infallibility— as regards 
persons— is a general faculty and concerns all propositions. We carry ourselves 
at times like a burden, especially when we know what we should be doing and 
our inclinations drive us from our duty, and at times we experience an easiness 
that carries us forward to its completion. Certitude is the relationship between 
the mind and the given propositions, the additional factor being “a sense of 
security and of repose.”104 We might say that the main criterion of a certitude’s 
truthfulness is the satisfaction of these two factors: the person who experi-
ences genuine certitude reposes in serene tranquility. Let me note in passing 
that one should never consider Newman’s vision of certitude in isolation from 
other crucial elements of human integrity. Therefore, we cannot, for instance, 
imagine certitude without its attendant peace of mind.
It often happens, however, that what we once were certain of we now find as 
doubtful, or straightforwardly false. Whatever the outcome, we can do nothing 
but use ourselves as we are and use whatever faculties we have, i.e. there are no 
external authorities to which we can have recourse. I mean that we should nat-
urally look up to good examples and great characters, but we cannot replace 
our personal decisions for theirs, we cannot replace our selves for theirs! Such 
seems to be Newman’s lesson, especially that the purpose is to possess and 
enjoy the truth— an exceptionally individual task. In other words, there is no 
general certitude; certitude is always someone’s. Let us stress that certitude, 
which is a deliberate assent, follows the process of reasoning; hence, if certi-
tude is false, then it is reasoning that is at fault, not assent. Therefore, as we can 
deduce from this statement, if I feel certain of something, then I feel certain; 
it would be futile to grow frustrated because of what we feel and we cannot 
help feeling it. Rather, let us examine the concrete steps that have led to this 
feeling. Our nature induces us to assent to something with proof attendant 
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on it. Newman advises circumspection in assenting, and people are often rash 
and thoughtless (especially in notional assents). Assent is a valuable personal 
act, despite the fact that people may often assent to something that is different 
than they originally thought, therefore “antecedent objections to an act are 
not sufficient of themselves to prohibit its exercise; they may demand of us an 
increased circumspection before committing ourselves to it, but may be met 
with reasons more than sufficient to overcome them.”105
Newman holds the accumulative structure of our knowledge, therefore he 
was so committed to historical studies. Knowledge is passed on from one gen-
eration to another, and knowledge not only in the sense of data. In his histor-
ical approach, he goes counter to the rationalist- empiricist position of Locke’s 
punctual self in the case of which our identity is primarily created by our 
momentous consciousness, not by our historical duration. Generally speaking, 
Newman’s attitude is a revolt against the enlightened ahistorical approach. In 
his interpretation of Locke, Charles Taylor came up with this conception of the 
punctual self as an ability to objectify and distance oneself from one’s self. This 
presupposes a disengagement from himself or herself, rational control, and 
“the re- creation of our habits, and hence of ourselves.”106 In Newman, there is 
no such distance from oneself, for here we use ourselves, i.e. we move forward 
together with the whole of our being. The person is not a consciousness liber-
ated from the body and let loose to float in the vacuum of indefinite existence.
This anti- teleological objectifying, or even reifying conception of the mind 
is destructive for the ultimate calling of the person. Locke treated the mind 
as being composed of simple ideas, like building blocks out of which the 
human being is free to build whatever construction it wishes. The mechanistic 
world proposed by the Enlightenment and the sentimental world proposed 
by Romanticism are both destructive for the human person. In the former 
the human being is a great constructor with an abandoned final cause and 
no blueprint of what is worth building, except the immanent project. In the 
latter, the human being is lost amidst a blind quest for ever new expressions 
of his insatiate psyche. The so- called “new men” and “new women” are excel-
lent examples of what we are talking about. The lone wanderer, treading the 
ruins of foregone traditions, cannot build anything lasting when deprived of 
the transcendent foundations.
The human being liberated from the meanderings of his own self, sub-
dued to Reason, becomes a master of his world. He sets off to rebuild it on a 
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more solid foundation, “by following reliable rules of concatenation,” based 
on “probable evidence […] we wrest the control of our thinking and outlook 
away from passion or custom or authority and assume responsibility for it 
ourselves.” Here we have “an ideal of independence and self- responsibility, a 
notion of reason as free from established custom and locally dominant author-
ity.”107 Here is the essence of rationalist reasoning: pure reason, the transcen-
dental I floating in the void, free from what might thwart it: passion, custom, 
authority. The question is whether such a human being exists, or whether it is 
just another ideal type.
If we have made a mistake in our past, we are obliged to reason with greater 
caution, not to abandon reasoning (and suspend our assents) in general. As in 
Descartes, assent is an act of the intellect, which should be measured or, to be 
more precise, portioned out in line with what is clear and distinct; in Newman, 
assent is “a free act, a personal act for which the doer is responsible […].”108 
In the latter case, therefore, we take assent as it is in the concrete being. The 
initial situation, however, is that of chaos, of what our author calls “functional 
disarrangement,” which is characterized by “disorder” in which man’s “facul-
ties have their rudimental and inchoate state,” and they must be “gradually 
carried on by practice and experience to their perfection.”109 Reason is always 
someone’s reason, not Reason (which, in the rationalist- empiricist context, is 
often capitalized) armed with universal rules of logic. The human being is in 
the process of growing. He must bring himself round to true knowledge, i.e. to 
the harmony between the inner self and assent to the object of knowing. This 
is what we have already called the state of preparedness. In his metaphori-
cal description, Newman calls the sense of certitude “the bell of the intellect” 
which may at times strike when it should not.110 This fact, however, is not a 
sign that the clock should be rejected, but that it should be adjusted. In this 
sense of a need for regulation, both the intellect and conscience are similar, i.e. 
they need adjustment. The moral and intellectual “sanction[s] are liable to be 
biassed by personal inclinations and motives; both require and admit of dis-
cipline; and, as it is no disproof of the authority of conscience that false con-
sciences abound, neither does it destroy the importance and the uses of cer-
titude, because even educated minds, who are earnest in their inquiries after 
the truth, in many cases remain under the power of prejudices or delusion.”111
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As we can see from the above, Newman does not consider man’s faculties 
as such, in their ideal disposition, but considers them as they are found in the 
concrete human beings entangled in their idiosyncratic circumstances. Our 
mindsets all too often depart from what is required of us and we fail to live 
up to the standard, that is, what we recognize as our duty. People can barely 
precisely distinguish between various types of notional assent and what is only 
credence or opinion they take for certitude, or else they rarely feel any need 
to do so.
Let us repeat: certitude is indefectible, which does not mean that it is 
infallible. Once certitude, always certitude, and those who claim they have 
lost their certitude are simply proving they have never had it. As Newman 
writes: “Certitude ought to stand all trials, or it is not certitude.”112 Assent given 
to something can often be understood as a prejudice. In such a case, we are 
obviously in danger of making a mistake. Certitude, we must remember, is “an 
assent given expressly after careful examination.”113 Naturally, we can always 
ask: what if, despite careful examination, I fail in my certitude? Newman pro-
vides three conditions of certitude: “that it follows on investigation and proof, 
that it is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and repose, 
and that it is irreversible.”114 This point is yet another counterargument to all 
those who claim that Newman was anti- intellectual; such a claim is especially 
contradicted by the fact that the Cardinal constantly stressed the importance 
of rational grounds.
Let us emphasize again one important moment. Sometimes, people claim 
to have been certain of a doctrine, but in fact they have not accepted this 
doctrine in its entirety. For instance, some converts from Protestantism to 
Catholicism, especially in the nineteenth century, left the Catholic Church 
when new dogmas appeared, i.e. the dogma of the Immaculate conception 
and the dogma of papal infallibility. Newman rightly observed that they had 
never had certitude with regard to the Catholic Church, if they had been selec-
tive as to her doctrine. What they held, rather, was their private opinion about 
the Church. Therefore, indeed certitudes remain unimpaired while people 
may move from one religion to another, the problem being that these certi-
tudes may be placed within different wholes. The Catholic Church, Newman 
intimates, contains all the truths, which is why she attracts so many converts. 
Thus, those certitudes found in other regions in Catholicism are found in their 
integral composition— complete melody, yet still developing— if I may say 
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so. Newman is also trying to account, I guess, for his decision to convert from 
Anglicanism— without losing his certitudes, but gaining others because this 
admixture of truth is found in all religions. We may say that, eventually, he 
found the right system.
Now, why do some certitudes perish if, while being certitudes, they should 
remain? How is that possible, if Newman claims that the inherent property 
of certitudes is that they remain? I understand it that the formal conditions 
for certitude always remain, and then they must be filled with material cer-
titude. And he must have been thinking about himself when he wrote that 
one might travel through the landscapes of many religions without losing his 
certitudes, “but with a continual accumulation of truths, which claimed from 
him and elicited in his intellect fresh and fresh certitudes.”115 We may explain 
this apparent contradiction— that certitudes perish— by referring to systems 
in which they function (I shall write about this further on). They perish not 
in the sense they were not subjectively felt, but that they were placed within 
“distinct wholes.” When we build a wall, we use bricks. Bricks in themselves are 
just bricks, yet I may replace one with another, without this particular brick 
being replaced ceasing to be a brick. Bricks do not perish, although they may 
be— and often are— differently arranged. We should not, therefore, concen-
trate on one brick, if we wish to learn the whole construction of a building, of 
its designer’s idea, or— as in our case here— of a system.
If I make a mistake, argues Newman, and “my certitude is unfounded, it is the 
reasoning that is in fault, not my assent to it.”116 This experience of unfounded 
assent should be all too familiar to any reader of these words. Yet, the fault is 
not in the personal process of giving assent, but in the object to which one has 
decided to give assent. This kind of reasoning shows Newman as a critic of 
scepticism, because a sceptic, as we commonly define him, is someone who, 
having failed to reach the truth, says that the truth does not exist.
When we look briefly at the Carmelite saint’s individual path, we can observe 
a similar growing in certitude. In quest of her inner certainty (certitude) Edith 
Stein documented her path in letters which “show the gradual confluence of a 
painfully sought solution to the problem of inner uncertainty, the problem of 
friendship with Ingarden, and the emergence of a different kind of peace.”117
Perhaps we could summarily understand Newman as follows: looking at var-
ious religions we can indeed find the same truths, but in different contexts— in 
distinct wholes. The point is not to focus on one truth in isolation from others, 
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that is, in isolation from the whole of the system. Only then can one feel at 
ease, in repose when one can sink into safe ground. It is like sinking into a com-
fortable armchair, without having to look back in fear of finding sharp stones 
which might hurt us. Finding the right system, as I have already said, has, in 
itself, both intellectual and emotional components.
15 Religion as a System
Newman argues on behalf of the existence of certitude in the following man-
ner. First of all, the fact that a true doctrine is not generally received is not 
proof against certainty. When I accept something as certain, I cannot expect 
other people to do the same. Reception is not a proof or a condition sine qua 
non of a doctrine’s truth. The teaching of the Catholic Church then, just like 
the truths of modern science, may continue, although neither the Church nor 
science is universally received. The validity and legitimacy of the truth is dis-
tinct from its acceptance. We must focus rather on the certainty of truth, for 
the problem is not in the variety of religions, “but in the contradiction, conflict, 
and change of religious certitudes.”118 The truth must be certain in order to 
endure, but it does not have to be universally received. Our assents to propo-
sitions vary, as we have been arguing throughout this work; they can be weak 
or strong, premeditated or emotionally biased, but just as the human being 
cannot be considered under one aspect, likewise “a religion is not a proposi-
tion, but a system; it is a rite, a creed, a philosophy, a rule of duty, all at once; 
and to accept a religion is neither a simple assent to it nor a complex, neither 
a conviction nor a prejudice, neither a notional assent nor a real, not a mere 
act of profession, nor of credence, nor of opinion, nor of speculation, but it is 
a collection of all these various kinds of assents, at once and together, some of 
one description, some of another […].”119
I think that this conception of religion as a system that I am now putting 
forward and to which I have already alluded can be well defended. The human 
being does not exhaust his essence in one proposition; he is multifaceted and 
should be considered from many sides. In like manner, no one aspect exhausts 
a religion; indeed, it is “a rite, a creed, a philosophy, [and] a rule of duty.” The 
point is that man starts from a different element he has assented to, and then 
endeavours a free variation focused on that element; we learn about reality 
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by studying its various aspects. It can be an opinion, credence, or profession. 
In other words, one starts from various places of a certain doctrine. These 
places taken together, which often requires a considerable amount of time and 
patience, make up the whole of the doctrine, but taken separately they fall 
short of it (one element does not make up the whole of it). Therefore, from 
the same element some become Catholics, Protestants, or subscribe to athe-
ism. This single aspect, isolated from the rest, and developed into a series of 
variations, leads to the oblivion of the others, i.e. to the oblivion of the whole 
system from which they have been abstracted. Let me remind the reader that 
the human being is originally immersed in “functional disarrangement”; each 
individual person must come to grips with himself. A single aspect is only a 
reflection of a larger whole, but the inchoate self may try to use this aspect 
to build up his own theory that suits him, rather than the truth of the reli-
gion in question. Therefore, these variations are easily carried out by man’s 
free deliberation in which one conclusion follows another. Without a fulcrum, 
they come to a dissipation. Such a fulcrum could be the Church, with her solid 
dogmatic system. Newman is excellently showing his stance on evolution in 
like manner. Inasmuch as science calls for development, personal certitude 
in the area of religion is subject to the same, mutatis mutandis, principles of 
evolution. In this process, the human person must embrace all the implicit 
and explicit elements always seeking to accommodate what can separately be 
understood as a conglomeration of loosely connected pieces.
Or let us take another example. Human life can also be imagined as a system 
composed of a series of episodes unfolding throughout its course. Now, if you 
pick one episode, and forget that it is just an element of a larger whole, you 
are in danger of making a fatal mistake. Separate episodes are often in glaring 
contradiction to each other. Rudolf Höss was the notorious commandant of 
the concentration camp of Auschwitz.120 He lived with his family in a comfort-
able and spacious house surrounded by a large garden adjacent to the fence 
of the camp. Therefore, each morning he would open the gate to his place of 
work where oppression, pain, hatred and death ruled; and each afternoon he 
would go back through the same gate into a world of flowers, music, and paint-
ings. Like a ghastly Alice in Wonderland, he switched his life back and forth. 
Should someone pick one frame of his life’s film and concentrate on it, they 
would say: here is a tender father, a connoisseur of paintings, and a lover of 
music; but then another person might pick another frame and say: here is a 
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bloody torturer, a blind ideologue, and cold executioner. And they would both 
exclaim: these two frames certainly do not show the same person! But they do, 
and the solution is that we should not focus on isolated episodes and general-
ize them.
Any discovery or invention can be interpreted with regard to its effects on 
those who are vitally interested in it. A new discovery in science may, in itself, 
be just a solution to a concrete problem, but in combination with other dis-
coveries it can bring about a long- awaited remedy against, say, a series disease; 
what was not originally planned then resulted in unexpected offshoots. Not 
only in religion, then, do we need to approach it as a system whose specific 
elements emerge in time and are revealed to successive generations. The same 
is true about science, a fact that should be a lesson of humility to individual 
scientists. A concrete discovery is only one aspect; we do not yet know what 
other practical results will be brought to reality in the future. This approach 
in the area of science is, at the same time, a warrant that individual scientists 
will not give up when their personal endeavours fail. It may happen that only 
future generations will cherish the unveiling of a scientific mystery. Above all, 
we should avoid rash generalizations; in the past, they often resulted in anath-
emas or revolts.
In like manner, the same truth in different individuals may produce differ-
ent results. Therefore, the three people described by Newman who ended up 
being a Catholic, a Protestant, or an atheist started from one certitude and 
carried it into a new system. Nevertheless, the original certitude remained, but 
with other elements being added; it was placed within a transformed whole. 
To use another metaphor, we can imagine a patch of colour which in itself is 
just a patch, but may become part of Leonardo da Vinci’s Virgin and Child with 
Saint Anne or Modigliani’s Gypsy Woman with Baby. The same shade of green, 
for instance, can remain as it is, but be placed in different surroundings. Or, to 
take still another example, the same sequence of notes can be found in various 
melodies. Now, the point is that when one loses his certitude, it turns out that, 
in fact, he never had it. Likewise, in each religion there is something in com-
mon with other religions. Therefore, it may happen that “a man might travel 
in his religious profession all the way from heathenism to Catholicity, through 
Mahometanism, Judaism, Unitarianism, Protestantism, and Anglicanism, 
without any one certitude lost, but with a continual accumulation of truths, 
which claimed from him and elicited in his intellect fresh and fresh certi-
tudes.”121 The sad point about this unfortunate outcome is that, once we cling 
 121 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 202. 
 
The Grammar of Knowledge in the Concrete 95
to one aspect and make it the central one while ignoring the others, we may in 
like manner, go in turn from one religion to another, and never reach the right 
one; in fact, never become a religious person. Let us note in passing, speaking 
somewhat metaphorically, that the example of a single note can be compared 
to a simple assent, but then we need to find the whole of the melody. Or we 
may have a string of notes that are in perfect harmony. In that case, we still 
need to place them within their melody, i.e. within their system.
And just like in the case of the patch being a part of different paintings, the 
same certitude may be an element of a different whole. Indeed, a similar exam-
ple can be taken from language. We have the same words placed in various 
contexts and syntactic wholes. Various truths are incorporated in individual 
systems in which they occupy different places. The same word, say, expressive 
of friendship may be incorporated into various systems.
16 Probability— the Guide of Life
The area of certitude is fairly limited. In many spheres, we are satisfied with 
mere opinions that vary, that keep us adrift with what is generally shared by 
our community at large. Therefore, here comes another of Newman’s princi-
ples which reads that “probability [i.e. not certitude] is the guide of life.”122 
(Let us note in passing that John Henry Newman might just as well be con-
sidered a philosopher of language. His analyses in this area have brought 
many new insights. Later on, they were developed by professional analytical 
philosophers.)
Because the province of certitude is so limited, it is commonly assumed 
that “probability is the guide of life,” that we are satisfied with what is only 
probable. Newman stipulates, however, that we should not carry this maxim 
to an extreme. Generally, then, the claim that probability as the guide of life 
should be treated as a kind of intuitive generalization on the basis of daily 
empirical data.123 I understand this claim as follows: it is presupposed in prob-
ability itself that truth does exist, for we call something probable in relation to 
what is certain, otherwise we would not be able to call something probable. 
Probability therefore in its essence is an approximation to the truth. Moreover, 
we need more than probability, than the weighing of arguments, to be com-
mitted to religious devotion, to endure and stand firm amidst adversities; we 
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are inclined to know what is certain. Here is the difference between what he 
called nominal Christianity and vital Christianity.124 In other words, one needs 
the firm ground of certitude to be a real Christian in whom words are con-
sistent with deeds. The earnestness of our religious life must be animated by 
certitude. Hence, the perception that “probability is the guide of life” should be 
treated as a kind of popular belief on the basis of daily experience.
Another argument against certainty comes from the area of science. Because 
there are numerous creeds and religions, hence— some argue— there is no 
truth, there are only subjective opinions. Rationalists hold that religious truth 
should be laid down like a scientific truth— universal and generally accepted. 
Newman says that there is a common agreement as to the certainty of univer-
sal and cardinal truths. But even here one could argue that there was a time 
when philosophers held different opinions with regard to the origins of the 
universe, i.e. when they, for instance, sought the arche of the world. This would 
contradict the common intuition concerning the first principles, namely that 
they are commonly shared. I wonder if we could apply the same principle in 
the area of morals. Conscience is said to be composed of three elements: syn-
deresis, sapientia, and scientia. Now, if synderesis can rightly be called the first 
principle, for it announces that there is a right and a wrong, so perhaps we 
could say that there is at least certainty with regard to this principle shared by 
all rational human beings.
The fact that we have so many religions and numerous creeds is perhaps 
proof that certitude does not exist, in the same way as it was missing in the ori-
gins of human learned development. One cannot deny that there are dedicated 
upholders among those who stick to false doctrines. Thus, perhaps the ques-
tion of certitude should still be held as a disputable matter. The Cardinal, how-
ever, renounces such a conclusion. We acquire reality by learning its numerous 
aspects. The thing is to place them within the right system, i.e. the system to 
which we are not only subjectively attached, but which has historically evolved 
in its complete (and still open to be completed) entirety.
17 Formal Inference
It is natural that in our formal reasoning we seek to fix a common standard 
between one mind and another. Otherwise, we would not be able to maintain 
communication, let alone learned communication. The common standard is a 
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precondition for our intelligibility. Like Descartes, Newman finds the epitome 
of such a standard in mathematics, which, by its self- evident symbols, holds 
all considerations together. In language, this role is played by words; each lan-
guage being a different system. Therefore, words in turn can be organized into 
meaningful structures by the inherent logic of the system, one model of which 
is Aristotelian syllogistics. Such a logic is adequate within the milieu of very 
general and abstract terms, and thus departs from concrete things. Hence, it 
can correctly be used in the case of notional apprehension. Formal inference 
feels at home, if we may say so, amid abstract symbols.
Logic, then, simplifies reasoning, so that it is not led astray by the idiosyn-
cratic nature of the concrete objects; it substitutes words for symbols in order 
to “circumscribe and stint their import as much as possible, lest perchance 
A should not always exactly mean A, and B mean B; and to make them, as 
much as possible, the calculi of notions, which are in our absolute power, as 
meaning just what we choose them to mean, and as little as possible the tokens 
of real things, which are outside of us […].”125 This is the price we have to pay 
for precision, i.e. the departure from reality. Symbols are easier to handle. We 
need to have deprived the words— to use Newman’s metaphorical parlance— 
of “their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life, to have starved each 
term down till it has become the ghost of itself, and everywhere one and the 
same ghost […].”126 Indeed, the same ghost because we want to be intelligible 
and comprehended. Logicians put reality into well- ordered and ideal struc-
tures, i.e. into “ghosts,” so that concrete objects can be efficiently manipulated. 
In like manner, we use such terms as suitable for mathematical equations.
Newman points to the fact that, out of necessity, we have to abstract names 
from reality for the purpose of logical requirements. Thus “man” is only “man 
in general”— turned into one aspect or taken for granted as one, indistinct, 
mass, a mere representative of the set of elements, or, to take another illus-
tration, only a sketchy outline of a human figure. It is true that, in order to 
communicate ideas, we have to translate them into a language devoid of real 
references. Then, by way of this universal tool of communication, we can exist 
 125 Ibid., 214.
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within the world of science, but cannot reach into reality, for “abstract can only 
conduct to abstract; but we have need to attain by our reasonings to what is 
concrete; and the margin between the abstract conclusions of the science, and 
the concrete facts which we wish to ascertain, will be found to reduce the force 
of the inferential method from demonstration to the mere determination of 
the probable.”127 Quite naturally then, we need a kind of personal reasoning— 
a point I have been all the time driving at in this book— a subtle instrument 
which resonates with reality.
In view of the above, indeed, our formal inferences can only reach what is 
probable in the concrete (i.e. probability is the guide of life). They are adequate 
tools for the consideration of abstract thinking. What has been found as a gen-
eral conclusion, when applied to a particular case, is only probable. I think 
that an example in point here may be found in medicine. Let us say that, as a 
result of scientific research, a drug has been found to cure a lot of diseases. It is 
composed of active substances whose results are well- tested; nevertheless, the 
person to whom this drug is supposed to be administered is always concrete. 
And the effect upon his expected recovery can only be probable, or it may fail 
entirely. There are many elements that we take for granted, i.e. we treat them as 
premises, in order to facilitate our reasoning. And if we go back to the sources 
of our knowledge, we arrive at the recondite first principles— truths that we 
need to accept— without “any common measure of minds,”128 which is a very 
strong theme in Newman. We are all linked by a thin network of humanity 
with each element deeply immersed in our individual worlds. And this is the 
main problem for Newman, namely, that we fail to accept the original truths 
from which we individually depart. Then, when formal inferences are carried 
out from those truths to a conclusion, we renounce the conclusion because we 
have rejected the reality from which it started. Thus, for instance, if someone 
fails to respect the sanctity of human life from its conception till its natural 
death, any argumentations against abortion, providing ever newer data, are of 
no use because there is fundamental disagreement from the very beginning.
Let us refer here to Stein’s revelatory remark made in her letter to Ingarden 
about the “limits of reason” (which I shall be discussing further in the next 
chapter), which can be interpreted as the barrier of formal inference when 
applied to the concrete. For in the concrete, the human being must employ 
something more adequate and specialized than mere abstract formulas. 
The sources of knowledge are recondite, i.e. they are hidden in the abyss of 
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primeval life, as Stein called them. The direction of Newman’s analysis seems 
all too obvious. We must go back to the point from which we start. If we miss 
this point of departure, there is no sense bewailing the wrong conclusions.
Let me remind the reader that all this time we are discussing the romantic 
response to rationalism and sentimentalism, all of them— as we can under-
stand our heroes— reductive views of the human being. The responses were 
sought in existentialism and phenomenology, and, above all, in personalism. 
Such were the romantic revisions of the enlightened quest for universalism. 
The nineteenth century focused on the incompatibility between conceptual 
knowledge and personal experience, and the twentieth century followed suit. 
While analyzing Newman, we touch upon the component elements of person-
alism, phenomenology, and existentialism. Generally, we stand in confronta-
tion with the romantic revision of the enlightened quest for universalism. We 
stop in respect before the limits of our ratio, and have to subdue ourselves to the 
mystery of the human person who can accept more than he can comprehend 
or demonstrate. Edith Stein, who herself experienced the mystery of her own 
person, naturally must have felt endeared to Newman’s thinking. The point was 
to observe that social life is carried out on the one hand within the confines of 
a legal (i.e. logical) order, i.e. the rational construction of any political system, 
and on the other it is buttressed in human daily endeavours by non- political 
institutions, enmeshed in a complicated and powerful network of traditions, 
customs, and religions. If we rely only on the state and its law, which is general, 
we find it inadequate to cope with the dynamic variety of the concrete. One 
needs something more akin to, and connatural, with the idiosyncrasies of indi-
vidual circumstances and that pertains to one’s personal character. Something 
that, from within, empowers the person to action. In essence, we need a meta-
physics in the singular— metaphysics translated into the singular fortune of the 
person. In the Philosophical Notebook we read: “Granting that the whole sci-
ence of metaphysics is esoteric […] treatises on it should always be written in 
the first person singular, still it may be true that a continuous meditation may 
bring out to a particular mind a truth in the way of intuition, I mean as some-
thing perceived without reason of middle term — as eyes long accustomed to 
gaze upon darkness see objects for which others would require more light.”129 
Newman is indeed consequential in his thinking, as we shall see here. There is 
something fascinating in his hesitation between simple assent— which comes 
from a spontaneous response to a given value, and certitude— which is the 
effect of reflection. It seems that this spontaneous reaction is more important, 
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yet it depends on someone’s spiritual preparation. Spiritual preparation also 
denotes a readiness to act duly. (Let us note in passing that the biblical stories 
about the call of the first Apostles, mentioned before, are very much to the 
point).
Therefore Newman defends the individual (egotistic) position— examining 
one’s own self. And he goes on to explain that “[i] n most departments of writ-
ing, to speak of self is egotistical — not so in metaphysics. In it the writer 
cannot propose to do more than record his own opinions, the phenomena to 
which he appeals and the principles which he assumes being within his own 
breasts. He has nothing in common with others in the sense in which he may 
assume a community with others as regards external objects. His hermit spirit 
dwells in his own sphere. All then I propose to do is testify my own notions, as 
a psychological fact, & a contribution to psychological science.
All I aim at is to draw out a case, or a «probable — » and I think this enough, 
because there is very little teaching in this subject matter, which is much 
more than probable, though one system or theory may be more probable 
than another. I am not speaking of particular doctrines, but of a system or 
philosophy.
Why I think it enough <worth while> to aim at what is probable, is, because, 
if I am only recognised so far, unbelievers & others who hold false views, or 
Catholics who hold views which I do not relish, cannot put me down.”130 We 
start from our selves as from facts, with which we are most familiar. If we 
begin with a general theory, its application to a concrete event only reaches 
probability.
Metaphysics— because Newman is all the time referring to facts and reality 
(i.e. the way the person is), and the singular— because the general must be 
translated into the particular. In order to understand this, I propose the follow-
ing example: “love thy neighbour” is part of metaphysics, and an answer to the 
question: “who is my neighbour?” is the singular.131 Newman’s message, there-
fore, is also an authentic apology on behalf of human freedom. He himself 
found in his own person an example of a very intricate and meandering path to 
personal growth which no external system could preplan or outline in detail.
Logical reasoning must admit a multiplicity of assumptions and the uncer-
tainty of its conclusions. Each person’s act bears its own personal mark. 
Notional arguments, being general, can never reach the particular, therefore 
there is nothing personal in them; what in abstract looks like proof, in the 
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concrete reaches only as far as the probable. What can thus be shown as true 
in inanimate matter can hardly be identified with animate objects. Here we 
need the living mind to detect what is otherwise hidden in obscurity. I think 
Newman makes this area of discreteness the special object of his interest. There 
are things that rely on individual expertise and personal endowment, rather 
than judgement by rule. Newman seems to find no reason to praise someone 
for their theoretical predictions when they turn out to be true. The movements 
of planets, for that matter, must have been prearranged and then they were 
only reflected in mathematical equations. Therefore, his well- known conclu-
sion reads as follows: “Science, working by itself, reaches truth in the abstract, 
and probability in the concrete; but what we aim at is truth in the concrete.”132
18 Units before Universals
Units should come first before universals. Concrete things are alike, not iden-
tical. Therefore, although all human beings share one trait, namely humanity, 
they are different in their personal individuality, in their sameness, and in their 
selfhood. Abstract sameness does not exist, and even as regards rationality— 
the trait we often treat as common and identical to all men— is, in each 
case, entirely different.133 Thus, Newman was a personalist who stressed the 
incommunicability and incomprehensibility of each human being. God the 
Creator is incommunicable and incomprehensible, so likewise His creatures 
are incommunicable and incomprehensible; we, so to say, inherit the traits of 
incommunicability and incomprehensibility from the Creator. I mean that we 
may understand certain aspects of their being, but we never completely reach 
someone’s mind, or enter someone’s interior. We have access only to what is 
externally manifested. And even the acting agents, who, naturally, are in touch 
with their own interior, can only imperfectly grasp the full meaning of their 
own beings. Newman is often accused of nominalism, but we should not think 
that he decides about the existence or non- existence of universals. He merely 
states, and rightly so, that there is a discrepancy between general notions (uni-
versals, i.e. man) and concrete beings (this here John). And in our daily expe-
rience concrete units have priority over universals; we are dealing with units, 
not universals.
 132 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 223.







In the sciences, we form abstractions, but we begin with things, and they are 
treated as wholes. Only then are we able to understand them. “The individual 
man before my mind may be viewed in relation to his anatomy, his organic 
nature, his intellectuality, his religiousness, but in each case it is he who is 
viewed, and he is one. Each abstraction then retains with it the idea of unity. 
”134 We experience ourselves as wholes, a unity, and this knowledge is “gained 
from sight,” and this idea of unity “acts upon the mind, and kindles the thought 
or discovery «Why, I declare, I am one, I am one and the same,» [- when I am] 
<as seen in my> consciousness, in thinking, in existing.”135 The elementary and 
primary principles of thought are not innate, the soul would not think with-
out some external stimulus, and— having been roused— it reflects upon itself. 
“And first, when it contemplates itself, it will at once gain the notion of unity — 
and of individuality — and of independent existence.”136 Newman defines his 
starting point as follows: “My point is, not to deny that our knowledge comes 
from experience, not to advocate innate forms, but to say that our experience 
is not so much of external things, but of our own minds.”137 Indeed, external 
objects are like images in our minds. And each mind views them differently. 
Each mind, so to say, touches upon them in its own individual manner.
Our originality consists not in how we can appear to other people, but how 
differently we look at different things. And abstraction, of necessity, must sim-
plify what is incommunicable and immeasurable.
If we thus inherit incommunicability and incomprehensibility from God, 
we must approach each human being, including our own self, accordingly, i.e. 
never taking it for granted, but always with respect to his or her individual his-
tory and development. Taking something for granted is the natural feature of 
all inferential processes as expressed in language. We are doomed to use gen-
eral terms, otherwise we would not be able to communicate at all, nor would 
we be able to construct general knowledge. And when such reasoning, which 
uses general terms, is applied to concrete situations, the knowledge that is thus 
gained is— as we already know— only probable.
Newman’s considerations obviously touch upon a well- known distinction 
between entropy and redundancy. What is individual is often entropic, for it 
contains information that is highly unpredictable; and what is general contains 
predictable information, that is redundant. Since our knowledge about reality 
is never perfect and complete, but is composed of various aspects, we can only 
 134 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 17– 18.
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therefore be satisfied with the accumulation of aspects. They cannot be con-
verted into syllogisms because they are too circuitous and elusive; we have to 
give them abstract names. Newman rightly observes that, in order to grasp the 
human being in the concrete, we need a more adequate and more sensitive 
instrument, namely another human being. Thus, we arrive at this mysterious 
principle which reads cor ad cor loquitur (heart speaks unto heart); only one 
heart can speak unto another heart. If heart, as we shall see further, denotes 
the broader (and more adequate) faculty of the person, it can enter into fruit-
ful communing only with another heart— this conclusion sounds logical. And, 
naturally, a conversation of hearts metaphorically symbolizes here a conversa-
tion of persons who are not reduced to intellects, i.e. an exchange of general 
information. The intellect merely uses the general notions and addresses the 
general processes. They express only certain aspects of the general character 
of the individual being, but are never exhaustive or complete. They resemble 
a sketchy portrait of a person. Now, in order to consider Newman’s personal 
decision we can ask: how did he come to know that the Catholic Church was 
the true Church and that he should join it? How did Edith Stein come to know 
that Christianity was the true way for her even up to the moment of entering a 
contemplative order? From Newman’s biographic facts we learn that he stud-
ied the primitive Church, yet— as he himself noted— there is a discrepancy 
between the knowledge we gain and the formal inference we employ to elicit 
some conclusions and a personal decision we make. There is a discrepancy 
between the mere statement that a proposal holds true and the decision that 
I should follow it. Therefore his studies could have prepared him for his final 
decision, but, ultimately, he was the only person to make it not on the basis 
of self- evident premises, but on the basis of his personal result, on his per-
sonal fiat.
19 Informal Inference
Let us now consider the characterization of Newman’s informal inference. 
He was well aware that, in order to reach the complexity of the concrete, one 
needs to find a much more subtle instrument, a point I have already stressed, 
than the general method of syllogistic reasoning, which makes use of general 
terms. Rather than summing up all the aspects, we need to approach the being 
in its wholeness. This conclusion reminds us of the manner in which we under-
stand the transcendental sphere (in Rousseau or Kant), i.e. the general will 
(Rousseau) and the transcendental I are not a mere enumeration of partic-
ular cases; the general will and the transcendental I are rational hypotheses. 
 
104 Chapter 2
They suffice in general considerations; therefore, the main fruit of modernity is 
the independent and autonomous being in the context of negative liberty, i.e. 
liberated from any arbitrary intrusions. The thinking and acting agent would 
rather get lost amid all the minute aspects and would find the conclusion lack-
ing. He needs to grasp “by a clear and rapid act of the intellect, always, however, 
by an unwritten summing- up, something like the summation of the terms, plus 
and minus of an algebraical series.”138 This quote shows the constant tension 
in Newman’s writings between what results from the tedious process of rea-
soning and what is due to an intuitive grasp. Reasoning can be understood as 
formal and informal: the formal is subjected to some external and universal 
rules, the informal pertains to the person. Intuition is natural, which does not 
mean that it is not subject to development. To the degree to which the person 
grows in obedience to internal duty and conscience, the intuitive instrument 
is made more sensitive to assenting to moral values.
Newman calls reasoning “the very breath of my existence.”139 Consciousness 
and reasoning are essentially bound up with the idea of existence. I cannot be 
conscious of something that does not exist. Obviously, we may dream, espe-
cially daydream, about something that does not exist, but what Newman 
understands by the phrase “to be conscious” is that something operates some-
how on our mind and sets it in motion, i.e. into thinking and reasoning. In 
other words, operation speaks of existence.
As we can see, the intuitive grasp is not a physical summation of well- 
defined units, but rather a hidden process by which we get to know the con-
crete. It must be remembered that, as we have said, this knowledge is not for-
mal, but personal— which means that it lacks an explicit form, and remains 
only implicit. We reach the concrete by way of a kind of instinct. Informal 
inference does not replace formal inference— as I have remarked above, the 
two currents— formal and informal— coexist in the one person. If I were to 
portray its essence, I would compare it to a visit to some friends or relatives. 
The visit has its formal elements such as a concrete appointment, knocking at 
the door, greeting the person, and the informal elements are composed of all 
the words and gestures that can never be predicted beforehand, so they are 
informal. They are responsive to individual circumstances (assuming that we 
are sincere in this encounter). Or, to take another example, let us look at sur-
gery. The surgeon knows the general principles of surgery, but in each case it is 
different, so he must apply or modify his general knowledge to this particular 
 138 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 232.
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case. His successive conduct then relies not so much on his theoretical acquain-
tance with medical rules, at least not exclusively, but very often on his intuitive 
and implicit experience. Instead of following the individual elements of his 
medical knowledge, resultant from other cases and made general, the surgeon 
knows what to do with the internal and implicit certitude which depends on 
his personal acquaintance with the case in question and his intuition of what 
should be done. For some, this particular procedure may arouse in a concrete 
case to certitude and proof depending on the constitution of the individual 
mind. The surgeon’s knowledge can here be identified with what he feels that is 
right at a given moment. This feeling should not be mistaken for an emotional 
state. Rather, it is his mental and personal certitude as to what should be done. 
Let me remind the reader of Gauss’s example. Indeed, the mathematician’s 
inference in one act grasped the conclusion.
20 Personal Knowledge versus Inference
Thus, our procedure in knowing reality is an intricate intermixture of explicit 
elements— the conditional inferences from which we arrive at conclusions 
from premises— and implicit elements, from which we unconditionally assent 
to given propositions. Aside from principal knowledge, we need personal expe-
rience of the matter at hand in order to issue the right judgements. Instead 
of focusing, for that matter, on the objective truth of the Church, Newman 
emphasizes the fact that in his honest, inward- looking approach, man is capa-
ble of grasping this truth in his person. Therefore, he concentrates on our per-
sonal endowment, on our instinctive acquaintance with a particular case and 
the testimonies of others, rather than on formal argumentation. This is the 
groundwork of our belief. We should adhere to this personal faculty of our very 
person and trust it, rather than try to seek general knowledge and then apply it 
to our lives. Newman proposes that the person rely on his “own living personal 
reasoning, [his] good sense, which is the healthy condition of such personal 
reasoning, but which cannot adequately express itself in words […].”140
Thus, for the person who is steeped in practical knowledge, a formal ergo 
in a conclusion comes to life with reality. This term, ergo (i.e. then) in implica-
tion, has a different meaning in each case, depending on who is undertaking 
the reasoning. Speaking somewhat metaphorically, ergo can be alive and cre-
ative, arousing the individual to action, or else dead and formal, hardly ever 





personally efficient (see the case of my Lazarus). In an abstract and formal 
situation, when we consider the well- known logical implication that if X is 
greater than Y and Y greater than Z, then (ergo) X is greater than Z, we may find 
it difficult to resist the obvious or else may become personally involved. The 
personal manner of understanding ergo in an implication does indeed deserve 
a more thorough examination, for— judging by the external manifestations— 
it is not at all easy to discriminate between notional assent and a real one. 
A person engaged in the subject in question grasps the whole proposition with 
one act; a person who is only theoretically acquainted with it follows the for-
mal procedures. For such a person, the word ergo is a mere logical symbol, 
like the symbol “+” in a series of numbers. He is simply arbitrarily told that the 
element that follows ergo results from the element that precedes it, but, unless 
he really understands the reality of the components, the ergo has no power of 
conviction, no power of eliciting real assent. Recapitulating what we have said 
so far, we can come up with two meanings of the word ergo: logical and existen-
tial (or personal). The logical meaning is a mere inference on the basis of the 
premises in question (inference inherent in the terms under consideration), 
the existential (personal) meaning is the response of the person. Obviously, we 
may be dealing with both meanings, and for the external observer it is difficult 
to discern which of them is present. Only introspection can provide an answer 
and a respective action.
The main point of our considerations here is to stress the intrinsic relation-
ship between action and its author, i.e. whether I am myself really and truly the 
agent. If ergo is a mere repetition of implication, I can be completely absent 
from what I (notionally) declare an implication. On the contrary, I am a self, 
an effective person in whom acts originate; they do not pass through me as if 
they were passing through an inanimate object, but they emerge from me. Let 
me observe in passing that the problem of understanding ergo is similar to the 
word “last” from Randy Pausch’s “last lecture.” We have here the same, let us 
say, transition from notion to reality, from a mere notional apprehension to 
the illumination of reality. This is what we describe in English as dawning, i.e. 
it dawned on me.
We do not have to prove our existence by formulating cogito ergo sum. “I am 
conscious that I am,”141 argues Newman. I learn about my existence through 
the operations of my faculties: “I feel pain. I have not faith in the feeling, but 
the feeling is part of me, or bound up in my «I am». Consciousness indeed is 
not of simple being, but of action or passion, of which pain is one form. I am 
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conscious that I am, because I am conscious I am thinking (cogito ergo sum) or 
feeling, or remembering, or comparing, or ≤exercising≥ discourse.
I repeat, if it be improper to speak of «faith in one’s being», it is improper to 
speak of faith in <certain> other things besides being — being is not known 
directly, but indirectly through its states (just as the eyes do not see the sub-
stance of bodies, but the qualities) and these states, which convey the notion 
of being, are such as feeling, thinking, remembering &c. Certain faculties then, 
or rather their operations, are a part of the initial idea of existence.
This view of the subject brings us a step further, as revealing an important 
principle. Sentio ergo sum. To call this an act of argumentation or deduction, 
and that it implies faith in that reasoning process which is denoted by the sym-
bol of «ergo» seems to me a fallacy. I do not advance from one proposition to 
another, when I know [- am conscious] my existence from being conscious of 
my feeling but one and the same act of consciousness brings home to me that 
which afterwards at leisure I draw out into two propositions, denoting two out 
of many aspects of the one thing. What is called reasoning then is in its essence 
not a deduction, but it is the perception of certain complex ideas, or the modes 
or the dress of things. Thought and being, or sensation & being, are brought 
home to me by one act of consciousness, prior to any exercise of ratiocination, 
though I may afterward, if I wish, survey the complex idea by means of that 
exercise.”142 Newman suggests that the word “ergo” should be replaced by “for,” 
e.g. “I am for I think,” “I am for I reason.” It is not deduction in the form of that 
well- known scheme of implication: if p, then q → if I think, then I exist. Rather, 
I grasp my existence by one act. My consciousness informs me about my exis-
tence through sensations.
In reality, therefore, the circumstances are entirely different. Reality, so 
to say, opens up to this particular person. If we resolve, however, to apply 
some formal rules to individual cases, we are in danger of falling victim to 
circuitous arguments and never reaching a satisfactory conclusion. There is 
a correlation between certitude and implicit proof and such is “a law of our 
minds.”143 Newman always stresses this requirement of a connatural relation-
ship between the mind and the thing that this mind is supposed to consider. 
Understanding, in its primary sense, is a personal effort, not a logical puzzle, 
especially in concrete circumstances. Therefore, apart from our general knowl-
edge of some problems, we need to have personal experience with the objects 
under consideration.
 142 Ibid., vol. 2, 34– 35.






In concrete reasonings, we cannot help but rely on ourselves; we have to 
use ourselves, as we have often repeated here, “judge for ourselves, by our own 
lights, and on our own principles,” or, in other words, the criterion of truth is 
“not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral 
character of the person maintaining them and the ultimate silent effect of his 
arguments or conclusions upon our minds.”144 Newman always stresses this 
living faculty of judgement in the individual person: not only intellectually, 
but also morally. This is another strong theme in Newman which shows his 
view of human integrity. And this is also an excellent reference to St Augustine, 
namely the fact that morality, or the purity of the heart, is a precondition for 
our correct thinking. Newman stresses this personal and practical endowment 
in which “an ounce of common- sense goes farther than many cartloads of logic 
[…].”145 The processes of reasoning that lead to action and assent are multi-
form, subtle and omnigenous in the concrete, so they cannot be measured by 
rules; they are personal. Here, verbal argumentation must become subordinate 
“to a higher logic.”146 And this higher logic comes from the person, the per-
son who must be prepared intellectually and morally to face the challenges of 
reality.
All in all, Newman intimates that it is personal knowledge— a combina-
tion of logic, personal experience, and historical encounters with the subjects 
in question— that can assess the value of some practical implications. All of 
these elements come together to form this higher logic of the person. In this 
logic, the explicit and implicit elements appear to be on the same footing, and 
in concrete judgements the implicit ones become prevalent.
This silent incorporation (of implicit knowledge) is of the utmost impor-
tance. The mind should not be garrulous and noisy, a phenomenon which 
often takes place when ignorance is clumsily masked with a proliferation of 
words. It becomes so when it is involved in a busy consideration of arguments 
which happens when a person thinks he is master and constructor of real-
ity (the mechanistic treatment of reality). When reasons are measured out, 
and appear to be of equal value, what conclusion is there to result from this 
strenuous job if moral character is lacking? The condition of silence smacks 
of contemplation. We repose in certitude as we repose in reality. And this 
repose is stronger than any formal conclusion which can be demonstrated. 
The person feels at home, a feeling that is difficult to lay out in formal terms. 
I have often repeated the feelings of repose and contentment, manifest signs of 
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certitude. For both Newman and Stein, their personal choices were associated 
with peace and contentment; let us remember that the aforementioned states 
of mind have nothing to do with some passive and Stoic acquiescence. Once 
she arrived at her new spiritual home, i.e. feeling certain about her decision, 
Stein “found complete peace and contentment in her hidden life of prayer and 
sacrifice.”147 She found herself within a spiritual castle and “difficult concepts” 
became simple, and the Carmelite Rule was “all alive in her own person.”148 
What originally, with her natural reason, could have been approached only 
with reluctance or pitifulness, was now accepted without any reservations. The 
virtue of obedience was viewed through the eyes of her renowned spirit. And, 
likewise, Newman, when he joined the Roman Catholic Church. He had to con-
cede that another kind of logic must be at work in the person’s individual life.
In concrete matters, verbal logic is subordinated to, say, personal logic, i.e. to 
what kind of character we are. Two minds may, and often do, look at the same 
thing in two different ways, for they approach them with their different intel-
lectual and moral beings. As I have already said, Newman doubts the plausibil-
ity of sudden conversions. He believes, instead, in a gradual process in which 
knowledge is mingled with the ingredients of character. It is a process which 
resembles the spontaneous accumulation of data rather than enforced deduc-
tions, “a calm contemplation and gradual understanding of their premisses.”149
The person must grow in understanding. It is the kind of knowledge that 
becomes one with the person who holds it, or is even held by it (as we remem-
ber about being possessed by an idea), rather than being a mere manipulation 
of notions. The knowledge that is meant here is like the Image of God that 
comes via the conscience. Newman compares it to the process in which the 
eyes become accommodated to the details of a landscape. Layers upon lay-
ers settle in the mind, thereby allowing the person to grow in individuality. 
This process of settling and growth is characteristic of Newman’s and Stein’s 
developments. Newman refers to “the trained imagination,” which is capable 
of seeing “the representations of things” behind the notions.150 Indeed, when 
we understand reality and concrete events as being messages from someone, 
through their authors we make them personalized. All human acts are marked 
with personal intentions. We should be able to read them as personal commu-
nication, and transmit them in the same way we send communiques to other 
persons. And he eventually concludes “that methodical processes of inference, 
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useful as they are, as far as they go, are only instruments of the mind, and need, 
in order to their due exercise, that real ratiocination and present imagination 
which gives them a sense beyond their letter, and which, while acting through 
them, reaches to conclusions beyond and above them. Such a living organon is 
a personal gift, and not a mere method or calculus.”151 Edith Stein also has this 
practical bias, as I have pointed out in Chapter 1, i.e. knowledge translated into 
practical acts on behalf of others, as an important element to create a person-
ality, not a mere way to accumulate information.
Following Locke’s suggestion, Newman agrees that there are cases which are 
sufficient for scientific proof, although they rise only to probability. But what 
are these propositions which rise to probability? And Newman proposes an 
answer, namely that they are to be found in concrete matters. It is here that 
we are guided by supra- logical judgment, and this judgment— as Newman 
intimates— “is not mere common- sense, but the true healthy action of our 
ratiocinative powers, an action more subtle and more comprehensive than the 
mere appreciation of syllogistic argument.”152 Obviously, we arrive here at the 
world of the virtue of prudence. And prudence is “a personal endowment”; 
indeed, virtue, according to Aristotle, is not part of our nature, but something 
that we accomplish as a result of hard work. After all, virtue is the outcome 
of what we do against our natural inclinations. This personal logic does not 
exclude logic in abstract matters, but supplements it.
Thus, we have outlined— speaking in political terms— a conservative 
context of human action in which there are legal structures within which is 
placed a virtuous man, contrary to, for instance, the theological principle of 
ex opera operato, which means that the sacraments are valid, irrespective of 
the agent, but depending on our own minds, “by our own individual percep-
tion of the truth in question, under a sense of duty to those conclusions and 
with an intellectual conscientiousness.”153 Newman’s approach is clearly laid 
out in these words— we use ourselves in our integrity, the intellect and the will 
united together to bring forth a personal result, that well- known phrase from 
the Cardinal’s University Sermons that has already been mentioned here. The 
person, thereby, is a living cognitive institution, if I may use such a phrase. All 
faculties of this institution are of high value, for they all participate in cogni-
tion and action. The only kind of certitude we can attain is moral certitude 
and moral evidence, and that— as the British Cardinal claims— not only in 
spiritual subjects but also in other, terrestrial, questions. Newman claims that 
 151 Ibid.
 152 Ibid., 251.








The Grammar of Knowledge in the Concrete 111
even in mathematical science the principles of concrete reasoning— in which 
the intellectual prowess must go hand in hand with the moral character— 
are valid. And he compares this case to the famous lemma from Newton’s 
Principia. As we know, if we multiply the number of sides on a regular polygon 
inscribed in a circle, it will ultimately (i.e. in infinity) become a circle. But, in 
fact, it disappears before it becomes a circle. Likewise, in reasoning we accu-
mulate premises, so that they ultimately turn into a conclusion. We anticipate 
and predict the conclusion in concrete matters, rather than attain it by way of 
accumulation. The arguments converge, but do not translate into the conclu-
sion, for, after all, they only lead to it, and no single argument is a conclusion, 
since, in such a case, the conclusion would be illogical. Therefore, it is not the 
ergo in an invincible syllogism that brings about the conclusion, but the per-
sonal absorption of the numerous (uncalculated) premises which are laid out 
in their complicated relationships.
A good example of the coalescence of explicit and implicit reasons can be 
taken from the area of criminal cases. Judges must rely not only on the evi-
dence to bring in a verdict of guilty, especially if the evidence is only circum-
stantial. The point is that in concrete matters we often are certain, but fail to 
provide respective argumentation on behalf of our certitude. The reasons are 
too subtle and invisible to be demonstrated as we proceed from conditional 
inference to unconditional assent.
To sum up my considerations on personal knowledge and informal infer-
ence, let me go back to Newman and quote an important statement. In the 
Philosophical Notebook we find his personal reflection: “I doubt whether what 
is called reasoning be in its essence a process.”154 This depicts his basic hesi-
tation between intuition and reflection as the fundamental sources of knowl-
edge. Indeed, when we compare thinking with reasoning, the former term is 
broader than the latter. Now, if reasoning is a process, it is subjected to the 
well- known rules of logic, i.e. we pass from indubitable and incontrovertible 
premises to a conclusion. We can thus suspect Newman’s reservations and his 
fundamental anxiety about the intervention of the imperfect intellect with its 
natural predilection for speculation. Newman even writes about “the wild liv-
ing intellect of man”155 and goes on to outline his great programme of Catholic 
defence— by outlining his concept of the person. The intellect is at home with 
the explicit elements of our knowledge. Newman recapitulates all the typical 
accusations that were levelled against him as follows: “[I make] profession 
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to hold doctrines which I cannot possibly believe in my heart, but that I also 
believe in the existence of a power on earth, which at its own will imposes 
upon men any new set of credenda, when it pleases, by a claim to infallibility; 
in consequence, that my own thoughts are not my own property; that I cannot 
tell that to- morrow I may not have to give up what I hold to- day, and that the 
necessary effect of such a condition of mind must be a degrading bondage, or 
a bitter inward rebellion relieving itself in secret infidelity, or the necessity of 
ignoring the whole subject of religion in a sort of disgust, and of mechanically 
saying every thing that the Church says, and leaving to others the defence of 
it.”156 All of these are simply the main items on the deistic agenda and inspired 
by Locke’s modern philosophy: the Church is like a foreign idea imposed on 
the mind; man holds ideas he cannot account for; the claim to infallibility 
is against human autonomy; and the ultimate conclusion that, under such a 
state of affairs, the individual mind must either secretly (i.e. slavishly) revolt or 
yield submissively to it. The result is, as we know, enthusiasm or irrationality. 
(Interestingly enough, let us observe that it somehow did not occur to Locke 
and his followers that being forced to join the state (Anglican) Church could 
lead to the same line of accusations). And the solution for Newman is very 
simple— you pick up only certain aspects out of something which is a whole. 
Only by learning the whole system can you understand its separate elements.
21 Faith versus Intuition
Newman understands faith in two ways: religious and natural. Naturally, we 
have to believe in many things we cannot, nor do we feel any necessity to, 
check. There are things within us and without us. He applies the word “faith” 
to “our reliance <certainty> of things without and not within us.”157 Hence, 
the world within us is what we actually feel. Intuition is prior to faith. In the 
Grammar of Assent he writes about instinct. It would be absurd to say that 
we have faith in intuition, hence intuition is the real starting point, and it 
concerns the things within us. Intuition pertains to three things that precede 
the knowledge of myself: (1) consciousness, (2) thought, (3) a certain analysis, 
which becomes, afterwards, the principle of reasoning. The knowledge of my 
existence is the fourth act. All of them are “one complex act of intuition. Here 
we have real intuition, but I have faith, not intuition, of the external world.”158 
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The phrase “cogito ergo sum” is therefore a complex act consisting of four ele-
ments. First, I intuit about my consciousness, then about my thinking, then 
I reflect on my thinking, and ultimately combine them into a complex idea, a 
complex intuition.
The original point in Newman’s approach is that ratiocination can be treated 
as an act of the mind rather than a psychological process. Let us recall Stein’s 
confession after having read the mystic text. At the same time, however, before 
we lay a charge against Newman for his inconsequence (between ratiocina-
tion as an act and as a process), we must observe that certain processes in the 
mind are tacit. Consequently, even though a decision may sound like an act 
of the mind, it has, nevertheless, been preceded by some implicit and hidden 
internal process. Thinking is a personal life. Even the subject involved finds it 
difficult to trace all its paths. Saint- Exupéry puts it beautifully in his Wisdom 
of the Sands where we read: “inasmuch as the heart and soul have no concern 
with the rules of logic or the science of numbers— this is where I step in and 
impose my will.”159
22 The Illative Sense— Practical Wisdom
Newman argues, as I have already alluded to, that reasoning in the concrete 
can be understood as a simple act that has the nature of instinct. He calls it 
natural inference. And thus we have arrived at the key point of Newman’s doc-
trine. The human person integrates within himself the intellectual and moral 
resources to arrive at an instinctive manner in which to accept the truth. We 
may call this informal inference, natural inference, or Illative Sense. These 
terms describe the mode in which we react to reality, i.e. we react according 
to the way we are. And we are a coalescence and convergence of various per-
sonal faculties. The person opens himself to truth inasmuch as he has worked 
on his true self; the true self is responsive to the truth of reality. In this sense, 
it becomes clear that cor ad cor loquitur (heart speaks unto heart), and in this 
personal communing we descend on to the firmer and more solid ground of 
understanding than when we are involved in argumentative exchange. This 
communing is conscious and unconscious, explicit and implicit, relies on what 
is told and what is untold, it ultimately refers to the primeval depth which 
Edith Stein discussed and of which we shall be talking further. The human per-
son makes use of his illative faculty and thus grasps the truth in the way of 





unconditional assent, instead of following the external rules. Such rules sub-
due the intellect, but they hardly reach the innermost centre of the person.
Our most natural mode of reasoning is ultimately “not from propositions to 
propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes 
to wholes.”160 We deal with them with our intrinsic and personal power, for 
we can never learn all the aspects of the objects in question. We may say that 
Newman proposes a most “democratic” endowment of the human person, for 
it does not depend on the amount of theoretical knowledge we have acquired. 
Newman advocates this spontaneous activity. Some of his comments, how-
ever, may initially raise some doubts, but on second thoughts they become 
clear. He is writing, for instance, that true poetry is “a spontaneous outpouring 
of thought” and that “no one becomes a poet merely by the canons of criti-
cism.”161 It is true that by reading critical essays on poetry no one becomes a 
poet, but it is also true that a mere spontaneous outpouring of thought will 
not make one a poet. These quotes are examples which show Newman at his 
best, that is, they depict his consequence and cohesion. Poetry understood as 
“a spontaneous outpouring of thought” reminds us of simple assent, and read-
ing “canons of criticism” resembles certitude. And we know that, for Newman, 
assent is a precondition of certitude.
At the same time, however, let us observe that Newman is right in claim-
ing that anyone, irrespective of his intellectual capacity, may learn the truth 
and act accordingly. Such a person may know what to do without being able 
to formulate the reasons why, because his knowledge is implicit. He may 
not be able to give intelligible reasons. He feels all at once that he is certain 
of what he says or does. We have here natural acuteness and personal idio-
syncratic modes of recognition. People well- acquainted with the matter in 
question instinctively grasp the solution without going from antecedents to 
consequents. Indeed, we even deal with this kind of spontaneous knowledge 
improved by practice and habit in the area of the natural sciences. There were 
truths in the past predicted by scholars which could not be proved, let alone 
demonstrated. The examples we could mention here are gravitational radia-
tion or the fact that bodies of enormous masses can bend light. It must be 
noted that Newman’s instinct should not be treated as a natural sense, one and 
the same in every person, “but a perception of facts without assignable media 
of perceiving.”162 It is a spontaneous perception of the truth. Obviously, there 
are cases of supernatural intervention in which someone is suddenly struck 
 160 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 260.
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by the inappropriateness of his behaviour. Such was St Paul’s conversion. We 
have to admit, however, that we do not know anything about some hidden 
processes of doubt that might have made their way into Saul’s mind before he 
was struck by supernatural intervention. In the case of Saul, it was like a rev-
elation, like light that had broken in upon him. But before the final act of his 
personal drama had taken place, however, he might have become astonished 
by the manner in which Christians faced persecution. All these moments of 
heroism that seemed to have defied suffering were indeed mind- boggling for 
pagans throughout the Old Testament and for Pharisees at the threshold of the 
New. That experience of wonder at the other person’s inexplicable conduct 
would parallel the situation of Reinach’s widow that I have already described 
and the way Edith Stein perceived it.
Newman is seeking to provide natural grounds for apprehending and hold-
ing fundamental truths. It seems that, for him, the whole of human nature is 
inclined to these truths and the more we try to demonstrate them by means of 
logical rules, the more we meddle with the natural sources of their accommo-
dation. In fact, when subjected to analysis we distance ourselves from them, 
since we can never convey the contents of our internal experience, nor is it nec-
essary. The point is to open up the natural avenues to the human inmost cen-
tre, the avenues each person must walk himself. They spring up from the very 
constitution of our minds. This point must be properly understood, because 
we have already said that knowledge is acquired like virtue, i.e. we have to grow 
to learn. In personalism, we understood the person as the being which is and, 
at the same time, is becoming. Now we learn that it is the natural constitution 
of the mind to be open to knowledge; nature and art seem to enter into com-
bat. Our natural view of things is connatural to our minds; Newman means 
“a power of looking at things in some particular aspect, and of determining 
their internal and external relations thereby.”163 We are potentially endowed to 
know the truth by personal acquaintance with a certain subject. This gift can 
be subtle and versatile, and it is peculiar to some minds. They gain this natural 
and spontaneous gift of ratiocination. Newton, therefore, was inclined to dif-
ferent matters than Napoleon. The reader may be reminded of Gauss’s exam-
ple mentioned before. Newman seems to be pointing at Aristotle’s phronesis, 
but for him it is not an instrumental art.164
We make use of this spontaneous cognition via a sense that is proper to our-
selves. In other words, our discretion and judgment are exerted spontaneously 
 163 Ibid., 265– 266.






and we cannot give an account of how they proceed or whence they proceed. It 
is an act in which the agent and the observer become one; they move forward 
in much the same way as they breathe. Obviously, we may analyze them after-
wards. Discretion and judgement proceed from concrete to concrete and are 
attached to a definite subject- matter. This is the key point in Newman’s theory 
of knowledge in the concrete, where our natural and spontaneous ratiocina-
tions are at work. They resemble taste and invention in other contexts.
Newman wants man to be transparent. In concrete matters, the question 
of good and bad is often at stake, and it is here that “yes” (a word) must mean 
yes (reality) and “no” must mean no. Otherwise, the person becomes unreal 
(the question of real and unreal words will be dealt with further on). This rati-
ocinative faculty is not a general instrument of knowledge; rather, it can be 
called departmental. It is, in fact, a collection of faculties. A good example in 
point here would be memory, which, in respect of different persons, varies. 
We should trust persons then, not logical science, since, apart from their spe-
cialized knowledge, they have personal experience of the matter in question. 
Aristotle intimates the same idea in his Nicomachean Ethics: “Therefore we 
ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced 
and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstra-
tions; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.”165
In Aristotle, phronesis (practical wisdom) characterizes the sagacious man, 
a man of practical wisdom able to deliberate well about what is good and expe-
dient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sort of things 
are conducive to our health or strength, “but about what sorts of thing conduce 
to the good life in general.”166 So, it seems that we can establish a common 
measure between two persons endowed with practical wisdom, something 
that is not possible for Newman. Two minds are incommensurate. In con-
crete circumstances, two minds are working entirely differently. One may pose 
a question here. Namely, if we are to trust persons on account of their long 
acquaintance with the subject- matter under consideration, how do we know 
that their view is not biased, for instance, by political expedience? How are we 
supposed to know that their intentions are morally noble? Are they not leading 
us astray? Therefore, without the issue of conscience these questions rightly 
give rise to doubts. And, let us add, consciences are shaped under appropriate 
conditions. Yet another thing is of utmost importance— Newman points to the 
individual histories of those who are supposed to be consulted. If we follow 
 165 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by W. D. Ross, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999, ch. 
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their history and find them wanting in honesty or impartiality, we are evi-
dently right to abandon them. We take the person together with his history, in 
case we might spot some false steps. After all, we need to obtain a clear picture 
of what we are looking at. In that case, it is someone’s life that is speaking to us. 
By following our masters we become prepared to lean on ourselves and draw 
on our intellectual and moral resources. Thus, judgement is not merely a result 
of skill in argumentation, but it is— as Newman calls it— “the architectonic 
faculty” with the Illative Sense (right judgement in ratiocination) as its branch.
Newman is constantly trying to show that, despite the fact that experience 
leads to probabilities when put in the form of a syllogism, certitude does exist. 
People feel certain. He is obviously referring to Kant when he writes that there 
are philosophers who “grant the à priori principle assumed in the argument, 
and in consequence are obliged, in order to vindicate the certainty of knowl-
edge, to have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms, and 
the like, which belong to us by nature, and may be considered to elevate our 
experience into something more than it is in itself.”167 The intellectual forms, 
however, were designed by Kant to arrive at pure knowledge, the kind of knowl-
edge that is independent of experience. In the Kantian option, man arrives at 
certainty in a world distilled from the erroneous testimony of the senses, in 
the area of the transcendental I. For Newman, the very fact of certitude, to 
which those who experience it testify, is sufficient for its existence. His aim 
is practical and he does not want to be a metaphysician, i.e. he shrinks from 
appealing to some theoretical premises.168 The mental state of certitude is 
enough for the truth of a proposition because the most important thing is that 
something is true to this particular person; in other words, that this person is 
living the truth. The person may “objectively” be wrong, but there is no denying 
that he does experience something as true and about which he is certain. Let 
us remember that certitude is not passive, it does not come from outside but 
from within, it is “an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is the 
duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason, and, when 
reason forbids, to withhold.”169
As we have already shown, there is no common measure between minds. 
We are our own centres when we reason. We have at our disposal the ratioci-
native faculty whose perfection is the Illative Sense.
 167 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 270.









23 The Sanction, Nature, and Range of the Illative Sense, or the Power 
of Integration
We live among various things and we have to use ourselves to know them, i.e. 
our faculties and our abilities. As Newman writes: “I am what I am, or I am 
nothing.”170 I need to suffice myself, but the main purpose is to ascertain myself. 
We need to know who we are in order to put ourselves to use. Obviously, there 
are many faculties in man whose capacity is still not fully realized and ready 
to develop. Man is, therefore, somewhat incomplete and open to perfection, a 
point I have already alluded to. In this sense, Newman is a realist. He takes real-
ity as it is. We are potential beings. There are many inchoate and rudimental 
elements in our nature which we gradually, by recurrent efforts, seek to bring 
to perfection. The human being, as Newman observes, is “the creator of his 
own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self- made.”171 And, let me repeat, we 
have this great task of integration at work here. I, a person, am a very compli-
cated instrument whose principles of operation I learn throughout my life. In 
other words, I am given to myself as a concrete being and at the same time am 
assigned to myself as a concrete task. There are infinite dimensions inside and 
infinite perspectives outside I have to master. The explicit and implicit zones 
are mingled together. As the implicit zone is, naturally, not well- defined— I 
believe in it rather than know it by way of intellect— the explicit instrument 
is often abstract and inadequate to precisely describe the interior. I need to 
master the elusive world of emotions, rules, and requirements. Therefore, in 
order not to be lost amidst the intricate paths of argumentation, as seems to be 
Newman’s claim, it is safer to develop a habit of correct thinking, in which we 
accept the truth in much the same way as we breathe. Real assent then comes 
out naturally from man.
What we obtain, let us repeat, is a personal result. In this process, nothing 
is deterministic or mechanical. It is a personal task. We acquire knowledge by 
means of inference and assent. Newman reads like a metaphysical realist when 
he writes that we must appeal to man and his nature as a fact. I have already 
mentioned this point when writing about metaphysics in the singular. It is of 
no use attempting to devise a science of reasoning in the concrete, i.e. a kind 
of universal logic which would bring any mind, in the form of a mechanistic 
procedure, to the required solution. We need to rely on ourselves and “confess 
that there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by 
 170 Ibid., 272.
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the mind itself, and that this phenomenon, perplexing as we may find it, is a 
normal and inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like 
man on a stage such as the world. His progress is a living growth, not a mech-
anism; and its instruments are mental acts, not the formulas and contrivances 
of language.”172
Newman does not seek universal schemes of knowledge, which anyone 
could master at the bidding of some expediency; rather, he takes aim at per-
sons capable of gaining certitude. Thus, it is not structures from outside, as 
it were, which decide for us, but it is the personal inside that paves the way. 
Certitude grows together with the person in whom questions, decisions, and 
actions form a deposit— if I may say so— thereby creating character (person-
hood). We gain knowledge by the rightful use of inference and assent. Inference 
is obscure and assent is distinct and definite. And we can see how the mental 
and sensate levels coalesce in Newman’s proposal, as they coalesce in Stein’s.
The personal knowledge thus gained relies on the integrated capacities of 
the person, explicit and implicit. This integration resembles a kind of readiness 
worked out in a person to respond to the demands of the truth. I think that the 
best instantiation of what we are talking about here is Edith Stein’s testimony 
of her experience of certitude. She writes in the book Jüdische Familie: “I could 
not proceed with anything except on the basis of some inner drive. My deci-
sions emerged from a level of depth which I myself was unable to grasp clearly. 
But once something had emerged into consciousness and taken on a definite 
shape in my mind, then nothing could hold me back. Then it became almost a 
game to accomplish the apparently impossible.”173
This process of “emerging from a level of depth” addresses exactly the 
implicit character of human knowledge. The internal truth of the human per-
son renders him a living instrument of certitude. Certitude is not co- equal to 
understanding. I may be certain of something as a whole, although I cannot 
explain the detailed grounds of my certitude.174 There is something powerful 
in the human person, in respect of his degree of integrity, that, despite the 
intricacy of verbal argumentation which he may be too awkward to render, he 
can stand firmly by what he claims as certain. We are talking here about the 
law of progress that man gains in real assent and action. It is a living growth, 
in which man is “born to truth.” There are different paths to it, all of them con-
natural to us, whether we call them demonstration, testimony, speculation or 
 172 Ibid., 275.
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evidence. The point is to discern at which moment we find ourselves. Newman 
then steps in with his, naturally Augustinian, proposal, i.e. we need overruling 
Providence to guide us safely through all these intricate paths. I understand 
this as follows: man should not place too much hope in his solitary efforts 
in finding the way. I mean it is our personal task, but we are never alone, we 
are surrounded by numerous exemplars and inspirations in the bosom of the 
Church.
And the final stage of our faculty of judging and concluding is the Illative 
Sense. In his rendition of the latter, Newman not only refers to Aristotle’s phro-
nesis, but also to the logic of transcendental phenomenology. As we know, in 
phenomenology we focus on a double manner of understanding objects. First, 
we have the natural world, that thing of nature that is “one and the same for 
all individuals who encounter it,” and then “the thing as it presents itself to the 
individual encountering it at the moment.”175 I think there is a parallel between 
what Stein calls the coherence of constituting consciousness and constituted 
objects and what Newman called connaturality. This coherence or connatu-
rality exists differently with respect to whether the mind is considering the 
physical world or the spiritual world. Newman rightly observed, apart from the 
objective existence of a given object, there is, parallel to it, its subjective pre-
sentation, i.e. the object is somehow present to me, and its presentation (not to 
be mistaken with its existence) is unlike that to someone else.
Newman defines this personal path in the following manner: “The author-
itative oracle, which is to decide our path, is something more searching and 
manifold than such jejune generalizations as treatises can give, which are most 
distinct and clear when we least need them. It is seated in the mind of the indi-
vidual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those 
special cases of duty which are personal to him.”176 The Illative Sense is akin 
to an acquired habit. This habit, matured by practice and experience, is not 
a theory of what duty is and how it should be understood, but “it is a capac-
ity sufficient for the occasion, deciding what ought to be done here and now, 
by this given person, under these given circumstances.”177 Therefore, it is very 
personal, concrete, and individual. Each individual has this ruling principle in 
himself, and if he is still uncertain, he appeals to someone else. Newman claims 
that we follow living examples rather than theoretical conclusions. There are 
as many kinds of phronesis as there are occupations. One person may excel in 
 175 E. Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. M. C. Baseheart, M. Sawicki, 
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one area and turn out to be a complete failure in another (and we remember 
the examples of Newton and Napoleon, as given by the Cardinal). As Newman 
rightly observed: “A good man may make a bad king; profligates have been great 
statesmen, or magnanimous political leaders.”178 In all these areas of practical 
activity, we use our skills and sagacity. He even calls them instinct or inspira-
tion. In concrete matters, we follow the logic of thought rather than the logic 
of language, the logic of thought being more subtle and elastic. And Newman 
compares its procedure to modern mathematical calculus. The essence of the 
latter is that we sum up the infinitesimal parts (those elements that cannot be 
measured) into one whole.
24 Intuition versus Reasoning
I think that we may be right in claiming that there are similarities between the 
way Newman interprets intuition, simple assent, and conscience. I would like 
to put this forward as a kind of thesis, namely, that there is a parallel between 
obedience to conscience and intuition. In conscience, the first thought is 
always right, says Newman, and in intuition we grasp the matter at hand in 
one moment. I do not want to say that intuition is always right, but in like 
manner Newman does not hold that conscience is infallible, either. The sim-
ilarity between intuition and conscience consists in their functional immedi-
acy. In intuition, we grasp something in one act, and in conscience we should 
instantly obey; the main point is the danger of reflection and its attendant 
rationalization. We know that in conscience rationalization eliminates its 
dictates and categorical character. The thing is that the person should grow 
in such functional immediacy, in such readiness to the call of what is right. 
Any intrusions from reflection may interfere with this readiness. We read in his 
Philosophical Notebook “that one man sees what another does, that A & B are 
alike arises from no comparison & discrimination of outlines, complexion, fea-
ture etc. but it arises from the way in which he, (& not another perhaps) looks 
at them. It is a kind of intuition, and hence it is very difficult to separate what is 
called reasoning from intuition.”179 Hence, we are constantly reminded that we 
think and reason with the whole of our person. It is not merely an individual 
intellect that sifts through separate elements of the problem being studied, but 
the whole person who intuits about it.
 178 Ibid., 279.







Counter to the rationalist- empiricist view, Newman observes that minds are 
exposed to “unperceived impressions” (I shall talk about these further on) and 
such impressions often constitute their composition. Indeed, we have in our 
minds unperceived impressions which we cannot explain, as well as concepts 
which we can account for. The religious idea, the living idea, appears in our 
mind not primarily as a concept, but as a reality. For example, we could say 
that the situation resembles a hurried glance at something: we have seen it, 
but do not know precisely what it was. Certainly, we know it was real. We come 
to meet it half- way by being open to it, via an intensive quest for that which 
we have thus cursorily perceived. Something impresses our mind, arouses it, 
alarms it, and takes possession of it. The living idea touches the mind, pen-
etrates the mind from the inside and is entirely different from a mere report 
of sense data, or from a response to sense data. It is profound, it is reliable, 
although we may not be able to give an account of it. Even Edith Stein, after 
having assented to the truth of what she had read, would not have been able 
to explain why, or to define what actually was the truth. Growth in this sense 
would mean a readiness and openness to be thus possessed. In order to avoid 
misunderstandings, as the word “openness” has become very fashionable these 
days, that openness in Newman’s context is openness to God’s words.
The “activity of our reflexive powers” implies a process by which to arrive at 
secondary ideas, i.e. the creation of our minds, but, unlike for the empiricist, 
for Newman an explicit form is not necessary. Locke would call it enthusiasm 
and, in fact, an irrational attitude. Newman thereby postulated his own form 
of the objectivity of the religious idea: it is objective although not conceptually 
apprehended. What is necessary for true growth in religious matters is realisa-
tion and possession on the part of man. The religious state of mind, if I may say 
so, is thus akin to mysticism and poetry. It seems that Newman alludes to the 
mystic experience of the desert, of emptiness, and of impenetrable darkness. 
Despite this state of confusion and conceptual obscurity, the religious person 
moves forward.
Our inward knowledge is real and permanent and distant from confession, 
it “unconsciously supplies the mind with spiritual life and peace.”180 An unper-
ceived impression, we may infer, stands in opposition to a perceived impres-
sion. The latter is an impression that is derived from a well- known experience 
and has been processed by our reflexive power. Newman challenges the well- 
known rationalist- empiricist paradigm of the origin of knowledge reduced 
only to scientific knowledge, which is especially inadequate when applied to 
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human nature. Such principal terms as “Person,” “Substance,” “Incarnation” 
are hidden to us, that is, we use them in our language, but their contents are 
hidden. We come to anticipate them darkly through our senses, but we can 
never entirely grasp their meaning. For Kant, as we know, they are also hidden 
and incomprehensible, therefore he postulated them as categories of practical 
reason. Kant’s proposal is, here, a special kind of ruse. The sphere which theo-
retical reason fails to reach can become a postulate of practical reason. When 
Newman distances himself from reason, he does not refer to that which is irra-
tional, but rather he is aware that, due to the insufficiency of reason, the reality 
of the person transcends what pertains to reason. Thus, Newman distinguishes 
the world of notions and the world of reality, not in order to set these two 
worlds in opposition, but in order to show their essential otherness and, at the 
same time, complementariness. Man uses notions he defines since, otherwise, 
he would not be able to develop science. Science, by its nature, should be an 
area of intersubjective comprehension or intelligibility, as the metaphysician 
would say. Otherwise, common research would not be possible for those peo-
ple who pursue science; it would not be possible to know it.
25 Faith and Reason
The world of reality is different than the world of science and theory, especially 
in the area of faith and morality. It eludes the reductive function of notions; it 
calls not so much for knowledge and definition, as for an answer, action, expe-
rience, and commitment. It is a world that cannot be ignored with aloof or 
despondent neutrality, a world that has absolute claims to its truths, for it con-
cerns the whole of man, his ultimate goal and destiny. There are realities here 
that are impressed on our minds, but not in the form of clear- cut concepts, 
categories or judgements in the first place. Rather, we approach them when 
we react like children, “for what is short of truth in the letter may be to them 
the most perfect truth […].”181 If we were to compare Kant and Newman in this 
respect, we might imagine that Newman’s response to Kant’s dilemma would 
be the following: yes, this is true, our reason is helpless to conceive of such 
things, but it is not reason that confronts them but the person. We do not have 
to posit anything, we have to open our minds and hearts. It is not the capacity of 
our mind, or the vastness of our imperatives that make up for the insufficiency 
of our knowledge in religious and moral matters, but the extent to which we 





can confide in Him who is the Person. It matters much to what extent we can 
unfold ourselves and allow ourselves to be possessed. Likewise, we are always 
called upon not to reason, but to trust, to follow, and to bear witness. Reason is 
ultimately guided by Faith, when “it is content to be a little child […].”182 The 
line of progress in Newman runs towards simplicity. His concept of simplic-
ity, however, is completely different to Rousseau’s. Newman does not assume 
that human beings are primarily pure and innocent. On the contrary, man is 
primarily weak and sinful, a creature that is apt to rebellion and in need of con-
version. Conversion is supposed to occur not by dismantling the whole social 
order in a revolutionary coup, but through self- transformation. Metaphorically 
speaking, Rousseau is presented as starting as a child; Newman is ending as a 
child. In his view, man strives towards childhood till the end of his life. I think 
we may call Rousseau’s ideal childishness, and Newman’s humility.
This is a very interesting point. As we can see, for Newman, unlike for 
Enlightenment thinkers, we arrive at certain knowledge— in practical 
matters— individually, not when we rise to the universal level of reasoned 
notions. And certain knowledge is co- equal in Newman with persons who are 
certain of something, and this, in turn, does not mean that they rise to the point 
of clarity and distinctness of concepts. On the contrary, they often fail the test 
of notional clarity and distinctness, as we expect them to give reasons why 
they hold to some truths. Therefore in our interpersonal relationships we have 
to always take it as a matter of fact that, aside from the universal fabric of what 
is commonly shared by virtue of universal logic, there are principles and val-
ues which other people hold, but which are incommunicable and yet remain 
the source of their inner life. In reasoning, they then appear more important 
than impersonal rules. (If two people from the same house or the same street 
are so different, so much more different are those who belong to two different 
cultures). The end- process of progress for Newman would be persons who are 
certain of how to act well, not persons who can define a good act. Newman’s 
reasoning in these matters borrowed much from the romantic school, the 
Alexandrian Fathers, Augustine, the Oriel Noetics, and, above all, the phronesis 
tradition that went back to Aristotle. In this tradition was grounded Newman’s 
illative sense, which has already been mentioned, according to which, in our 
thinking, we rely on “implicit reasoning” and “implicit inference,” “natural 
inference.” To be more precise, we might even speak of personal reasoning 
and personal inference.183 Newman literary calls it “personal reasoning” in his 
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Grammar of Assent, of which mention has already been made. As we can see, 
we are elaborating here on Newman’s phenomenology (or hermeneutics) of 
thinking.
This spontaneous process of development that has been discussed here is 
derived from the fact that, as individual persons, each of us reasons differently. 
We have different, “cogitative methods,” as Newman called it, and “the territory 
of thought is portioned out in a hundred different ways.”184 Much of our men-
tal endowment depends on the principles we hold, rather than on the univer-
sal rules of reasoning. Thus, different people may interpret the same facts of 
experience differently. This does not mean that we are completely in the dark 
as to what is true or false in development, that our cogitative method cannot 
be put to the test. In other words, much can be said about the value of life, but 
words are always inadequate and far inferior to one simple deed of courage 
when, for instance, someone offers his life for someone else.
This state of affairs is aptly rendered by Edith Stein’s phenomenological 
analysis. I mean here especially her thoughts on the relationship between 
belief and faith (fides) and this particular situation where belief is transformed 
into conviction and becomes close to fides. The latter term means to take a 
stance, one’s own act, a thing that ideally corresponds with Newman’s term 
realize; it is not an established opinion, but a personal response.
26 The Explicit versus the Implicit and Being Possessed
This thrust of ideas and their realization are closely related to another of 
Newman’s term, namely that of possession, or rather of being possessed. The 
state of being possessed is, in turn, related to the two levels existent in the per-
son: explicit and implicit. I have already alluded to this issue numerous times 
in this work. I mean the essential discrepancy between the person’s belief and 
his capacity to account for this belief in an intersubjectively comprehensive 
message.
As we know from this text, in order to assent to the truth we do not have to 
acquire a complete command of the idea that is presented, for the obvious rea-
son that the idea is often too complex to be grasped in toto; furthermore, it may 
be of a dynamic nature and, under the process of development, it contains ele-
ments which are there and elements which are to become. Certain aspects wait 
to become unfolded by personal experience, discovered rather than conceived. 





It is not the intellectual structure of the idea, however, that determines our 
assent, but its life— such is Newman’s definite conclusion. Undoubtedly, 
Christianity is such an idea, therefore it is capable of possessing people’s 
minds, to enflame them and to be conveyed from one person to another. Our 
comprehension, being more or less clear, can facilitate our assent, but does 
not necessitate it. If it did, only those who were intellectually knowledgeable 
would stand a chance at accepting what is presented to them. Newman is 
obviously referring to his text about consulting the faithful in matters of doc-
trine.185 This consulting does not mean actually asking the faithful, but rather 
observing their genuine experience of faith, especially in its historical context. 
Newman was amazed at the fact that in the past, when various heresies would 
put the educated divines off their orthodoxical doctrine, the simple believers 
could stand firmly by their faith.
In his University Sermons, he observes that “the inward idea of divine truth 
[…] passes into explicit form by the activity of our reflective powers, still such 
an actual delineation is not essential to its genuineness and perfection.”186 
A simple and uneducated believer may not be able, and he often is not, to 
provide a formal demonstration on behalf of that to which he has assented. 
Newman adds a yet more radical characterization: “But what is remarkable at 
first sight is this, that there is good reason for saying that the impression made 
upon the mind need not even be recognized by the parties possessing it. It is 
not proof that persons are not possessed, because they are not conscious, of 
an idea. Nothing is of more frequent occurrence, whether in things sensible 
or intellectual, than the existence of such unperceived impressions.”187 And 
here we arrive at yet another key term in Newman, i.e. being possessed. When 
we possess something, we can retain a certain safe distance between the thing 
possessed and the possessor. It is an intellectual distance filled in by reflec-
tion. But in the case of being possessed by something, such a distance disap-
pears. We are in the hands of an idea, if I may say so somewhat metaphorically. 
Indeed, Stein’s confusion after having read Teresa of Avila’s book or seen Mrs 
 185 I mean the revolutionary text published in the Rambler (July, 1859 — interestingly 
enough, in the year of Darwin’s publication), entitled On Consulting the Faithful in Matters 
of Doctrine. Monsignor George Talbot (1816– 1886) should be especially mentioned here 
as the person always rushing to report to Rome on what was going on in England. The 
Church was not ready yet for the elevated role of the laity (she had to wait until the 
Second Vatican Council). And to Bishop Ullathorne’s impertinent (with a marked aloof-
ness) question “Who are the Laity?” Newman answered “that the Church would look fool-
ish without them” (See M. Trevor, Light in Winter, 201).
 186 J. H. Newman, University Sermons, 320.
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Reinach or noticed the simple woman praying in the church— all of which are 
unperceived impressions— leaves the reader, the onlooker perplexed but not 
knowing why. A living idea exerts such impressions; they are powerful but not 
comprehensible, because they are not products of an individual mind!
When a living idea gets into one’s mind, it begins to operate within, but it is 
too rich to be grasped. It is “commensurate with the sum total of its possible 
aspects,” which vary “in the separate consciousness of individuals.”188 Various 
minds react to it in different ways. In respect of this idiosyncratic compliance, 
the idea, for some minds, appears to be real, for others, not. Indeed, we per-
ceive an individual mind inasmuch as we perceive an object, i.e. from its vari-
ous sides. Then, after an examination of its numerous aspects, they are consol-
idated and brought into one object, i.e. the dogmatic structure of the Catholic 
faith, for instance.
A real idea cannot be exhausted. If it is complex and contains many aspects, 
they can be, in turn, analysed separately. Christianity, for instance, contains 
a plethora of aspects, as I have already said, for it is “dogmatical, devotional, 
practical all at once; it is esoteric and exoteric; it is indulgent and strict; it is 
light and dark; it is love, and it is fear.”189 A living idea may contain elements 
which, on analysis, are even contradictory; its task is to give life, not to satisfy 
the intellect. When an idea is capable of arresting and possessing the mind, it 
is said to have life, “to live in the mind which is its recipient.”190 Mathematical 
ideas cannot be said to be called living, although— let us admit— there are 
mathematical problems, e.g. the theory of prime numbers, which have held 
many minds in their grip. Newman claims that only great ideas which concern 
human nature can be called living. He writes: “when some great enunciation, 
whether true or false, about human nature, or present good, or government, 
or duty, or religion, is carried forward into the public throng of men and draws 
attention, then it is not merely received passively in this or that form into many 
minds, but it becomes an active principle within them, leading them to an 
ever- new contemplation of itself, to an application of it in various directions, 
and a propagation of it on every side.”191
Only to such ideas are we ready to devote much time by returning to their 
original thrust in contemplation. Such are the great philosophical ideas on 
human nature or the rights of man. They arouse interest and stir up emotions; 
in a word, they create commotion. Let us look at how the author beautifully 
 188 J. H. Newman, The Development of Christian Doctrine, 34.












characterises Christianity which— as he says— “differs from other religions 
and philosophies, in what is superadded to earth from heaven; not in kind, but 
in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics; being informed 
and quickened by what is more than intellect, but a divine spirit.”192
Persons are often baffled about the ideas they have. Their minds remain 
under a gradual and tranquil expansion. There is no abrupt revolution, but 
a steady process of “the development, in explicit form, of what was already 
latent within it.”193 Indeed, our hesitation about Newman’s being a mystic 
or not can readily be solved by this quotation from his University Sermons, 
in which the future Cardinal describes what is otherwise well- known from 
mystical experience: “Moreover, it is a question whether that strange and 
painful feeling of unreality, which religious men experience from time to 
time, when nothing seems true, or good, or right, or profitable, when Faith 
seems a name, and duty a mockery, and all endeavours to do right, absurd and 
hopeless, and all things forlorn and dreary, as if religion were wiped out from 
the world, may not be the direct effect of the temporary obscuration of some 
master vision, which unconsciously supplies the mind with spiritual life and 
peace.”194 This picture perfectly fits that which, in other contexts, is described 
as the mystical night. A person who is supposed to assent to the truth is actu-
ally going through darkness in his life. Therefore, Newman concludes that 
“the reality and permanence of inward knowledge [is] distinct from explicit 
confession.”195
Let us also observe in passing that in the case of divine truth, all minds are 
simple and uneducated. This seems to me to be simply a logical conclusion 
drawn from the consideration of the nature of what is divine. If a finite being 
is confronted with what is infinite, there is no gradation. No matter how many 
steps a person takes towards the palace of knowledge, he has barely managed 
to comprehend it. Therefore, I would like to put forward the following the-
ses: when Edith Stein really assented to what she had read, it was not her intel-
lectual prowess that helped her assent, but the simplicity of her personality. It 
was not her educational preparation that had set the scene for acquiescence, 
but her personal transparency. This point will be discussed at greater length 
when we talk about the abyss of existence.
 192 Ibid., 57.
 193 J. H. Newman, University Sermons, 321.
 194 Ibid., 322.
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27 Faith Above, Not against, Reason
Edith Stein excellently and succinctly explained how she understood the place 
of reason in concrete matters in her letter to Roman Ingarden. We read in this 
letter: “It seems that first, using the intellect, you have to approach the limits 
of reason and then come to the door of mystery. Perhaps Newman can help 
you with it, although his point of departure is quite different. In any case, I will 
send Letters and Diaries as soon as it is printed.
I hope it is perfectly clear that it is not my intention to describe my way as 
the way. I am fundamentally convinced that there are as many ways to Rome 
as there are human minds and hearts. Perhaps the intellectual way comes off 
badly with the representation of my way. In the years of preparation for my 
conversion it had a strong influence on me. However, realistically considered, 
not ‘feelings’ but real events, along with the concrete image of Christianity 
in the words of witnesses (Augustine, Francis, Teresa), were decisive for me. 
However, how shall I describe for you in a few words an image of each ‘real 
event’? An infinite world opens up something entirely new when you once 
begin to live the interior instead of the exterior life. All prior realities become 
transparent; the genuine sustaining and motivating strengths become percep-
tible. Previous conflicts become trivial! The individual comes to understand a 
life filled with passion and blessedness that those living a worldly life do not 
know and cannot grasp, something that from the outside appears as the most 
uneventful day in a totally inconspicuous human existence. And how strange 
it appears when you live among those who see only the superficial and never 
notice anything else in the world around them.”196
Let me stress several points from Stein’s letter. First, she does not want “to 
describe her way” as “the way.” This is a very Newmanian approach in which 
every person is responsible for his own choice, which he must realize in him-
self, rather than blindly following someone. Second, despite the importance of 
the affective side of the human being, it is not “feeling” that drove her on, but 
a “real event,” another beautiful recapitulation of the strong theme shared by 
Newman and Stein. And, third, the “real event” can hardly be rendered in the 
form of an intellectual representation. Indeed, Newman expressed his help-
lessness to describe what drove him on by simply asking: “What have I done 
thus to be deserted, thus to be left to take the wrong course, if it is wrong?”; 
nor was Stein able to explain why her emotions were aroused on seeing peace 
in Reinach’s widow’s face, the simple woman sunk in prayer, or when reading 





Teresa of Avila’s text. Such were their real events and such were their personal 
responses, but it would be impossible to precisely account for their place and 
time. They were lone wanderers under the burden of their personal responsi-
bilities. Of course, she could not describe in words what struck here as unper-
ceived impressions— it was real, but incomprehensible.
Newman, for his part, reflected on the question of reason and its limits 
in the Philosophical Notebook. There is an entry under the symbolical date 
of 1859, the year in which Charles Darwin published his renowned Origin 
of Species. The point was to distinguish between things which are against 
reason and those which are beyond reason. He opens his considerations with 
a quote from St Thomas Aquinas. Things that are against reason cannot be 
“repelled,” and things that are beyond (above) reason cannot be “solved or 
explained.” Now, an objection that is unrepellible is against reason, and a 
question that is insoluble is above reason. We need to distinguish between 
the questions that are unrepellible and those that are insoluble. The insol-
uble question is above reason. There is nothing in the Christian Faith that 
is against reason, therefore there are no objections against it which cannot 
be repelled. At the same time, there are many things which are above rea-
son, therefore there are many questions about it “which cannot be solved or 
explained.”197 Moreover, Newman argues that we need to distinguish between 
“unanswerable” and “perplexity.” There are no questions which cannot be 
answered, hence there is nothing in Christianity that is repelling, although it 
may be difficult to understand. Here, again, we meet the fundamental word 
“system.” When talking about Christianity, we should not be dealing with 
its fragmented elements in isolation from the whole of it. Therefore, in the 
sense of “answer” any objections against Christianity can be “answered.” If 
it were not possible to “answer” them, they would be against reason. At the 
same time, “there are many […] <questions about> the Christian faith which 
cannot possibly be answered, and if they all could be answered, there would 
be nothing in the Christian Faith above reason.” This problem results from 
the imperfection of our human intellect. The intellect cannot reach “those 
truths by which the questions about the Faith are duly explained or solved.” 
Therefore, Christianity is not against, but rather above, reason: supra and 
non contra rationem, the token of the insoluble question and the untenable 
objection.198
 197 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 101.
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28 The Infinite Abyss of Existence
We have inside us this “instinctive sense” of, or faith in, other testimonies “on 
which to ground our certitude.”199 The reason for this is that we confide in 
what we hear, rather than doubt everything until a clear and distinct demon-
stration is granted. Our natural condition is that we are not faced with clear or 
distinct ideas, but with antecedent probabilities, as we have already said. We 
can assent to truth despite mere probabilities, owing to our personal sense of 
integrity. Chaos or disintegration is not necessarily something entirely nega-
tive. We can always treat it as a chance to grow, to pull ourselves together no 
matter what happens, because we can confront the unpredictability of events 
with the vastness of the abyss of our existence.
Newman has often been accused of egocentrism, that he is writing only 
about himself. I think such an objection is incredibly oversimplified and based 
on a complete misunderstanding. I would rather talk about his, almost reli-
gious, respect for the sanctuary of the human person and regard for human 
limitations. How could he have learned respect if he had ignored his own lim-
itations? And, examining his own life, he had learned patience and humility. We 
can most adequately summarize his position in the following question: what 
could we be, if we only realized what we are? But the point is that each person is 
placed within his own ethos. He needs to comprehend it in order to respond 
to a given circumstance. Because we do not know exactly the basic structure 
of someone else’s ethos, we may rightly call it a shadow or a being hidden in 
his own shadow. Therefore, Newman writes “that every being in that great con-
course is his own centre, and all things about him are but shades […]. He has 
his own hopes and fears, desires, judgments, and aims; he is everything to him-
self, and no one else is really any thing. He has a depth within him unfathom-
able, an infinite abyss of existence; and the scene in which he bears part for the 
moment is but like a gleam of sunshine upon its surface.”200 This beautiful pas-
sage perfectly renders what Edith Stein defined as primeval life, and of which 
I shall talk later. What is this centre from which decisions come? Is it our good 
nature, as Rousseau put it? Is it practical reason, as Kant wanted it?
If the individual is “the abyss of existence,” as Newman claims he is, how can 
this abyss express itself through a concrete form? And how can the infinite find 
a concrete form? A form that is, of necessity, finite. The abyss of freedom is in 
quest for a form. Only through a frame, imposed on chaos, can the individual 
 199 J. H. Newman, Grammar, 237.







make his or her life meaningful. And if the individual is “an abyss,” nothing 
short of an abyss can give it the form. The abyss, by definition, is unnameable. 
It is indeed a great challenge to place the abyss of existence within frames. They 
must be co- equal to the task at hand. The conclusion is logical enough: the 
human abyss of existence must be placed within the frames of God’s abyss. 
Otherwise, the infinite can never be squeezed into a finite form. Man is a mys-
tery to himself. This mystery can be grasped only by Someone who is capable 
of penetrating all the intricate, idiosyncratic pathways of the unfathomable 
human abyss.
The American Newman scholar, John Crosby, who comments on this 
passage in his book The Personalism of John Henry Newman, refers to the 
infinite number, in itself a proper analogy in the context of Newman, as the 
Cardinal was interested in mathematics. Nothing can be added or deduced 
from the infinite number. Therefore, the human being, in his relationship 
with the world, is like the infinite number in relation to the finite numbers. 
Everything that we experience, everything within the range of the empirical 
I— to use Kantian parlance— is indeed nothing in relation to human infin-
ity. It is “like a gleam of sunshine.” In order to bring this infinity round to 
action the centre must rule over the vast area of hidden (implicit) shadows. 
Speaking somewhat metaphorically, we can say that the infinite actor plays 
a finite role. How can one rule over infinity? Or, does one have to? Not by 
accomplishing certainty from without, but by arriving at certitude within. 
Infinity, by its nature, cannot be placed within finitude. We are surrounded 
by a set of infinite existences. For matters of simplicity, we treat each human 
being as a set whole, but it is a composite rather than a solid figure (a well- 
defined exemplar of a larger whole). When Newman uses the word “whole” 
in the context of the human being, what he means is that man can make 
himself a whole when integrated. Again, let me resort to mathematical or 
even physical analogies. We are dealing here with quantum mechanics, with 
infinitesimal magnitudes. They can be expressed by mathematical formulae 
but cannot be measured.
Certainty cannot grasp “an infinite abyss of existence,” because the former 
contains a rigid formula; it is the Newtonian world. The abyss, for its part, flows 
out, exceeding the limited frames; it belongs to the medium of infinitesimal 
magnitudes. Its shapes overflow.
Which of these cases fits Stein’s assent to the Christian truth after she had 
read Teresa’s book? What is the precondition for her assent? I think that the 
foundation is the fundamental simplicity and inherent reality that create 
the potency for the act of real assent. Any person who has been real has a 
chance to thus assent. I understand inherent reality as internal undividedness. 
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And the phrase “has been real” must be understood as “using real words” in 
Newman’s sense.
29 The Real versus Unreal Words
This section studies the discrepancy between the words and images, between 
the notions and reality. Jean Guitton perfectly characterises our times when he 
writes: “Our civilisation oversaturated with knowledge and means of knowl-
edge offers so many masks and false supports that man no longer knows what 
he knows and does not know.”201 The French philosopher is naturally writing 
about the twentieth century, but these negative tendencies diagnosed then are 
even more pronounced today. The old revolutionary battle cry écrasez l’enfâme, 
which, during the French Revolution, was aimed at the absolutist aristocracy, 
in the twentieth century was turned against the bourgeoisie and erupted in the 
1968 revolt. As it usually happens with all revolutions, they are based on sev-
eral naïve presumptions among which one prevails: it is enough to remove the 
wrong form in order to dig out the good man from under the rubble of false-
hood and pretence. Such is Rousseau’s immortal illusion. Newman’s response 
to that would be simple: it will do no good to change the external form, man 
must bring out his true self. The revolutionaries go by way of opposites, which 
is hardly ever a good solution. If the old (bourgeois) society respected certain 
codes of behaviour, let us have no codes; if they venerated tact, shame, and 
secrecy, let us proclaim openness and shamelessness. If they insisted on lim-
itations, let us opt for absolute freedom (even though they call it licence). In 
such circumstances, false words abound, and lofty declarations are plentiful. 
It is true that abuses must be denounced, there is no doubt about it, but they 
cannot be cured by the method of substitutive oppositions.
Since we are immersed in shadows, it is only right to ask about our real 
whereabouts: where are you talking to me from? Are you really there? And 
the words you are formulating, are they really yours? Do they belong to your 
interior, to your true self, or are you merely repeating foreign words? What 
do the words reflect? Are they someone’s words or merely general opinions? 
What is their context? Their ethos? Does the speaker live in reality, or only 
aphoristically— to use Kierkegaard’s term? Such are the words designed to test 
the reality and place of the speaker. They tend to settle whether the speaker is 
 201 J. Guitton, Le travail intellectuel : conseils a ceux qui étudient et a ceux qui écrivent, 





really present in the reality he is telling us about. Or else he is merely looking at 
something which, for him, is inaccessible because he himself does not believe 
that he could stand by the reality he is talking about. And even if he criticizes 
something, i.e. he is expressing a negative opinion about a reality in which he 
would not like to participate, we still do not know whether he means what he 
is saying. When we speak words that give lie to what we really think, we pro-
nounce unreal words.
The history of mankind can be viewed in this way that, for instance, orig-
inal sin, the first fall, can be regarded as the first moment of unreality. The 
story of the first fall is paradigmatic unreality— the ideal type of all unrealities. 
The first man wrought a kind of cleavage between words and their meaning— 
the essence of how Newman understands unreality. Adam heard the ques-
tion: ‘Adam, where are you?’. And he answered, contrary to the facts: ‘I have 
hidden myself because I am naked.’202 Such is the origin of paradigmatic unre-
ality and paradigmatic lying for all the future generations to come. Adam knew 
that nakedness was not the main reason for his hiding (as if man could hide 
from God!), nor did he know the meaning of nakedness, that it was something 
to be ashamed of, something that should be hidden. With this unreality, man 
came to the false conclusion that he could cover all embarrassing situations 
with unreal words. Thus, he ushered onto the stage of human history decep-
tion, distortion, and equivocation. As his behaviour was censored for that, he 
ultimately invented a non- judgmental attitude and political correctness as the 
mark of obligatory decorum. And he learnt not to treat his life too seriously. 
Life is just a game to be played for others or for oneself. To have fun, to amuse 
oneself, and to amuse others, other actors. In this manner, the story of unreal-
ity unfolded.
The gap between the real and unreal words may come from the fact that 
we often hear that sublime doctrines should correspond to the like feelings. 
And, in this context, the Romantic poet writes down the accusation of the 
false poet: “Thou playest to strange ears of unconceived delights … Thou draw-
est forth tears. But thou thyself, what feelest thou? What dost thou create? 
Through thee floweth a stream of beauty, but thou art not beauty. Woe unto 
thee! The child that weeps on its nurse’s bosom, the flower of the fields that is 
unconscious of its fragrance, have more merit before the Lord than thou.”203 
 202 Cf. Gn 3:8– 10.
 203 Z. Krasiński, The Undivine Comedy, quoted after Monica M. Gardner, The Anonymous Poet 
of Poland Zygmunt Krasinski, Cambridge: At the University Press, 1919, 95– 96. A classic 
example here is Jean Jacques Rousseau, who sent all five of his children to an orphanage, 
whereas, at the same time, he produced sublime, noble treaties on education in which he 
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These words come from the pen of one of the great Polish romantic poets, 
Zygmunt Krasiński (1812– 1859). In his The Undivine Comedy we find this clash, 
this inadequacy between words and deeds. The Philosopher from Krasiński’s 
drama is a porte- parole of the Enlightenment encyclopaedists who ardently 
believed in human progress. It is interesting that the Polish romantic poet 
calls his belief “self- willed belief,”204 a phrase that emphasises human self- will, 
rather than religious belief.205 We must remember that, for Newman (and this 
places him outside the circle of fideists), the act of faith is a special (personal) 
intellectual act.
We sooner learn the doctrines than their attendant feelings. Newman was 
well aware of this psychological regularity. This is one of the reasons why pro-
fessions are often not accompanied by attendant feelings. In the Parochial 
and Plain Sermons we read that man knows about the necessary association 
between doctrines and feelings. “But in truth he perhaps does not really believe 
them absolutely, because such absolute belief is the work of a long time, and 
therefore his profession of feeling outruns the real inward existence of feeling, 
or he becomes unreal.” And then the author formulates his warning: “Let us 
never lose sight of two truths,— that we ought to have our hearts penetrated 
with the love of Christ and full of self- renunciation; but that if they be not, 
professing that they are does not make them so.”206 In like manner, people 
speak about the shortness and vanity of life, using commonplaces because so 
they think this is expected of them. Profession outruns our emotions because 
real feelings take time. We should look at things, not words. “There is but one 
right way; it is the way in which God looks at the world.”207 This conclusion is 
very Augustianian in nature. Newman calls for sincerity and authenticity, in 
which we say what we mean and we mean what we say: “Let us aim at meaning 
across here as a negative example, because he himself stressed the importance of loving 
the group at the expense of the individual.
 204 Ibid., 203.
 205 I am proposing here the phrase “self- willed belief,” because the 1875 English translation 
“intuitive conviction” does not render exactly the meaning of the Polish phrase, which is 
“samowolna wiara.” This phrase perfectly fits Newman’s criticism of the general tendency 
to be guided by pain or pleasure, and his criticism of the counterfeit of conscience, which 
has already been mentioned. Furthermore, the phrase “wilful belief” may suggest here the 
Protestant understanding of Christian faith in which the principle of sola fide is dominant 
and the process of the privatisation of religion is well under way. The “self- willed belief” 
can only be present where the individual relies on his own private opinion rather than 
on the teaching of the Church. It was extremely important for Newman to always think 
within the bosom of the Church.
 206 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 975.










what we say, and saying what we mean; let us aim at knowing when we under-
stand a truth, and when we do not.”208 In Grammar of Assent, Newman’s accu-
satory voice resounds in his words when he writes: “We sometimes find men 
loud in their admiration of truths which they never profess.”209 And in one 
of his sermons he notes that people “do not really dwell on what they pro-
fess to believe.”210 There are two reasons for this: we can blame the agent for 
his superficiality and ignorance, or else this inadequacy results from the very 
nature of the matter given to consideration. What we can deduce from the 
importance of real words is that the most important thing is to avoid the dubi-
ousness that sneaks in between the subject and the object. The subject can be 
in error, but should never be divided inside, i.e. he should never intentionally 
lie as to his real attitude. Inasmuch as we elaborate on the sacrifice of expiation 
and account for it in many words, we still do not know why this was necessary.
I would like to explain what I mean by way of illustration. Let us imagine 
a ladder. Each rung of the ladder denotes a word. The real word is the rung 
on which we are actually putting our foot. This rung is my reality. Not only do 
I pronounce a single word, as I am ascending the ladder, but I am physically 
touching it, feeling it or, rather, feeling the reality hidden behind it. Some rungs 
are below me— they are no longer mine; some rungs are above me— they are 
not yet mine. The past should not be mixed with the future, and the present 
must be acknowledged. Obviously, the past is present in memory; the future 
is present in hope. Memory and hope must not be replaced. The difference 
between real and unreal words resembles our considerations on the use of the 
word ergo in inference. When ergo is used merely in its logical sense, barely 
touching the person, it can be actual without being real; it is formally present, 
but is devoid of any substance. Therefore, ergo (like the unreal word) can be 
only superficial (notional) without being real.
That is why he delved into himself, devoted himself to writing letters, and 
committed his literary talent to Apologia pro Vita Sua. This particular intro-
spection into oneself had nothing of a display or a showcase. Rather, Newman 
sought to probe whether he was real in what he was saying, whether he had 
realized what he decided to teach. Newman wrote his Apologia not to prove 
he had never made any mistakes; such a task would be futile and, in fact, dan-
gerous, for it would bring forth the poisonous fruit of pride. He wrote in order 
to find out whether he had been hypocritical in his words or deeds. And he 
found no guilt in his conduct (which does not mean that it was infallible); let 
 208 Ibid., 979.
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us repeat again that it is better to be the sincere persecutor Saul than the false 
apostle Judas.
John Henry is thus trying to bring this message home to his former Anglican 
brethren who accused him of betrayal and opportunism, and to his actual 
Catholic fellow- believers who might doubt his sincerity.211 Prison wardens say 
that the most difficult thing is to witness change in petty thieves; it is easier 
for murderers. The thieves have a tendency to belittle their guilt, to explain 
it away, or even justify it. After all, they stole from those who had too much, 
as they themselves reckoned. Therefore, in the New Testament those who are 
most harshly reproved are not, if I may say so, sincere sinners, but hypocritical 
devotees, those who falsely regret what they have done.
30 Real Adherence (Not Notional), Personal Adherence to the 
Word of God
The worst thing is when we use unreal words, an outcome typical of the sit-
uation in which one says words contrary to the actual state of one’s mind. In 
one of Fulton Sheen’s books we find an apt description of this condition: “Very 
harmful effects can follow accepting the philosophy which denies personal 
guilt or sin and thereby makes everyone nice. By denying sin, the nice people 
make a cure impossible. […] By refusing to admit to personal guilt, the nice 
people are made into scandalmongers, gossips, talebearers, and supercritics, 
for they must project their real if unrecognized guilt to others. This, again, gives 
them a new illusion of goodness: the increase of faultfinding is in direct ratio 
and proportion to the denial of sin. […] It is a fact of human experience that 
the more experience we have with sin— our own sin— the less we are con-
scious of it. In all other things, we learn by experience; in sin, we unlearn by 
experience.”212
Contemporary man, to use the Kierkegaardian metaphor, is always shrink-
ing from his tomb, from the tomb of his duty, of his authentic existence. He 
can fulfil his fortune, but he shuns it, always finding excuses. The tomb is the 
way of the cross for the individual, not Hegelian History or the State. That is 
the essence of human despair. Hegel claimed that man can fulfil his destiny by 
 211 When Newman claimed that the Thirty- Nine Articles (the Anglican creed) could be inter-
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part of the queen. (See G. St Aubyn, Queen Victoria. A Portrait, London: Sinclair- Stevenson 
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being buried in the objective being of the State, i.e. his whimsical individual-
ity can be mastered and controlled within the confines of the objective legal 
system. Does it suffice? Kierkegaard (1813– 1855) protested against this out-
come. In order to fulfil our destiny, we need to enter the tomb of our individ-
ual fortune, and we can do this. That is why the tomb in the East is filled and 
happy and the tomb in the West is empty and unhappy. Kierkegaard, therefore, 
had an excellent insight into all the consequences of what we are confront-
ing at the moment. As Alasdair MacIntyre mentions, the attempts are made 
“to diminish central Christian doctrine in a way that would make it accept-
able to post- Enlightenment culture, the culture of encyclopedia.” Such was 
the post- Cartesian and post- Kantian heritage which, in the late- nineteenth 
century, sought to subject theology to rationalist standards; this subjection 
meant “rejecting, modifying, and truncating theism until it became a doctrine 
acceptable within the framework imposed by the encyclopaedist’s unitary 
and ahistorical conception of rationality […].” Such attempts must have been 
taken seriously by Kierkegaard in the first half of the nineteenth century and 
by Newman almost throughout the whole century. MacIntyre writes: “these 
recurrent attempts evoked a variety of theological restatements, of which 
Kierkegaard’s and Newman’s were among the most notable.”213
Let me present an example of this ahistorical approach, an example that 
appears to be quite common today. There are people who are silent about 
the orthodoxy within the Catholic Church— for the sake of fear or political 
correctness— a tendency that is characteristic of a peculiar type of aggiorna-
mento, especially popular with some parts of the western hierarchies in their 
openness to the contemporary world. Therefore, they resort to some linguistic 
games instead. Because the word “Catholic” is derived from the Latin “catholi-
cus,” they say, and the latter means “general,” then “Catholic” can be reduced to 
“all- inclusiveness,” “instant culture,” “latitudinarianism,” “comprehensiveness 
of belief.” It must be noted that such an attitude had brought the Anglican 
Church to a deadly standstill in the nineteenth century and created what was 
later labeled as the “Broad Church.” And we come to a paradoxical hybrid, a 
strange qui pro quo, where all opinions are accepted and the question of truth 
is suspended. Like in Macbeth, we have a mixture of many elements: fair is foul 
and foul is fair. A mere linguistic foundation for the Church seems to be a very 
insecure foundation for a solid edifice as the Church undoubtedly should be. 
Too broad an approach may certainly satisfy the requirements of a fashionable 
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tolerance, but shall not establish a dogmatic institution. In this maelstrom of 
proposals, set against the vast panorama of ideas, skepticism may have the 
final say.
The notional assent introduces us into what Kierkegaard called the aph-
oristical way of living. He called it “the religion of the aphoristical and the 
accidental”; we “live aphoristically, we who live withdrawn and segregate, like 
aphorisms in life, without community of men, without sharing their griefs and 
their joys; we who are not consonantal sounds in the alarums of life, but soli-
tary birds in the stillness of night, gathering together only occasionally, to be 
edified by considering the wretchedness of life, the length of the day, and the 
endless permanence of time; we […], who have no faith in the game of happi-
ness or the luck of fools, who believe in nothing save misfortune.”214 Living in 
aphorisms is living a non- committal life, as Michael Novak calls it. Those who 
are forever absent live either in hope or in memory. Only those who are present 
to themselves are happy. The unhappy man can be absent in his hope or in 
his memory. This penetrating psychological insight into the human psyche is 
indeed worthy of the most profound consideration.
The most important purpose of our life is to “obtain a correct knowledge of 
[ourselves]”— such is the fundamental direction of our life.215 When we profess 
great doctrines, we must be well aware whether we really mean what we thus 
pronounce, for “all those who neglect the duty of habitual self- examination 
are using words without meaning.”216 The point is then to know, i.e. to realize, 
the language I am using. Otherwise, “assent to a form of words which declares 
those doctrines […] is the same as a real holding of them, and belief in them, 
then it is equally possible to believe in a proposition the terms of which belong 
to some foreign language, which is obviously absurd.”217 Nevertheless, similar 
situations are very common. People think that when “they are familiar with 
words, they understand the ideas they stand for.”218 In like manner, some think 
that the mere repetition of the word “conscience,” a word which belongs to 
common language, makes those who repeat it people of conscience. Self- 
knowledge is especially crucial in the case of religion and morals. Newman 
stresses the fundamental importance of examining one’s heart first in order 
to use these words with meaning. He explains it thus: “For it is in proportion 
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as we search our hearts and understand our own nature, that we understand 
what is meant by an Infinite Governor and Judge; in proportion as we compre-
hend the nature of disobedience and our actual sinfulness, that we feel what 
is the blessing of the removal of sin, redemption, pardon, sanctification, which 
otherwise are mere words.”219 We should go inside and “read ourselves,” to set 
about a profound introspection. To know oneself is to plant religion inside. 
We should rather believe things, than words; “without self- knowledge you have 
no root in yourselves personally,”220 and to know oneself does not mean to 
achieve the transcendental level. Professing without understanding is of no 
avail, and the correct form of understanding is realizing. I shall talk about this 
at greater length when writing about Stein’s primeval life and man’s inmost 
depth. Now let us focus on the question of conscience, one of the strongest 
themes in Newman, and, naturally, an important point in the issue of the 
reality- unreality of words.
31 The Voice of Conscience
Our natural experience does not lead us automatically to belief, because it may 
just as well lead us to unbelief. We must start from faith, unless we wish to claim 
that external circumstances are capable of determining our belief. Therefore, 
Clive S. Lewis (1898– 1963), in the introduction to his book The Problem of Pain, 
brilliantly recapitulates the time when he was an atheist. Then, his interpreta-
tion of the world was entirely different than when he became a believer. And 
the interesting turning point was the moment of belief, which helped him 
gain a totally different view of the same experience. The conclusion for Lewis 
was obvious: it was not his experience that had brought about this change, 
but his transformed approach. And he notes: “The spectacle of the universe 
as revealed by experience can never have been the ground of religion: it must 
always have been something in spite of which religion, acquired from a differ-
ent source, was held.”221
Conscience, for Newman, is such a mysterious faculty that, while heard 
inside the agent, it is, at the same time, a telling sign of the supernatural. 
And the conscience is concerned with the particular. Any considerations of 
Newman are incomplete if there is nothing about the pivotal role of con-
science in his pursuits. Conscience is this special place where the natural is 
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mysteriously combined with the supernatural, and it is the place of personal 
encounter, in fact, the most important encounter between man and God.
Conscience is not “a rule of right conduct, but […] a sanction of right con-
duct.”222 It does not say how to do something, but evaluates whether our action 
is good or bad. Therefore, conscience does not provide any general rule on how 
to behave, but is a judgement attendant on our behaviour. We can make errors 
in our judgements, but this does not mean that we always behave in the same 
way. The sense of moral obligation and duty is shared by all, but it may be asso-
ciated with different actions. As Newman stresses, the knowledge that there 
is a right and wrong is notional, but its application is practical. Conscience 
depicted as a triangle with the innate element of synderesis and two acquired 
elements— science and wisdom— is individualized in each case. In other 
words, as Newman explains, “this sense of a particular judgment or sanction 
on the quality of [an] action is part of myself in the same way that existence, in 
the same that sensation, consciousness, reasoning, memory are part of myself, 
and it is as unmeaning to say that I have faith in it, or blind faith in it, or that 
it is a law of the mind, as to say that existence is a law of the mind. It is bound 
up in the very idea or fact of my existence.” And the author is not interested in 
individual differences, with regard to the acquired elements, but in it being “a 
sanction or command.”223
Conscience is primarily a faculty of judging. Newman enumerates its char-
acteristic features, among which we find “a phenomenon of <my> existence, 
one of those phenomena, thro’ which as I have said, my existence is brought 
home to me.” But, unlike existence, which is brought home to us by virtue of 
faith, “the accuracy or truth of the praise or blame in the particular case, is a 
matter not of faith, but of judgment.” And he concludes by discriminating two 
senses of conscience: “the act of moral judgment, or for the particular judge-
ment formed.” And, consequently, we have “the foundation of religion” (when 
the act of moral judgement is meant) and ethics (when the particular judge-
ment is formed).224
The moral sense differs from the sense of beautifulness, for instance, for 
the moral sense is primarily concerned with persons. Yet one more funda-
mental characteristic of conscience must be mentioned here, namely, the fact 
that its ultimate authority reaches beyond the self, i.e. the voice of conscience, 
although it is heard within the self, does not come from the self. Therefore, we 
commonly speak of conscience as a voice, which is uncommon in the case of 
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some aesthetic judgements. Here, the voice usually comes from someone. The 
voice of our conscience in our decisions “dimly discerns a sanction higher than 
self for its decisions, as is evidence in that keen sense of obligation and respon-
sibility which informs them.”225
Another fundamental element of conscience is that its voice dictates and 
commands. The voice of conscience has nothing to do with the sense of the 
expedient or the beautiful. It is authoritative and minatory. Conscience consid-
ered as the moral sense is unlike the sense of the beautiful because it is always 
emotional, whereas the sense of the beautiful is emotional only in some cases. 
It fills us with awe, remorse and shame. It is something more than a moral 
sense. In its dictates it is interpersonal, i.e. another person is always presup-
posed. Conscience stirs our affections, because in its voice another person is 
being revealed to us, “this implies that there is One to whom we are responsi-
ble, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear.”226 In the 
voice of conscience, we have within us the image of some person; we listen to 
someone speaking inside.
The existence of moral obligation, therefore, is conditioned by the existence 
of God: “there is a God, because there is a moral obligation.”227 In the same 
manner, he examines the existence of conscience. “I have a certain feeling on 
my mind, which I call conscience. When I analyse this, I feel it involves the idea 
of a Father & Judge — of one who sees my heart &c. &c.”228 In like manner, 
conscience is not impersonal— there is Someone speaking to us— nor is it my 
private point of view— how could I feel ashamed of my own private opinion?
Indeed, Newman’s intuition seems correct here. It would be rather odd to 
experience any remorse when hearing sounds echoing from somewhere and 
having no personal sender. And we feel remorse even when in solitude, when 
there is actually no one around to talk to us. We may even have some Platonic 
associations when we read in Newman that “the presence of unseen individ-
ual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and colours of the visible 
world.”229
Newman holds that we have this initial knowledge of God, and it is present 
in children. This knowledge is latent in the mind, it is pre- reflective, but it is 
difficult to determine how much of it comes from within or without. It depends 
on each individual and individual circumstances whether this primordial 
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(residual) knowledge will be strengthened or distorted and obliterated. And 
even though distortion or obliteration might not take place, these initial senti-
ments could still turn into mere notional apprehension. The point is, therefore, 
how to keep this premeditated image of God alive.
As in the case of conscience, we combine fear with shame— the elements 
present in its voice— so here we seek to join strength with delicacy. Dogma 
symbolizes strength; it is a stronghold around which there may revolve a per-
sonal response. This personal response is obviously called upon to be trans-
lated into certitude, and this response is strength, but unlike the original and 
objective strength; certitude— as we have seen— calls for time. In this sense, 
it may be identified with virtue. And here we have arrived yet one more time 
at the point that is most intriguing for Newman, i.e. how is a dogma in each 
particular case given a personal shape. As in the example with the fan vault-
ing (in Chapter 2), this dogma is capable of upholding different personal con-
structions without changing its essence. Each person is constructing his or her 
personal shapes throughout his or her lifetime. Reason and the heart are con-
joined in a most spectacular dialogue. They are placed under one roof— yet 
another of Newman’s metaphor.
We must constantly bear in our mind that Newman is always striving for the 
integral view of the human person. He is neither inclined towards a rationalism 
of modernity nor towards a sentimentalism of romanticism. As I have already 
said, imagination (the power creating images) is important as the initiator of 
action, but nothing here comes about automatically. Reason is not rejected, 
but it must be placed within all other personal dimensions. As the Cardinal 
concisely summarizes his point: “Impassioned thoughts, high aspirations, sub-
lime imaginings, have no strength in them. They can no more make a man obey 
constantly, than they can move mountains. […] Conscience, and Reason in 
subjection to Conscience, these are those powerful instruments (under grace) 
which change a man. But you will observe, that though Conscience and Reason 
lead us to resolve on and to attempt a new life, they cannot at once make us 
love it.”230 Thinking, and whatever results from its processes, is an area of open 
options in which when it can be argued in favour of something, it can be made 
real. Reason is subdued to conscience. Indeed, in his way of comprehending 
Conscience is not the voice of practical reason (since in that case we would 
have reason subjected to reason, which would make a tautology), but the voice 
of God, who is seeking to bring the person onto the right path.




By calling conscience the voice of God, Newman wishes to stress that it is 
not “a creation of man.”231 Conscience is in us as a judgement, but at the same 
time not out of us when we evaluate something convenient, fit or beautiful. 
Newman criticises the claims of psychoanalysis that conscience is but a twist 
in primitive people, that it is irrational, that the very sense of guiltiness is irra-
tional. If man is but an element in a deterministic series of causes and effects, 
there is no talking about freedom of will. And if such is the case, there is no 
responsibility. Consequently, conscience cannot make man responsible for his 
acts. Certainly, Newman’s view of conscience stands in glaring contradiction to 
conscience viewed as our private and sovereign opinion which cannot be sub-
jected to any sanction. And Newman states that “Conscience has rights because 
it has duties […].”232 This is a very important point, for it says that conscience 
is not a mere private opinion, that it does not refer to itself but to Something 
else, or, to be more precise, to Someone else. Private opinions have no duties; 
their duties are enclosed in themselves, and they refer to no one except the 
self. Conscience, understood in this manner, brings the self back to order; the 
order that is not conceived nor invented by the self. Conscience therefore, as 
I have already said, is a sanction because it does not confirm the individual in 
his belief, i.e. in no way is it a sense of self- complacency. Obviously, since it 
has duties, it must be reared in duties. And the best context of rearing the con-
science in duties is, for Newman, the Decalogue, the Bible, the Sacraments, and 
the tradition of the Church. But even in this context, conscience, as the voice 
of God, is not limited or determined. I mean, for instance, those situations of 
heresy, when lay people saw in their conscience that the hierarchs were wrong.
Conscience’s worst enemy is its counterfeit, which Newman calls “the right 
of self- will.”233 And Newman defends Pope Pius ix who, in his encyclical Quanta 
cura, criticises the so- called “liberty of conscience.” The Pope obviously did not 
mean literary conscience, but its counterfeit; therefore, in fact, licence which 
in certain circles was (intentionally or ignorantly) called conscience.
Newman holds that conscience reigns supreme even when set up against 
the Pope’s infallibility, because the “Pope is not infallible in that subject- matter 
in which conscience is of supreme authority […].”234 Moreover, conscience 
“is not a judgment upon any speculative truth, any abstract doctrine, but 
bears immediately on conduct,” whereas the Pope’s infallibility “is engaged on 
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general propositions and given errors.”235 Outside of this area, the Pope may 
announce his decisions, e.g. administrative, but they are not infallible.
Yet one more thing must be mentioned in this characterisation of con-
science, as we find it in the pages of Newman’s writings. He observes that each 
science has its certainty in itself. We proceed from undeniable premises to 
general truths by way of induction. Indeed, this is what we do, in particular 
in the natural sciences. The sense of right and wrong, another name for con-
science, “is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puz-
zled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impress-
ible by education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course, 
that, in the struggle for existence, amid the various exercises and triumphs of 
the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the 
least luminous […].”236
This is an excellent diagnosis of conscience and an insightful analysis of 
its position in human moral knowledge. Important as conscience is, Newman 
realistically assesses its capacity, and, therefore, the Church and her institu-
tions in supplementing its inadequacies. Conscience does play an essential 
role in Newman’s grammar of knowledge, but we are constantly reminded— as 
we can see in this quote— that many other elements must come into play for 
human integrity to prevail. We can understand his hesitation with regard to 
certitude and intuition, his concession on the part of conscience— as he jok-
ingly remarked that he would drink a toast first to conscience and only after-
wards to the Pope— and at the same time his claim that conscience is the least 
luminous. In order to avoid confusion, let me remind the reader that Newman 
is always concerned with a concrete, real, and unpredictable being in a con-
crete situation. Therefore, few things can be theoretically decided in advance. 
And conscience is the last candidate for a thorough theoretical description.
Let us turn now to the question of habit. All of Newman’s analyses seem to 
converge on this point— the person’s habitual readiness to promptly respond 
to the call of the good of a given situation.
32 Habit— the Way of Action
Newman clearly draws on Aristotle when he describes virtue as “a mean,— 
that is, as considering it to lie between things that are wrong. We know what is 
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right, not positively, but negatively;— we do not see the truth at once and make 
towards it, but we fall upon and try error, and find it is not the truth. We grope 
about by touch, not by sight, and so by a miserable experience exhaust the pos-
sible modes of acting till nought is left, but truth, remaining. Such is the pro-
cess by which we succeed; we walk to heaven backward; we drive our arrows at 
a mark, and think him most skilful whose shortcomings are the least.”237
It follows from the above passage that the way to the truth is hard work. We 
need to try and show discipline. “We do not know what we mean by a habit, 
except as a state or quality of mind under which we act in this or that particular 
way; it is a permanent power in the mind […].”238 This power in the mind is not 
effected by merely intellectual activity.
It is important because unreal words bring us away from our personal growth, 
from the true unity of our persons. Being true to oneself is of utmost impor-
tance. Being true also means to be at peace with one’s conscience. Therefore, 
this does not mean to primarily have one’s own way. Another thing is that 
when we apply the Aristotelian way to virtue we act in a negative manner— 
by avoiding extremes, i.e. by saying “no” to each extreme. By going back and 
rejecting all the extremes, we finally arrive at the truth. In other words, we first 
departed from the truth at the moment when we took for the truth something 
that was merely its false reflection.
Habit as a permanent state of mind can be positive or negative. In other 
words, it acts in such a way as to prompt the agent to good deeds or to deaden 
him to the awareness that he is doing something bad. Therefore, Newman 
resorted to introspection, that phenomenological tool with which to examine 
one’s mind and find out where it is located in relation to the matters at hand 
and how it evaluates them. The mind can be, respectively, resolute on some-
thing good or in the grips of doing wrong. He lay down his individual model of 
introspection in Apologia pro Vita Sua, a very personal diary on someone’s spir-
itual and intellectual journey, an attempt at a justification of one’s life. What 
kind of justification was it? For sure, it was not a justification with a view to 
some objective criteria. This type of justification would be especially foreign to 
Newman, and would go against the grain of his guiding principle that “egotism 
is true modesty.” His justification was meant to show his personal consistency 
between his person and the choices he had made throughout his life. The most 
important thing is to be real, i.e. not to rationalize one’s conscience. It is better, 
one might conclude, to act and make mistakes than to pretend.
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The negative aspect of habit has the following effects upon the acting agent. 
It blurs his ability to assess his condition and entail despair. Fulton Sheen (1895– 
1979) put it wonderfully when he wrote: “The condition of despair induced 
by unrepented sin often reaches a point where there is a positive fanaticism 
against religion and morality. He who has fallen away from the spiritual order 
will hate it, because religion is the reminder of his guilt. Husbands who are 
unfaithful will beat their wives who are faithful. Wives who are unfaithful will 
accuse their husbands of infidelity.”239 Is it not here that we find the contem-
porary interest in the gloomy recesses of one’s mind? People like watching neg-
ative characters on television because, by way of contrast, they can think of 
themselves as someone better; and because they are given an opportunity for 
worse actions. Newman speaks about “secret faults” (secret sins). Conscience 
ceases “to upbraid us” when we refuse to listen to its reproaches. We can 
thereby become accustomed to sins (or faults) and desensitized, i.e. “the more 
guilty we are, the less we know it; for the oftener we sin, the less we are dis-
tressed at it.” And the Cardinal adds his own practical observation: “I think 
many of us may, on reflection, recollect instances, in our experience of our-
selves, of our gradually forgetting things to be wrong which once shocked us. 
Such is the force of habit. By it (for instance) men contrive to allow themselves 
in various kinds of dishonesty. They bring themselves to affirm what is untrue, 
or what they are not sure is true, in the course of business. They overreach and 
cheat; and still more are they likely to fall into low and selfish ways without 
their observing it, and all the while to continue careful in their attendance on 
the Christian ordinances, and bear about them a form of religion. Or, again, 
they will live in self- indulgent habits; eat and drink more than is right; display 
a needless pomp and splendour in their domestic arrangements, without any 
misgiving; much less do they think of simplicity of manners and abstinence as 
Christian duties.”240
In the quotation above we can see two elements. First, we find Newman’s 
consistency in carrying out his introspection. Second, his acute sense of obser-
vation. All the aforementioned negative symptoms of human behaviour can, 
in turn, be enhanced by the ethos in which we live. Once certain shameful 
deeds are accepted, let alone recommended, the agents readily resort to sooth-
ing excuses. Newman does not propose any revolutionary solutions. If one 
cannot change the ethos, one should leave it. Ethos can be related to what 
Newman calls custom. Habit is what comes from within, and custom is what 
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comes from without. Certain bad practices may grow very deep roots. People 
have a tendency to look with an approving eye at what should be eliminated. 
They “will feel the sway of the fashion of their age,”241 Hence Newman was 
right in claiming that one should be jealous of one’s own person.
Newman, for his part, stresses the fact that my primary responsibility 
is myself. I carry myself throughout my life, e.g. through the political ostra-
cism of Great Britain in the case of Newman, and through the suffering of the 
Holocaust in the case of Edith Stein. I am not called upon to save the world, 
nor capable of doing so. My first and foremost duty is to save myself. This is an 
individual and a social task at the same time. It is social in the sense that each 
authentic human being remains a pattern of behaviour for the generations to 
come. Here is someone who has managed to retain his personhood. Then, in 
his unique introspection, he tested his own position, whether he committed 
himself, whether he was real in what he was saying and doing.
In 1859, Newman rejected Ward’s view that we have to trust our faculties 
first, as it is our first speculative certainty. Therefore, his later philosophy is “no 
mere psychologism — it is a metaphysics of being as known in experience.”242
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 chapter 3
The Cross as a Source of Knowledge and 
the Language of the Heart
The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know.
 blaise pascal …
It is only with the heart that one can see rightly;
what is essential is invisible to the eye.
 antoine de saint- éxupery
∵
We have already defined the main purposes of Newman’s quest— to analyse 
how man thinks under concrete circumstances and how he assents to prop-
ositions (notional assent) or to reality (real assent), and, ultimately, whether 
he can arrive at certitude in the concrete. In Chapter 2 I sought to characterise 
Newman’s theory of knowledge in the concrete, i.e. how we come to assent in 
our daily experience and whether we can accomplish certitude. His principal 
position was that of “metaphysics in the singular,” in which selfhood rises to 
the point of being the main cognitive centre. Therefore, Newman uses such 
terms as personal result, cogitative method. This centre is, at the same time, 
very unsteady and unreliable, for it is the living centre of the human being 
that undergoes all the contingencies of the living entity, but at the same 
time the only one we have immediate access to. We have to use ourselves, 
however, all these shortcomings— hesitations, prejudices, uncertainties, 
weaknesses— notwithstanding.
In one of his sermons, Newman characterises our existential situation. He 
writes that people willingly follow their inclinations, “they are guided by plea-
sure and pain, not by reason, principle, or conscience; and they do not attempt 
to interpret this world, to determine what it means, or to reduce what they see 
and feel to system. But when persons, either from thoughtfulness of mind, or 




which they are born, then forthwith they find it a maze and a perplexity. It is 
a riddle which they cannot solve. It seems full of contradictions and without 
a drift. Why it is, and what it is to issue in, and how it is what it is, and how we 
come to be introduced into it, and what is our destiny, are all mysteries.”1 Thus, 
we can see that the author of these words is well aware of at least two distinct 
states of our existence: the theoretical one in which we are engaged in intel-
lectual activity and can assume a safe distance towards the vibrant current of 
events, and the actual one when we commonly decide about matters that per-
sonally concern us. In this sense, Newman’s message goes counter to the uni-
versalizing tendencies of the Enlightenment, especially the secular trends of 
the epoch of reason and experience. John Henry sought to restore the person 
and his idiosyncratic thinking to their right position. His method did not con-
centrate on coming up with some overall theory, but rather on accompanying 
the human being in his concrete struggle with daily reality. At the same time, 
such a being is called upon to respond to duties that go beyond what is expe-
riential and reach the supernatural. Such a being, spread between the here 
and now and the metaphysical beyond, must find personal resources to brave 
this predicament. In my interpretation of Newman I have constantly made 
recourse to Edith Stein, especially at the moments of their mutual inspiration.
In order to render the special position of the person, his tension between 
the truth and personal assent to it, Newman attempts first a thorough study of 
the theory of knowledge, bearing in mind all the time the specific human con-
dition. He is therefore aware that the original “functional disarrangement”— as 
we called it after him in Chapter 2— is a very unwelcome situation, but, at the 
same time, something that we have to take into account, if we aspire to por-
tray a realistic picture of the human being. Doomed to his contingent fortune, 
the person must come to grips with his individual (internal and external) cir-
cumstances, for— weak as he is— he is endowed with respective faculties to 
accomplish that which he is called to accomplish. He is endowed with reason, 
conscience, and the capability of abiding by principles. He is like a tree bend-
ing under the strong gusts of wind, firmly holding the ground with its roots. 
Reason, as the natural personal faculty, must be understood in its proper con-
text. It is true that Newman in the quote above emphasizes the role of reason 
in overcoming chaos, but reason must be accepted as it is in the person him-
self. We should rely on it, but not place too much confidence in it, we should 
mind its limitations. Let us note that, in the quote above, reason is placed side 
by side with conscience.
 1 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 1229. 
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Newman explains his understanding of reason in the Apologia. He agrees 
with the stance of classical philosophy that the primary object of reason is to 
attain truth. At the same time, he is aware that it is right reason that is meant 
here. Therefore, he explains his position: “I have no intention at all of denying, 
that truth is the real object of our reason, and that, if it does not attain to truth, 
either the premiss or the process is in fault; but I am not speaking here of right 
reason, but of reason as it acts in fact and concretely in fallen man […]; I am 
considering the faculty of reason actually and historically; and in this point of 
view, I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple 
unbelief in matters of religion.”2 Newman is constantly asking about reason in 
a concrete human being surrounded by his changing circumstances. That is 
why, the Cardinal proposes a more apt instrument to cope with them.
The reference to “pleasure and pain” in the quote above obviously makes us 
think of nineteenth- century utilitarianism. For Jeremy Bentham (1748– 1832), 
pleasure and pain were the two masters which guided human nature. Thus, 
man was reduced to two reactions placed at two extremes: either to seek plea-
sure or to avoid pain. The abandonment of this simplistic philosophy would 
mean creating a system, i.e. turning all our sense data into a coherent whole, 
seeking a more profound interpretation of what we can experience. We need 
to approach the surrounding world not only with what we transitorily feel as 
enticing, what is pressing on us at the moment, what is expedient, but con-
stantly attempt to create one overall sense from that which appeals to us. 
For that, theoretical comprehension is insufficient, as I have been trying to 
prove; we need to gain personal command of the sense data at hand. Let me 
remind the reader how challenging this task is. We have to confront the abyss 
of existence in which only some elements are explicit, others being implicit, 
i.e. unnamed. Indeed, this personal command we wish to gain calls for a more 
sensitive and adequate instrument than a general knowledge of physical pro-
cesses. We can find the source of this knowledge inside us. This path inside— 
which will be dealt with at greater length in Chapter 4— will warrant, on the 
one hand, an authentic pledge of individuality and, on the other, a steady core 
of personality. For Newman and Stein, the soul is the core, the heart is the mea-
sure, and the cross is the ultimate point of reference. And these are the areas in 
which the two thinkers are particularly integrated. And the heart is guided by 
what Newman called “higher logic.”
Let us note that the logic of the heart was propounded in the nineteenth 
century as an opposition to the equalizing transcendental tendencies, i.e. 




constructivism feels at home in the divorce from reality, when man apparently 
free from all obstacles can create his world anew. Surprisingly, if he wishes to 
plan everything, the plans turn into their opposite. The so- called ideal political 
systems then become systems of the worst oppression. And why should we 
wonder? Reality translated into concepts is no longer reality, when words are 
only words— conventional markers— starved of their real and nutrient con-
tents. The illusion is that only the explicit level exists, and the implicit depth 
is neglected. It is true that the explicit constitutes only a part, and not a very 
large part, of the person. To grasp the implicit area, we need a more adequate 
instrument.
1 Going Inside— Meeting God
The soul is the life- giving form of the body. It is at home in its innermost region. 
When the soul ascends to God, it reaches out to something outside, but, at the 
same time, goes inside. God is a mystery which “attracts us constantly.” This 
mystery reveals itself to us, but never completely. A created spirit can ascend 
to God— we read in Edith Stein— only by transcending itself and sinking “by 
this very fact into a secure position of rest.”3 This sinking into “a secure position 
of rest” reminds us of Newman’s understanding of certitude, for being at tran-
quil rest is the main characteristic of certitude. Let us remember, however, this 
most intriguing (indeed, there is something powerfully beautiful in it) hesita-
tion between certitude and simple assent, i.e. the person’s immediate response 
to value; Newman, as we remember, was inclined to emphasize simple assent. 
Since St John of the Cross “calls God the deepest centre or point of rest of the 
soul,” the striving after certitude is striving after God, but above all striving 
after the self is such. Indeed, if we have the right to understand Newman’s cer-
titude as finding one’s true self, in like manner we can surmise that, in his view, 
this discovery must be identical with finding God. How else can it be, if repos-
ing in certitude is coequal to one’s principal task?
According to Newman, the doctrine of the Cross is “the true interpretation 
of this world,” a statement which is in accordance with his claim that the Cross 
is the measure of the world. And the Cross is the fulcrum for the abyss of exis-
tence to find its orientation in the world. The message of the Cross is not the-
oretical knowledge, therefore it is “not on the surface of the world […]; it is 
 3 E. Stein, The Science of the Cross: A Study of St. John of the Cross, trans. by H. Graef, 
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a hidden doctrine; it lies under a veil […].” I gather that the conclusion from 
these words is all too obvious— the doctrine of the Cross must be accepted by 
the person and realized. As Newman explains, “when received into the faithful 
heart, there it abides as a living principle, but deep, and hidden from observa-
tion.”4 This remark is an excellent corroboration of our former analysis. I think 
we may, for instance, identify the Cross and the kind of knowledge it conveys 
with the implicit part of our cognition; after all, its knowledge is deep and hid-
den from observation. Let us note the inherent cohesion of Newman’s think-
ing and how he comes forward to meet his German Carmelite translator. I am 
always fascinated by the way the initially muddled paths ultimately converge 
and form a wider current. They seem to have found this sensitive and adequate 
instrument in the doctrine of the Cross and the heart.
Our experience would testify to the contrary, for it seems that suffering— 
which is symbolised by the Cross— is ubiquitous, that, in fact, there are more 
sorrowful than joyful moments. Therefore, the true doctrine of the Cross, as 
depicted in the aforementioned quotes, must denote something else, some-
thing much more profound than the visible aspect of suffering, “for truth is 
not on the surface of things, but in the depths.”5 The author of these words 
then goes on to appeal to “the language of figure, the heart of religion.” In other 
words, the essence of religion is as hidden as personal experience, or, rather, 
the person’s individual response to experience. The message of the Cross and 
the heart seems to converge and express something essentially profound— the 
core of Christian religion. Let me remind the reader what Edith Stein wrote 
about the Cross to Mother Prioress, namely, that one can learn it by living it. 
This is something analogous to Newman’s realization or his simple real assent. 
Is that not the essence of religion— to move forward in confidence and faith-
fulness to God?
By way of analogy, Newman explains that “the heart may be considered 
as the seat of life; it is the principle of motion, heat, and activity; from it the 
blood goes to and fro to the extreme parts of the body. It sustains the man in 
his powers and faculties; it enables the brain to think; and when it is touched, 
man dies.”6 As the physical heart sets the whole of the body in motion and 
makes the blood circulate, “the sacred doctrine of Christ’s Atoning Sacrifice is 
the vital principle on which the Christian lives, and without which Christianity 
is not.”7 In his Parochial and Plain Sermons, Newman is writing about “spiritual 
 4 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 1232.
 5 Ibid., 1232.
 6 Ibid., 1233.










knowledge,” that is, faith, which “carries with it its own evidence, and admits of 
no mistaking the true spiritual conviction being unlike all others.”8
Just as inanimate matter is drawn to the centre of the earth by the power of 
gravity, so too the spiritual beings are drawn to God. A material object retains 
its gravitational (centripetal) motion as long as it is at a distance from the cen-
tre. In like manner, the spiritual being is under the power of attraction so long 
as it is far away from God. Stein uses the term “ladder,” the same word used 
by Newman, we remember, in his analysis of real words. The Jewish author 
notes: “The soul ascends to God, that is, to union with him, by the steps of 
a ladder. The higher it ascends to him, the deeper it descends into itself: the 
union takes place in the innermost sphere of the soul, in its deepest ground. If 
this seems contradictory it should be remembered that these are only different 
spatial images supplementing each other and intended to indicate something 
utterly remote from space, which cannot be adequately represented by any-
thing taken from the realm of natural experience.”9 This parallel between going 
to God and going inside oneself is most amazing here. For it means that going 
to God is not equal to losing oneself. On the contrary, by approaching God the 
human being approaches his true self. Such is the message from Newman and 
Stein. And this message is in accordance with St Augustine and his mystical 
teaching.
But unlike the physical heart— we read in Newman— the spiritual heart is 
“hidden from view; it is carefully and securely guarded; it is not like the eye 
set in the forehead, commanding all, and seen of all: and so in like manner 
the sacred doctrine of the Atoning Sacrifice is not one to be talked of, but to 
be lived upon; not to be put forth irreverently, but to be adored secretly; not 
to be used as a necessary instrument in the conversion of the ungodly, or for 
the satisfaction of reasoners of this world, but to be unfolded to the docile and 
obedient; to young children, whom the world has not corrupted; to the sor-
rowful, who need comfort; to the sincere and earnest, who need a rule of life; 
to the innocent, who need warning; and to the established, who have earned 
the knowledge of it.”10 Let us note that the purpose of all the components enu-
merated here is primarily to effect a certain practical result, and not to satisfy 
theoretical curiosity, i.e. to be lived upon, to convert, to bring comfort, to give a 
rule of life, to warn. And let us observe two important elements in this quote. 
The doctrine of the Cross (the Atoning Sacrifice) is “to be lived upon”— Edith 
Stein came to the same conclusion— and it is “to be unfolded to the docile 
 8 Ibid., 322, 323.
 9 E. Stein, The Science of the Cross, 116.
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and obedient.” Indeed, here again we can see in practice the consistency of 
Newman’s thinking, namely the importance of the intellectual and moral 
united in the person. Intellectual prowess is incapable of assenting to some-
thing that may otherwise be logically clear and distinct.
Here, the doctrine of the Cross or the science of the Cross is the Atoning 
Sacrifice. Hence, it is not the mere visible signs of suffering that matter, but 
their profound sense of Atonement. And here, again, is the true individuality 
emphasised, for it draws on its true form from the depth of (primeval) life. True 
individuality resides not in some spectacular feats of individual expressions, 
like images of an object reflected in numerous mirrors. The images are aspects 
of the object, but taken in their singular character they do not exhaust the 
whole of the object. We need to turn from the images and direct our eyes on to 
the object. Therefore, in our dealing with the world we should behave likewise, 
i.e. “begin with the world unseen. They alone enjoy [the visible world], who 
have first abstained from it. They alone can truly feast, who have first fasted; 
they alone are able to use the world, who have learned not to abuse it; they 
alone inherit it, who take it as a shadow of the world to come, and who for that 
world to come relinquish it.”11
The true world, i.e. the world to come, is like the object hanging in front of 
the mirrors. Newman’s figure resembles Plato’s well- known vision of the peo-
ple chained in a cave. They also need to turn their eyes from the images on the 
wall and direct them on to the object. In Plato, it is the true idea. In this world, 
we are doomed to live in the shadows. In the world to come they will flit away. 
Our task is not to be offended by what we learn as a world of shadows, but to be 
clearly aware that we learn only aspects. Moreover, the true knowledge resides 
in the invisible world.
2 Newman and Stein— Mystics
The process of ascending, the actual climbing up the ladder, in the form of its 
physical metaphor is, indeed, like going away from oneself, or at least a solitary 
and individual journey. In fact, however, each step forward, if it is made in real-
ity, authenticity, and conscientious honesty is like coming closer to the centre, 
i.e. to oneself and to God.
In his book on Newman, Stanley L. Jaki placed a question mark after the 
word “mystic.” Newman’s biographers shy away from calling him a mystic. 





I think that, at least, some conditions are fulfilled. And there are other ele-
ments that smack of mysticism in Newman. Let me remind the reader of his 
simple assent as a readiness to respond to God’s call. There is, in Newman, this 
tension between intuition and certitude. Intuition is most directly related to 
the purity of intention, and certitude is superimposed on reflection, and there-
fore may be prone to rationalization. Intuition is akin to the person’s moral 
character. Indeed, Newman’s ultimate goal seemed to be certitude, but even 
more than that it was important to attain this fresh and ever- new alertness to 
assent to the truth of values. In other words, to what God may demand of man. 
In one of his prayers we read: “Give me that true wisdom, which seeks your will 
by prayer and meditation, by direct intercourse with you, more than by reading 
and reasoning.”12 Newman’s hesitation between the serenity of certitude and 
the promptness of assent indeed results from the believer’s feeling that assent 
is his manifest response to the call of a concrete situation. At the same time, 
when pondering on these two attitudes, we may conclude that there is no con-
tradiction between them— they are like two sides of the same person.
It is the essential element of mysticism to seek this transparent, spiritual, 
and unmediated communing with a deity. Edith Stein observes in her com-
ments on St John of the Cross that he “says little about the converse of human 
souls with each other […], he is not interested in the notional means by which 
the communication is effected.”13 Judging by what she has written, we find it 
only natural that in her phenomenological quests she met a kindred spirit in St 
John of the Cross and John Henry Newman. Let it suffice to remind the reader 
of the essential concepts of the Cardinal’s theory of knowledge: natural rea-
soning, informal inference, implicit thinking, personal result— they all point 
to the spiritual dimension of the person. They all stress the solitary— indeed, 
mystic— path inside, not to become a recluse or misanthrope, but to be more 
personally present in the world and to be more responsive to God’s calls. As 
we know, the “notional means” of communication Stein is writing about, for 
Newman belong to the weakest and, hence, least trusted because they are 
superficial and, consequently, the least personal.
If the soul is engaged only in this notional distance from the Creator, argues 
Stein, it is in danger of becoming distorted. This is something mystics stress, 
that the night is for human sense cognition, for the human senses. Verbal com-
munication is subject to errors, “it exposes the soul to manifold deceptions 
and errors: it may regard a mere delusion or phantasm as the apparition of 
 12 J. H. Newman, A Newman Prayer Book, 15.
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a spirit […].”14 The rationalists, as we know, proposed methodical doubt as a 
remedy against deception, the suspension of judgement. But we need to act 
when called to action. By keeping a distance from the object of our cognition, 
we place ourselves in danger of losing some important messages. Besides, this 
is not our natural condition.
I think that even in Newman’s concept of conscience there is something 
mystical, especially when he stresses the danger of the interposition of reason-
ing between the voice of conscience and action.
3 Selfhood— the Essence of Originality
It suffices to be ourselves in order to be individual, i.e. to save our individuality; 
and this turn to the self in quest of selfhood has something of the quality of an 
intrinsic dialogue with God inside man. As individuals, we are not products of 
one mechanistic and replicable template, so we do not have to prove that we 
are unique. On the contrary, we easily fall into the trap of collective awareness 
and collective thinking once we decide to search for individuality outside. For 
it is then that we fall under the spell of stereotypes and limitations, or else 
pursue the unknown tracks laid down by others, as we seek to hold on to the 
experimentation with foreign lifestyles. There is one song that is especially 
fashionable at the moment, namely, the song of diversity. This kind of diversity, 
however, does not result from the discovery of individuality, but apparently 
from a frantic quest for difference. The more different I am from others, the 
better. But then it appears that this feverish quest for difference pushes us into 
the old rut of the stereotype. Newman follows Augustine in his belief that real 
individuality resides in inwardness, not in outward manifestations. He learned 
from Augustine a total reliance on God and the importance of introspection, 
which Gottlieb describes as looking “into his own mind to see the truths that 
God had left there for him.”15 But Newman did not limit himself to pondering 
the contents of his mind, he also contemplated his own attitudes toward the 
revealed truths. Unlike Augustine, he was interested— after the Aristotelian 
fashion— in man in action. Like Augustine, however, Newman decided that 
it was time to stop doubting. His cause against doubting is anti- sceptical just 
like Augustine’s was. Which house looks more unique: the one inhabited by its 
owner or the one abandoned by its owner? It is the owner present in his own 
 14 Ibid., 117.







house that renders it as something special and unique. Therefore, the person 
inside his selfhood is the person at home. And this is the essence of originality 
at the same time.
Newman’s and Stein’s decisions could only come from a mature personality, 
from their profound selfhoods, where no one makes others responsible for his 
own fortunes. Therefore, in a sense, they both died in similar circumstances— 
as solitary and fulfilled selves. Newman, surrounded by friends but, at the same 
time, safely enclosed in his personal certitude, in which his heart conversed 
with the Heart of the Lord; Stein, surrounded by her fellow believers and filled 
with her personal certitude that this must be the incomprehensible way cho-
sen by the Lord for her. She did not know at the moment of her personal rev-
elation, when she confessed “This is the truth,” what might be the destination 
of this new journey she was gradually undertaking. And the external form of 
destination may be as different as different are two lives: Newman, reposed in 
his armchair, as we remember the last picture of him, and Stein holding tightly 
to the cross of suffering.
4 The Thoughts of the Heart
What are the thoughts of the heart in Stein’s interpretation? They “signify the 
original life of the soul in the ground of its being, in a depth that is beyond 
the division into diverse powers and influences.” It is the inmost part and the 
dwelling- place of God. Because this place is so hidden, it becomes mysteri-
ous even to the soul itself. This inmost sphere is “primeval life […] without 
form.”16 I think we may identify this form of life as Stein understood individual 
form. I understand thoughts of the heart as reflections of this form. They are 
true expressions of the person, but they are not notions. They have no forms, 
they are no creations of the thinking intellect, and they are beyond rational 
knowledge; indeed, they are implicit (Newman). Stein writes that our sensing 
of these thoughts of the heart “lacks the clarity of purely rational understand-
ing; on the other hand, it is richer than this.”17 In like manner, the heart rather 
is than speaks. Newman, for his part, places the doctrine of the Cross, which 
he calls “great and awful,” in “the heart of religion.” And he goes on to explain 
what he means by the heart by analogy with the biological organ quoted previ-
ously. We must bear in mind this analogy between the spiritual heart and the 







The Cross as a Source of Knowledge and the Heart 159
physical heart, when analysing the language of the heart in the context of the 
Cross. Inasmuch as the physical heart supports our vital functions, the spir-
itual heart supports our personal life. And what supports our physical life is 
therefore not intellectual, hence it is not explicit, only implicit. It is in the heart 
that we realize what we are assenting to. We keep in the heart the treasure of 
our very person. The most important things are not on the surface, they are 
kept in the heart; therefore, the doctrine of the Cross is “not one to be talked 
of, but to be lived upon.” This is incredibly interesting, as I think, that we have 
found common ground between the two thinkers. And this common ground is 
unlike a set of shared opinions, but common participation in something that 
is beyond theoretical views.
The thoughts of the (spiritual) heart are implicit, so they can hardly be 
translated into the explicit form. At the same time, we learn that they are 
“richer.” I understand by this that they are much more imbued with what is 
personal, and what is truly personal is incommunicable. More imbued with 
the personal, because they are free from reflective intrusions. Hence, it is quite 
logical to claim that which is incommunicable is not explicit. And any efforts 
at making it explicit are doomed to failure. The real person is inside, i.e. in the 
heart. As we recall Newman’s “unperceived impressions,” we can now say that 
they arise in the heart.
5 Interior Perception
This is a very interesting point and very much in accordance with Newman’s 
intuitions. As I have said, he elaborated much on natural reasoning, natural 
inference, and a kind of internal conversation. The soul is set aside from the 
mind and decisions of the will. Owing to our personal faculties, the prime-
val life that resides in the depth is brought to light; to be more precise, only 
its glimpses, it is apprehended by interior perception. Interior perception is 
different from the first sensing. Who can perceive these first motions? Stein 
answers thus: “Only a person living perfectly recollected in his inner being 
watches faithfully even those first movements.”18 And here we are brought 
again to Newman’s perception that only those who are whole can heal others.19 
Let us add more elements that characterise such a person. He is one whose 
words are real, who lives in obedience to his own conscience. In other words, 
 18 E. Stein, The Science of the Cross, 119.







one who lives in the unity of his being— the intellect and morality under one 
roof. Such a person is “perfectly recollected”— I am assenting to something 
and I know that it is I who is assenting to it.
The Carmelite Saint observes:
This brings us to the second reason why a man’s inmost being is hidden 
from him. As has been said, here the soul is truly at home. But, strange 
though it may sound, it is normally not at home. There are but few souls 
that live in and from their inmost being; and even far fewer that are con-
stantly living in and from it. Naturally, i.e. according to their fallen nature, 
men stay in the outer rooms of the castle of their soul. Whatever comes 
to them from outside draws them outward.20
In this beautiful quotation we again notice some (intentional or non- 
intentional) Newmanian tracks. Those who do not live in their depth are 
not at home, that is, they remain in chaos. They are torn between pleasure 
and pain, but because they do not live inside neither of these can bring them 
gratification— neither the satisfaction of pleasure, nor the evasion of pain. 
Indeed, they live at the Kierkegaardian aesthetic stage. And the main reason 
for this is that they treat pleasure and pain in isolation from everything else, 
primarily from their true selves, forgetful of the necessity to bring any dissi-
pated elements into a whole, i.e. into a system. They go and return, as the occa-
sion might be, without trying to find any sense of either direction. They remind 
us of homeless vagabonds, deprived of any set goal in their lives. Existentialists 
and writers provide plenty of examples of such types. A classic example is the 
hero from Camus’s novel The Stranger. They remain temporarily satisfied with 
what is expedient and what brings them fleeting satisfaction. Indeed, if certi-
tude is a journey towards a certain goal, it is not yet accomplished. There are 
few persons who live in their depth, who are so simple and undivided inside. 
More often than not, all the processes of rationalization are at work, which 
thwart the realization of the inmost being. I presume that the reader may feel 
somewhat confused now. If the inmost depth is unknown and implicit, how 
can we reach it at all, or, better still, how can we learn whether we have reached 
it, we have come closer to it or we have gone a long way from it?
The answer is surprisingly simple: we can learn about it only indirectly. We 
can pass judgement on it based on external manifestations. I have already men-
tioned some of them: reality, simplicity, conscientiousness, purity of motives, 
 20 E. Stein, The Science of the Cross, 119. 
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personal integrity— such are the clear signs of our residing in the centre of 
our inmost being. In general, going inside is a lifelong process, the process of 
growing.
The soul can move inside due to its being an ego. It is in its inmost sphere 
that the soul can truly be free, i.e. at the source of what primarily emanates 
from its depth without any interfering mediations. The interference may come 
from the inside (rationalization triggered by conceit, envy, greed) or from 
the outside (false authorities, temptations). In this “deepest point […] it can 
decide on its own being.” The decisions that are made from a more distant 
point are superficial and inadequate, for “it is mere chance if a decision turns 
out to be adequate, for only in the most profound point are we capable of judg-
ing all things by their ultimate standards.”21 The more distanced we are from 
our inmost beings, the less perfectly free we are, because, inasmuch as we are 
distanced, we are not wholly masters of ourselves, we are subject to external 
influences, we are, so to say, distracted. Man’s destiny is “to live in his inmost 
being and to master himself in a way that is possible only from this inmost 
sphere.”22 Who am I when I am distanced from my centre? Who am I when 
I am coming ever closer to it? What are the criteria by which we can judge the 
distance from the centre? Such questions may naturally arise. We may attempt 
to answer them. If, in our inmost depth, we are most truly free, and we know 
that it is implicit, then it is beyond any conceptualisation. Therefore, inside 
we are, so to say, naked— without plans, schemes, memories, or anticipations. 
We are where we are, and what we really are. This state indeed reminds us of 
a mystic state. We find in St John of the Cross detailed descriptions of how 
the soul should purify itself of any concepts. And in philosophy we have the 
picture of Kierkegaard’s two tombs. The aesthetic character is always some-
where else than where he should be— and this is the essence of his despair. He 
recalls things he should hope for, and he hopes for the things he should recall. 
Therefore, he is never in his true inmost depth.
It is only from this inmost sphere that the person can have a true relation-
ship with the world because only there is he at one with his true self, is he 
truly himself, “and only from here will he be able to find the place in the world 
that is allotted to him.”23 No wonder, then, that Newman, rather than trying to 
change the Anglican Church, set out on his journey in quest of his true ethos, 
of his genuine place. He realized that it was not the outside that must be trans-
formed, that the true sanctuary is his own self.










6 The Implicit and the Logic of the Heart
Since the thoughts of the heart take the implicit form, they are hardly acces-
sible to the self itself, unless vaguely, as only God knows them. Edith Stein 
stresses the fact that the question of the relationship of freedom to its inmost 
sphere does not come from St John of the Cross. It is suggested, therefore, that 
it is her own addition.24 We have to understand that, for mystics, but also for 
Stein and Newman, freedom does not mean in the first place the free expres-
sion of one’s self, let alone totally free choice in the sense of free options (as is 
viewed in the negative aspect of liberty). In their case, freedom in its primary 
sense means a readiness to surrender the whole of one’s being to God in obedi-
ence, i.e. to the duty that results from man’s obedience; hence, the Cross is, for 
Newman, the measure of the world and for Stein the special science. Therefore, 
Stein concludes, “with regard to this highest stage of the personal life there is 
perfect agreement between the mystical doctrine of the two founders of the 
reformed Carmel [St Teresa of Avila and St John of the Cross] and the view 
that the inmost region of the soul is the sphere of the most perfect freedom.”25 
It is in this inmost region that I am truly myself, that I have myself at my dis-
posal. Not in the sense that I understand everything, and can communicate it 
to others. It appears that the person is most free in the implicit sphere of his 
mind. First of all, because this sphere eludes conceptualization, and therefore 
it simultaneously eludes rationalization. We can even say that it is good for us 
that the implicit contents of our very being are beyond our reach. Therefore, 
they can become, firstly, the goal of our constant struggle, the ultimate point 
of reference; and, secondly, they are indestructible— one can kill and torture 
an individual, but one cannot touch the person. I know that this statement 
may sound somewhat paradoxical, as we have already said “know thyself.” On 
second thoughts, however, it is not paradoxical at all. It is true that the implicit 
sphere eludes our conceptualization, but nor do we need to know it in this 
conceptual, explicit, form.
In view of the above, and of what I have said so far, I would like to put 
forward the following thesis: the heart is composed of what is invisible and 
unmeasurable, it is akin to the abyss of existence and primeval life. The heart 
is the sphere of true existence. If, as Newman claims, man can really assent 
to something he does not understand, therefore, in like manner something 
that is unnameable, or cannot be described, can exert a visible effect on man’s 
 24 See E. Stein, ibid., 121.
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actions. In this sense, we may speak of the intransitive effects of our actions, 
i.e. their results remain in the agent.26 The person, throughout his lifetime, 
amasses not merely experiential data out of which he constructs theoretical 
knowledge. Equally important, or even more so, is his moral experience, his 
decisions concerning moral good or evil, that come to constitute the implicit 
abundance of his person. And, aside from theoretical knowledge that any per-
son has, there remains this powerful, invisible, unnameable spiritual core that 
is brought to light by the person’s simple and real assent to values. I think we 
can call this vital space the heart. Thus, the heart, as the unnameable sphere, 
indeed becomes Newman’s personal result. Personal, because it surpasses 
whatever belongs to our general acquisition of information. The heart then 
resembles the freshness of the simple assent. And the heart is the personal 
pulsating and vibrating organ with which the person responds to values. In 
like manner, Newman’s and Stein’s spiritual paths cross together. The more we 
respond to values, the more sensitive the heart becomes, for the fabric of the 
heart is composed of our decisions and acts, of the good we have assented 
to and realized. In other words, it is composed of facts, not of mere plans or 
dreams. Its power does not reside in anything sentimental. It becomes pow-
erful, although its power does not consist in arguments. Consequently, in his 
confrontation with reality the person is empowered not only with a capacity to 
methodically analyse problematic issues, formulate theorems and solve tasks, 
but is additionally empowered by the spiritual dimension that is powerful, yet 
indescribable; it does not even seek its manifestation in arguments.
Indeed, there is something mysterious in this logic of the heart. It is the 
logic of the person who has realized the truth. It is not composed of knowledge 
which can be given an explicit form, and yet it is a knowledge! In this sense, 
the science of the Cross can also be the science of the heart. And the personal 
result is the result of the heart! The power of the heart comes from reality, i.e. 
from the personal realization of reality. Therefore, it is indeed a personal result, 
not a general statement on some universal truths.
The saint Carmelite author asks about other people if they are capable of this 
mystical marriage, i.e. a close relationship with God without any demonstra-
tive knowledge. We can reformulate this question in the context of Newman 
and say: are all people capable of personal certitude? Are they capable of real 
assent? And to either question our answer must be in the positive. If each soul 
has this inmost sphere, and it is only natural that each soul should have it, for it 
 26 Cf. Karol Wojtyła’s discussion on the transitive and intransitive effects of human acts (K. 





is their ontic endowment, then the only problem is where the soul has decided 
to cover the distance (in each case individual) from its inmost sphere.
And here Edith Stein mentions the sensual man who is further from this 
sphere, for he is occupied with sensual enjoyment. I have already given the 
example of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic man, the epitome of whom for the Danish 
philosopher was Don Juan. Then we have the seeker of the truth. Much 
depends on what kind of truth this person is seeking: the truth of science, or 
only a mere amassing of “particular kinds of knowledge.” If such a man seeks 
the Truth of his life, say, wisdom in its most fundamental manner, he is closer 
to the inmost sphere. Looking at the matter in question from the Newmanian 
point of view, we would say that the person who gives his real assent to the 
truth, who realizes it— all of these terms belong to his vocabulary— is closer 
to his inmost sphere than he who considers these matters only in a theoretical 
manner, the mere subject of learned deliberation. I have tried to explain this 
point above, i.e. to show the indirect way we learn our whereabouts in relation 
to the inmost sphere.
Newman, however, does anticipate that there is a passage to the inmost 
depth inasmuch as there is a passage from notional to real assent. And because 
such a passage exists (always individual as to its space and time), man is not 
bound to his place; in like manner, there is a chance for transition and, conse-
quently, growth. At times, it is like a sudden awakening: where am I? Is this my 
place? Any event may occasion such alertness. A casual conversation about 
death, for instance, can be confronted with the sudden realization of its real-
ity, like the example of Randy Pausch I gave in Chapter 2. Or a mere theoret-
ical discussion about suffering can suddenly turn into a willingness to help 
someone close who suffers, even in the case of the sensual man, “for no type is 
tied exclusively to one sphere, only one will always be more powerful than the 
other.”27 In the case of the sensual man, however, such a prompt decision to 
act may take much more effort. Depending on our, say, primary character, we 
may find it more or less difficult to approach the inmost sphere. When man is 
naturally attached to a self- indulgent lifestyle, he will only reluctantly consent 
to discipline and rigour. In other words, the path inside can suddenly open up 
to us. The Cross is a great symbol of the domination of reality over theory, and 
it is, indeed, the measure of the world as it brings a totally external point of 
view. The Atoning Sacrifice that it denotes introduces an entirely new logic— a 
higher logic, Newman would say— a totally disinterested offer for those who 
do not deserve it.
 27 E. Stein, The Science of the Cross, 123. 
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We could even say that human beings are systems composed of aspects, but 
we cannot reduce them to these aspects, nor abstract from them towards some 
general terms. In both cases there is always a danger of depersonalization.28 
We must also constantly bear in mind that if all the contents of the human 
mind were explicit, then the precondition of reconciliation between different 
minds would be a discussion (between the one who knows and the one who 
does not know). It would suffice to add more arguments to those available; in 
this manner, a mere accumulation of arguments would be sufficient to bring 
someone round to our point of view. But the mind is a reservoir of an indefinite 
number of unknown elements that should be subject to the higher logic of the 
Cross. Its microworld ultimately requires conversion, not merely discussion. 
In other words, certain components of personal life must be discarded, some 
ethos must be abandoned. Furthermore, it is not the immanent logic of the 
intellect, active in the creation of ever new forms and styles, that can pave 
a safe path, but the unrelenting and permanent principles of the Cross. The 
Cross is a substantial testimony that calls for a respective response, if not equal 
in its form, then at least equal to its meaningful contents.
Man immersed in pleasure may find it especially difficult to go outside of 
himself in order to abandon his lifestyle. And here, again, we find an aspect 
of Newman’s analysis in which, we remember, he stressed the importance of 
intellectual and moral character. We need the integral development of both in 
order to overcome the original state of chaos, the contingent fortune of each 
man. Theoretically, i.e. notionally, the sensual man may understand what is 
being said, but he fails to see the reality behind the words and act accordingly. 
In the case of a suffering person, when his assistance is in demand he may sim-
ply fail to notice the person. Edith Stein puts this discrepancy between theory 
and practice superbly when she notes: “The words are heard, perhaps their 
immediate meaning is still understood, but the deeper region where their true 
sense would be grasped is in ruins.”29 Indeed, Newman was also well aware of 
this intrinsic incompatibility between words and deeds. Comprehension does 
not entail action. We are talking here about a fragmented man, a man who is so 
enslaved to one single sphere of his, e.g. the sphere of pleasure, that he cannot 
muster himself to action, although, theoretically, he has a perfect command of 
what should be done. Newman would say that he is not at one with himself.
In his analysis of the heart vis- à- vis reason, inspired by the traumatic events 
during the war, the Austrian psychologist Bruno Bettelheim (1903– 1990) put it 
 28 J. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1996, 10 ff.






beautifully in his book where we read that “heart and reason can no longer be 
kept in their separate places. Work and art, family and society, can no longer 
develop in isolation from each other. The daring heart must invade reason with 
its own living warmth, even if the symmetry of reason must give way to admit 
love and the pulsation of life.
No longer can we be satisfied with a life where the heart has its reasons, 
which reason cannot know. Our hearts must know the world of reason, and 
reason must be guided by an informed heart.”30
Bettelheim wrote these words in his 1960 book, fifteen years after the heca-
tomb of World War Two, the German concentration camps, the Holocaust, and 
the Soviet camps. The war can be explained (if it can be explained at all) in 
philosophical terms by referring to the atrophy of the intellect, an intellect that 
came to the conclusion that some races are superior to other races. The superior 
races are masters with the only right to live, to reproduce, and to develop. The 
appropriate place for the subordinate races, thus arbitrarily determined, is to 
serve the master race. Torture and gas chambers are only consequences of such 
presuppositions. Stein had long predicted the suffering of her Jewish nation. 
She was an intellectual, she found no difficulty in bringing such thinking into 
its consequences. Whenever the human being decides to remain disintegrated 
and decomposed, with atrophy and dystrophy as incompatible elements of 
his very being, he must face the negative consequences. And Bettelheim knew 
very well what he was writing about, as he was a prisoner of the concentra-
tion camps of Dachau and Buchenwald. We can only imagine what kind of 
book Edith Stein would have written if she had survived Auschwitz. I have no 
doubt that she would have followed similar lines: the heart informs reason, 
and reason teaches the heart. We find the same elements in the encyclical let-
ter Caritas in Veritate (Benedict xvi). The human being must develop in the 
harmonious unity between heart (love) and reason (truth), otherwise he is in 
danger of becoming a beast.
The American Bishop Fulton J. Sheen put it excellently when he 
wrote: “Finally, totalitarianism came on the scene to say that, since man is 
intrinsically corrupt, he cannot be justified by faith, or by works, or by the 
Sovereign Will of God, but only by the collectivity which absorbs man; this, we 
are told, will do away with human depravity by substituting state conscience 
for individual conscience and a dictator for God.”31 Immersing the human 
being in the Pan- rationalistic reality (the State, History) in a Hegelian manner 
 30 B. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart. Autonomy in a Mass Age, New York: Avon Books, 
1960, viii.
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is no remedy against the individual vices which cause social unrest. We need 
to address the human being in his integral unity. Dealing with individual parts 
separately serves only further decomposition and brings no repose in return. 
Sheen rightly observes: “To uncover the motives of sin, by studying the patient’s 
past, is no cure: sin is not in the understanding alone, nor in the instincts; sin 
is in the will. Hence it cannot be broken up as another complex may be bro-
ken up by dragging it into the consciousness.”32 Naturally, we sense here a very 
strong anti- Freudian element. At the same time, let us note that this integral 
view of the human being fits the similar attempts we find in medicine very 
well. It has long been affirmed that the patient should not be resolved into 
his constituent parts. If he suffers from indigestion, it does not follow that he 
himself has become the stomach or the liver (as can be often heard in medical 
jargon).
7 True Personality Comes from the Depths
For Edith Stein, not only is the inmost depth the seat of our true self, but— 
above all— “an ultimately adequate decision is possible only in the very depths 
of the personality.” And then she continues by saying that man is not “master 
of himself,” if “he has not yet realized the depths of his own interior being.”33 
Words float on the surface and verbal communication is often superficial. And 
“realization” has its important place in Newman’s vocabulary. Indeed, in the 
case of notional assents we rarely realize what we are assenting to. Frequently, 
we become excited and enthusiastic about opinions we support one day and 
abandon another, or we casually imitate others, thinking that we are mani-
festing our own views. Therefore, realization must come about no sooner than 
I realize who I really am, i.e. whether it is really I who formulates concrete 
beliefs. An act is genuinely personal when the person is genuinely, i.e. not only 
physically, present in it— when the person realises what he is doing.
Like Søren Kierkegaard, to whom I have frequently referred in this text, 
Stein observes that the sensual man can move to the ethical stage. In such a 
case, especially if this primary stage is permanently fixed and has turned into 
a habit, man may need an extraordinary awakening: “no man is naturally capa-
ble of surveying all reasons for and against which influence his decisions.”34 
The sense of this quote can be interpreted as the difference between inference 
 32 Ibid., 74.










and assent— that well- known issue Newman discussed. In his analyses, he 
came to the same conclusion, namely, that man’s natural assent is not the 
result of formal inference in which the human mind undertakes this tedious 
process of a meticulous inspection of all premises; John Henry writes, as pre-
viously quoted, about one act with which we give assent to a given truth, an 
act which resembles “an unwritten summing- up […] of an algebraical series.” 
Stein is, therefore, alluding to Newman’s distinction between inference and 
assent. Henceforth the leap from the aesthetic stage to the ethical stage is like 
the leap from notional assent to real assent. We are struck by an image rather 
than go through a long series of inferential calculus. Instead weighing all the 
pros and cons we make a decision and action follows. Such is our natural con-
duct in concrete matters. This is our informal inference and natural (personal) 
reasoning. Only God knows all reasons, all these interior vacillations as the 
pros are weighed against the cons. Man can only live “in this certainty of faith,” 
so he can repose in this faith and “must strive to recognize what is right in 
God’s eyes.” This conclusion “implies that only the religious attitude is truly 
ethical.”35 Because the matter is too complicated, therefore it is safer to hold on 
to religious tenets which provide guiding rules.
And here we have arrived at the Augustinian moment, for the natural seek-
ing and longing is the divine will. The consciousness of doing right is not co- 
equal with actually doing right, but the decision to do right is the precondi-
tion of justification. In other words, my knowledge about what is right is never 
perfect, and to attempt to attain perfection is doomed to failure. We do not 
have to resume a detailed analysis in order to act, neither is it necessary. Thus 
our procedures in daily acting— we already know it from Newman— is that of 
belief; the attitude of belief is our natural mode of acting. Stein continues: “If 
a man seeks what is right only here and now and decides according to his 
lights he is by this very fact on this way to God and to himself, even though he 
may not know it.”36 As we remember, this is what Newman described as using 
oneself; we have to use ourselves as we have no one else to use. (Let us note 
in passing that the quotations here resemble Adam Smith’s invisible hand, 
although for the Scottish philosopher it was the mechanism to be employed 
in the economic sphere. The logic, however, is the same: be satisfied with the 
modest I- perspective and do right what you have recognised by your reason 
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not know the mind of God. He may, however, believe to have approached it in 
his righteousness.)
Naturally, we are not left alone in this journey inside. Only the man united 
with God can become master of himself. Edith Stein follows the same paths 
Newman has defined in his sermon: reason, principle, and conscience. Since 
we cannot elaborate an overall scheme that would satisfy all, we have to rely 
on the individual person and his potential ability to do right, for he is endowed 
to act respectively. The saint Carmelite explains: “If a man seeks to do the right 
thing on principle, i.e. if he wills to do it always and everywhere, he has decided 
about himself and placed his will within the divine will, even if it should not 
yet be clear to him that right is identical with what God wills. But if he is not 
clear about this, he has not yet found the safe way to what is right; and he has 
disposed of himself as if he were already master of himself, though he has not 
yet realized the depths of his own interior being. The ultimate decision is pos-
sible only before God.”37 We find in this quote the basic Newmanian tenets like 
acting on principle and realization. Only the person who lives truly in himself, 
i.e. who knows what he is doing and wills to do it and experiences certitude 
about doing it, is acting in his own person. And another crucial point is that 
such a person may rightly believe that he is fulfilling his personal task entrusted 
to him by God. Ultimately, that he is doing what God wants him to do.
The man whose will is surrendered to God strives for what is right in God’s 
eyes. And for the person who is thus united with God “this question is solved 
once and for all.”38 We could paraphrase Newman’s words here: he knows what 
he knows. He realizes the truth.
Man can dispose of his innermost being and he is also called to preserve it. 
Man can be internally divided, so he can be internally far from his depths. He 
is not, then, master of himself. The function of understanding does not come 
from the depths of one’s interior, says Stein, and this is a very profound remark, 
for the function of understanding is akin to what we all commonly grasp when 
using the logical apparatus. But it is “those depths” that “do awaken in affective 
and dispositional life. Then your soul opens itself with that which is proper 
to it when it’s at home with itself.”39 I think we can easily find the kin traces 
with Newman’s image which can be a connatural reflection in the mind. But 
the soul must be “at home with itself,” in Newman’s parlance the person must 
be whole, united, and integrated. It must be noted that not all affections issue 
 37 Ibid.
 38 Ibid.
 39 E. Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. M. C. Baseheart, M. Sawicki, 








from the core of the person, i.e. from the soul, not all of them are “core- valent.” 
There are values which pertain to the unity of our psyche, but our “soul is not 
implicated in [this experiencing].”40 They are, so to say, “soul- less.”
Let us note that the description so far boils down to introspection. In order 
to retain individuality one must go inside rather than be dispersed in external 
forms, some of which are weird. Expressivism is not a remedy to rescue indi-
viduality, a fact that has already been stressed in this book. The conclusions 
we have arrived at sound indeed logical: the inside must be genuinely most 
individual and original because it is perfectly inaccessible to anyone beyond 
the self. We do not need to struggle and prove the external world how original 
we are, for the most original is one who remains inside. Newman enumerates 
the main elements of this kind of wisdom: “innocence, simplicity, implicit obe-
dience to God, tranquillity of mind, contentment […] because God works for 
those who do not work for themselves […].”41 Individuality and, consequently, 
originality consist not in pouring oneself out, but in remaining inside. All this 
comes down to being wary of ostentation.
The fear of ostentation, or in other words the form that triumphs over the 
contents, thus making man unreal, is constantly on Newman’s mind. This 
danger echoes in romantic poetry as a warning against inauthenticity. Man 
should witness to God “without pretension, or affectation, or rude and inde-
cent ostentation.”42 After all it matters little how people censure the believer, 
but what counts is “whether in God’s judgement he deserves the censure 
[…].”43 Newman was always ready to subdue to the authority of the Church, 
even when he was member of the Anglican Church in which the individual 
attitude was more prominent; when he found the ethos of his Church false, 
he decided to quit. His main purpose, however, was not to undermine author-
ity, but rather to enforce it. The more so when he joined the Roman Catholic 
Church. Therefore he bids his fellow believers “to shelter our personal profes-
sion under the authority of the general body.”44 What we need is secrecy and 
humility because— philosophically speaking, as Newman is always trying to 
proof— such is the nature of our knowledge, much of which is implicit and 
tacit. Rather than professing the truth as self- proclaimed prophets we shall do 
much better if we remain within the bosom of, and obey, the Church. Newman 
 40 Ibid., 229.
 41 J. H. Newman, Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1891, 299.
 42 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 98.
 43 Ibid.
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bets that our profession should rather be a spontaneous process, words flowing 
from us without premeditation, and deeds following words; ultimately, deeds 
suffice. Newman shunned ostentation. Let us observe how coherent his think-
ing is. He is always on his guard when individual speculation intrudes in doc-
trinal matters; when speculation seeks to get the upper hand. This mediation 
of the imperfect intellect is in constant danger of making mistakes.
Let us note in passing that some people say today that clergymen should 
stay out of politics, a very popular claim at the moment. What does Newman 
have to say? Obviously, they should not covet high places or be ambitious, but 
to demand that they “should not express an opinion and exert an influence 
one way rather than another, it is plainly unscriptural.”45 Here again he stresses 
the importance of being judgmental, an attitude which in Stein would mean 
being responsive to values. And like in the case of being non- ostentatious but 
moderate, gentle, and humble, avoiding contentious words, we should never-
theless pass judgments on the reality around us. It is good or bad, not neutral 
in any sense.
8 Primeval Life Accessible Yet Not Comprehensible
Following Edith Stein, the most original in us is the primeval life, not the exter-
nal forms that we choose for the sake of self- expression. Now the problem is 
that we have no direct access to this inmost centre of our selves, we cannot 
examine it, let alone perceive it with our senses or render it in an intersubjective 
and communicable form, yet nevertheless it remains the ever- present source 
of individual emanation. We should draw on the inside for what is outside. It 
is in contact with the primeval and non- conceptualised life where the human 
being is free with the utmost freedom that we can attain what is truly personal 
and truly individual. This point is in agreement with what I have said before. 
The inside is composed also of the non- conceptualized (resp. implicit) sphere 
and yet it beams with life, but we do not have to (nor can) put it in explicit 
forms. Indeed it is enough, as we said, if our intentions are pure, then we come 
close to what is expected of us, i.e. what is in accord with the inside. This is 
logical, while belief is unlike theoretical knowledge that can be demonstrated.
Therefore primeval life is not deterministic, hence when its impact is 
released and transformed into many internal forms and external expressions, 
one can become an Anglican or a Roman Catholic, for— as I have already 





said— in all religions one finds some common elements. The point is, how-
ever, that one should strive after what is truly his, what he can realize, and 
he cannot do it unless in his inmost self. Edith Stein notes, as I have already 
quoted it before, that “man is destined to live in his inmost being and to master 
himself in a way that is possible only from this inmost sphere.” This funda-
mental choice is carried out amidst various circumstances, what we generally 
call ethos, other people’s choices, and the historical background. Going inside 
resembles the Husserlian “zurick zu den Sachen [back to the things],” and John 
Paul ii’s poetic vision portrayed it as going to the source of the stream.
Since primeval life is not given to us for analysis, we can only describe cer-
tain attitudes as demonstrative of our proximity or distance from it. Newman 
focuses on “simplicity in act, purity in motive, honesty in aim,”46 they alto-
gether make up the essence of innocence and frankness. In other words there 
are modes of behaviour that bring us closer to the self. Such is the way of life 
that the believer should follow. John Paul ii in his meditation Roman Triptych 
notes the memorable words:
If you want to find the source,
you have to go up, against the current,
tear through, seek, don’t give up,
you know it must be somewhat here.47
Primeval life is like an unquenchable fire that radiates with personal truth and 
authenticity; we need to remember that “personal” does not mean here some-
one’s “personal secrets”. No, rather it denotes the ontic sphere, something that 
belongs to my very being, not something that belongs to the conscious part of 
my being. Then it depends on the individual person, on his simplicity, purity 
of motives, and honesty whether the truth and authenticity will manage to be 
conveyed outside in individual acts. Or whether they die down in artful and 
artificial behaviour. And it matters little if some believers are accused of being 
artful and artificial, but it does matter what they really are. Let us invoke the 
metaphor of transparency again, the clean mirror that portrays perfectly the 
reflections of objects on its surface. Inasmuch as the person grows in the truth 
of his very being, so he is ready to give real (spontaneous) assent to real values.
There is a difference between outward obedience, and interior assent. 
This issue is important not only from the point of view of its historical 
 46 J. H. Newman, Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day, 299.
 47 John Paul ii, The Roman Triptych, archive.org/ details/ poetryofjohnpaul100john [accessed 
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considerations, when concrete examples of persecutions are examined. The 
persecution of people on account of their religious beliefs is not a thing of 
the past. When Christians comply, for the reasons of meekness and humble-
ness, to the authorities they should renounce, they fall under the severe judge-
ment of being inoffensive.48 But, Newman argues, they only “yield outwardly; 
to assent inwardly would be to betray the faith; yet they are called deceitful 
and double- dealing, because they do as much as they can, and not more than 
they may.”49 Hence the science of the Cross and the language of the heart are 
rendered as the mystery of the person, especially the believer who can hardly 
be understood unless we learn the Christian system. The individual person has 
his unique imprint on whatever he is doing, the more so the person as believer 
is united in his inmost centre.
We are dealing with the complex unity of the person on the one hand, and 
the pluralism of sciences designed to study the person on the other. These 
sciences have divided the person into various aspects which they thereafter 
attempt to examine. In order, however, to render an adequate picture of the 
whole person one must not forget that we are studying the person as one sys-
tem, with the various aspects thereof being merely minute elements of the 
overall system.
Christians resume silence when persecuted, for the doctrine of the Cross 
imparts its specific logic on this renunciation of the world. And Newman’s 
words testify to his mystic attitude when he says: “Do nothing, and you have 
done everything.”50 Such words naturally agree with Stein’s analysis of St John 
of the Cross’s writings, for “the truth has in itself the gift of spreading, without 
instruments; it makes its way in the world, under God’s blessing, by its own per-
suasiveness and excellence […].”51 It is intriguing that to the degree to which 
we approach our innermost sanctuary, we become open to the “higher logic” 
of which Newman wrote. Going inside means— if I may call it that way— more 
apprehension but less communication.
The Carmelite mystic to whom Edith Stein devoted some much time and 
effort ran the similar paths of thought. We read in St John of the Cross that 
“faith and love are the two guides for the blind; they will lead you, by a way 
you know not, to the secret chamber of God. Faith, the secret of which I am 
speaking, is the foot that journeys onwards to God, and love is the guide that 
 48 This criticism is in some places of the world translated into liberation theology that seeks 
to marry the rosary with the gun.
 49 J. H. Newman, Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day, 302.











directs its steps.”52 Lack of self- knowledge creates nominal Christianity; self- 
knowledge is the precept to the word of Scripture.
Jean Guitton wrote in this same vein in his text Le clair et l’obscur [The Clear 
and the Obscure] where we read: “If everything could be clear and if it were 
possible to make every essence transparent, we would not have research or 
obscurity. And conversely, if we were thrown into the incomprehensible, no 
action would be possible: we would resemble exegetes placed in front of a mes-
sage written down in an unknown language. The chaos of clear ideas, the chaos 
of opaque existences are not made for us. And, to the truth, neither the clear 
nor the obscure has ever existed. Our climate is the mélange of the light and 
the shadow. In this temperate light, in this clear shadow we need to accommo-
date ourselves.”53 We live in chiaroscuro. The British writer of the twentieth 
century, Graham Greene, placed all his heroes against the backdrop of chiar-
oscuro, like Caravaggio’s figures. This is perhaps the main reason why Greene 
loved reading Newman, for the latter had no fear of a mystery. We are doomed 
to live in between, hence neither absolute reason nor total ignorance is the 
right diagnosis of the human condition. Faith and reason go hand in hand.
Now it seems only natural that Stein should have suggested reading Newman 
to her colleague Roman Ingarden. Indeed implicit thinking— actually, not only 
implicit thinking but also implicit faith— is beyond ratio, as it is personal yet 
beyond conceptualisation. The steps of our personal reasoning were meticu-
lously elaborated in the Grammar of Assent. We need the power of the person 
to adequately cope with given circumstances. Ultimately, however, the person 
must resort to God as the One who hides His will behind the visible curtain 
of phenomena. Enlightened speculation is of no avail to shed light on what 
is thus hidden, nor does man need to comprehend it. It is God who designs, 
and the human being can somewhat approach Him by going inside because 
God is not in the external manifestation of events. If God is the ultimate agent, 
obedience of the believer becomes the most important virtue. When this 
recognition— that God is acting— comes from the heart of the believers, as 
it should, “it approves itself to their reason, and they are able to recognize the 
expedience of obedience.”54 And, as Newman stressed in his critique of the 
enlightened view with its emphasis on the intellect: “The heart is commonly 
reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of 
 52 St John of the Cross, A Spiritual Canticle of the Soul and the Bridegroom Christ, trans. by 
D. Lewis, Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2000, 22 (http:// www.ccel 
.org/ ccel/ john_ cross/ canticle.html).
 53 J. Guitton, Le clair and l’obscur, Aubier- Montaigne: Éditions Aubier- Montaigne, 1964, 11.
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direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by descrip-
tion. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us.”55
Let us note how important such considerations are when we, for instance, 
discuss the peculiarity of the relationship between the State and the Church. 
Christians have always seemed maladjusted to the world. Therefore if one 
wants to understand their behaviour, one needs to understand the Christian 
system in which the person is living in the world as a stranger. Newman makes 
some clever remarks. When bishops wish to avoid a popular movement, they 
subdue to the civil authorities and become “hypocritical again, if they did their 
best to repress it.”56
 55 J. H. Newman, Discussions and Arguments, 293.






This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the cc by-nc-nd 4.0 license.
 chapter 4
The Interior— the Source of the Truth and 
Individuality of the Person
And yet it is a true doctrine;
for truth is not on the surface of things,
but in the depths.
 john henry newman …




Edith Stein studies the sphere of individuation in her monumental book Finite 
and Eternal Being. What makes an individual being individual? What are the 
elements that are shared by all beings and what are the distinctive features 
that can be ascribed to this being only and not to others? An answer to these 
questions is of utmost importance especially for such a being as person. As 
we have seen the solution here is crucial for Newman, for it decides about our 
notional or real cognition. Person is a human being, one of many other human 
beings, when we consider his shared features. Nevertheless, “what the individ-
ual thing is above and beyond its universally conceivable nature is its exclu-
sive and immediate property.” In other words there is infinitely more to the 
person than his shared properties, therefore “individuality as such has been 
designated as noncommunicability.”1 I have already written about individuality 
that is attendant on each individual being as such, irrespective of his capa-
bility of expression. Besides, in view of the above statement, the attempts to 
 1 E. Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent To the Meaning of Being, trans. K. F. 




The Interior—the Source of the Truth and Individuality 177
show individuality, let alone to impress others with our individuality, are futile 
because in its deep sense it is incommunicable!
John Crosby describes it precisely when he writes: “Insofar as we live as 
incommunicable persons, we live in a way hidden from others. I live in my 
interiority, or subjectivity, to which others do not have access as I do, I am pres-
ent to myself at the center of my subjectivity in a way in which no other person 
can be present to me, just as any other person is present to himself in a way 
in which I can never be present to him. Another person would have to be me 
if he were to stand in that place where I stand in experiencing myself.”2 I may 
obviously inform others about myself, but this does not change the fact that 
they learn about me through the mediation of the language. And I am the one 
who controls what I want to say, I am the interpreter of myself.
1 Individuality versus the Transcendental Area
We share with other beings the universal essence or nature. “But what is that,” 
asks Stein, “which the individual thing shares with no other thing, that which 
makes it an individual thing?”3 I think that here we encroach upon the sphere 
of Newman’s egotism, of his natural reasoning and inference, the idiosyncratic 
perception and personal result. They are best reflected in real assent. For it is 
in real assent that we observe an individual symmetry between the knowing 
subject and the object of knowing. Stein speaks about “inner non- dividedness” 
and “unity or oneness.” We must remember, however, that we are referring here 
to the transcendental area in which all other beings share, i.e. they share in 
undividedness as being separate from other meaningful structures. What every 
human being participates in does not make him different from other human 
beings in the sense of this human being. In Newman’s terms, we are still on the 
notional level, and Edith Stein rightly concludes that “this is why the transcen-
dental unity does not suffice to define and determine the nature of individual 
being.”4
The transcendental unity does not suffice to display the uniqueness of this 
concrete being, neither does it suffice to point at numerical unity. Indeed this 
kind of unity is opposite to multiplicity, which is composed of numerical units. 
Each human being expects to be respected in his or her individuality rather 
 2 J. Crosby, Personalist Papers, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2004, 33– 34.










than universality. Stein notes that “The generic nature of matter as such makes 
possible the co- existence [Nebeneinander] of things that are alike. However, 
this generic nature is not the ground or the root principle of individual being, 
but that which is required by the form.
Not the essential form but only the pure form or the essence […] of which 
things ‘partake’ by their essential form is what is ‘communicable’ to a multitude 
of individual things.”5 And it is not matter that can be translated into a means 
of communication. Stein continues her description: “Matter as such, to be sure, 
is not communicable at all. In itself and by itself it has neither meaning nor 
efficacy— neither something which could be communicated nor the power to 
communicate. It is simply that which receives, partakes, and is divisible.”6 The 
essential form is incommunicable, it is individual ‘in itself ’. Edith Stein further 
explains: “But the mere being- individual of one thing— as far as the content 
is concerned— differs not at all from the being individual of another thing. 
The being individual pertains to the empty form of the thing. If two individual 
things are to be distinguished as this or that, they must have something dis-
tinctive above and beyond their being individual. In the case of material things 
that are alike, this element of distinction is their share in matter [Stoffanteil] 
by which they differ spatially from each other. We have to ponder the question 
whether in the case of individual things of a different genus this share in mat-
ter is replaced by something else.”7
Stein attributes individual being also to the form, for the form cannot be 
without matter. The meaning of the form is the forming of matter.
If essential form is incommunicable, then there is no point in exerting one-
self in communicating what cannot thus be communicated. After all what one 
does manage to communicate must be something else than essential form. 
Ideal objects, like triangles, can only be distinguished by their position in space. 
The triangle is not an individual thing because its being a triangle is shared by 
all other triangles. It has a meaningful structure, for it can be distinguished 
from other meaningful structures, but “it lacks the full determinateness which 
is required for independence.”8
Let us make use of some literary examples. We know the story of the Little 
Prince from a world- famous booklet by Antoine de Saint- Éxupery. The Little 
Prince looked at the roses in a garden and wept in sorrow because he looked 
at them merely as instances of the same species, i.e. the individual form that 
 5 Ibid., 486.
 6 Ibid.
 7 Ibid.
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was empty. He looked at them theoretically and notionally without noticing 
any distinctive feature that could guide him onward to a personal attachment. 
Indeed there is no attachment in transcendental acquiescence. All flowers of 
the same species are the same and all shapes are the same, therefore they are 
of no distinction. And the Little Prince sought something distinctly individual.
He desperately searched for some distinctive signs in what was visible and 
external, and found nothing. There might have been some variations, e.g. some 
petals were larger than others, the contours of their outlines curved at differ-
ent angles, and the shades of colours differed. But these were minor differ-
ences; they were, so to say, quantitative and countable differences. The lesson 
he received from the Fox suggests to reverse perception, to look within rather 
than without, to look at the traces of mutual experience left inside. Even the 
relationship between two individual beings is rooted within because it is not a 
relationship between two inanimate objects, related to each other in terms of 
spatial and temporal positions. Transcendental perspective leads to frustration 
and scepticism; personal perception leads to attachment and suffering. And 
suffering is the main ingredient of human life. If there is no personal commit-
ment, everything seems dull.
St Thomas Aquinas wrote in his Summa: “For it is clear that whatever is 
received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. 
Now a thing is known as far as its form is in the knower.”9 Aquinas means the 
metaphysical mode of reception. In like manner it is metaphysical in the sense 
of unity. And this sense is notional and theoretical.
Indeed the sense of a detail is in the whole to which the detail serves. It is 
likewise with Christianity or any other great idea— it must be considered in 
its overall integrity, in its historical development. Only then can the individual 
elements be accounted for.
2 Communicability versus Non- communicability
In the case of material and individual objects “we must distinguish between 
the being- different […] and the being- distinguishable- in- its- difference […]. 
[…] The knowability of differences rests, in the case of material things, on their 
participation in matter, and in the case of pure geometrical structures it rests 
on their position or location in space. In both instances this knowability has its 
 9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 





foundation in the spatial nature of objects.”10 It is the nature of the carrier that 
is the ground or foundation of individual being. For Thomas Aquinas, the root 
principle of differentiation is matter. Now for Stein, “the personal carrier is the 
ground or root principle of individual being. And since we do not find the root 
principle of individual being in the ‘communication’ or, more precisely, in the 
self- molding of the form into space- filling matter, but see in this a kind of com-
munication […], rather than the unfolding of the essence of a definite genus of 
forms, the ‘non- communicability’ […] of spiritual forms to space- filling matter 
constitutes […] no proof of the non- communicability of the determinateness 
of the species to a multiplicity of individuals.”11
Edith Stein compares human life to a melody which, when played, each 
sounds differently. The melody is a person’s “<course of life> as a time struc-
ture.”12 It cannot be played exactly in the same manner, for at each time it 
springs uniquely. “The person is a carrier in a different sense than any imper-
sonal something. The life of the person ‘springs’ from personal being as from 
a source, and it is conceivable that this life might end without the person 
itself being annihilated, and the person might then begin a new life.”13 I find 
this musical metaphor particularly attractive when used as an analogy to 
human life.
The root principle of individual being is found in the formal structure of 
objects “and especially in the fact that the carrier which confines or sets apart 
the essence or nature of objects as their empty form is not communicable.”14 
The carrier is like an abyss from which the essence springs forth. Under the 
external influences material individual things manifest differences. Together 
with the determinateness of the species they are “responsible for the ‘fate’ of 
individual things and their particular actual formal structure.”15
3 The Human Being
Now with regard to human beings, the situation becomes much more com-
plicated. The human being is also a composite of form and matter, hence in 
this respect he is “an essence or nature that is always and everywhere the 
 10 E. Stein, Finite and Eternal, 492.
 11 Ibid., 493.
 12 Ibid., 494.
 13 Ibid., 495.
 14 Ibid., 496.
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same.”16 At the same time one concrete human being is entirely unlike other 
human beings. What makes him distinct from other human beings? Edith 
Stein answers: “The individuals are carriers of the particularity of the species 
and of the specific formation which is achieved with the aid of external cir-
cumstances. The material constitution of the individual being and of the envi-
ronment into which the individual is integrated are co- determining factors.”17 
This concrete individual results from its natural endowment— matter shaped 
by form— and the interaction of the environment, interrelations, i.e. ethos. In 
other words, we perceive this peculiar duality in each human being, i.e. it fol-
lows the mode of development of animals and plants, and at the same time 
there is something infinitely more that is being added to it. Aside to this “nat-
ural” aspect shared by all beings, human life is “a spiritual, personal, internal 
life that discloses itself to fellow humans and that is ever renewed from these 
sources; and, lastly, a life that is freely determined by the I— then we must ask 
whether this radical dichotomy of human life is not also of major significance 
for the individual being and the individual particularity of human beings.”18
Obviously today we know much more about this natural fortune of all 
beings than it was known in the time of Edith Stein. We have decoded the 
human genotype and we know that as far as the biological aspect of our nature 
is concerned we do not differ much from animals. The conclusion is hence-
forth obvious: it is not in biology that one should seek the root principle of 
human peculiarity and individuation. And here we arrive at what Newman 
called the infinite abyss of our existence, as we have already quoted it here.
4 The Life- Emanating I
Life “emanates from the I and […] the personal I holds command over it in a 
dual sense: so as to become conscious of it as of a life that is set apart from 
everything else; and so as to mold this life freely.”19 The I is not a pure ego. Stein 
rises to the heights of phenomenological description that borders on poetry 
when she writes that “the pure ego is, as it were, only the portal through which 
the life of the human person passes on its way from the depth of the soul to the 
lucidity of consciousness. And the inmost center of the soul, its most authentic 
and most spiritual part, is not colorless and shapeless, but has a particular form 
 16 Ibid., 500.













of its own.”20 Sarah Borden recapitulates this essential element of Stein’s elab-
oration on individual form. From her interpretation we learn that “each human 
being has an a priori content- rich individual form […], a form which provides 
a structure for our individual development and therefore limits our individual 
possibilities.”21 Then the commentator goes on to characterise the personalism 
of her heroine as follows: “Stein insists that each of us has a unique personal 
core that characterizes us and is permanent, abiding unchanged throughout 
our lives under any and all circumstances. It does, however, unfold and imprint 
our actions and lives ever more deeply. We could return to the image of the 
flower. Just as a flower begins closed and only gradually opens to the sun, so 
our personal core begins tucked within itself and only gradually blooms out in 
our mental, sentient and physical life.”22
This fountain of internal life is marked with personal uniqueness and it is 
the undying source of individual life. Not only do we find inside the source of 
our personal life, but also the source of our individual responsibilities. There 
is always something unique for men and women, for husbands and wives. 
Individually, they tend to be dispersed in quest of a lifetime career, not because 
they find it inside, but because they can see others fervently seeking their per-
fection in careers.
The real centre of individual life is inside, in the innermost part of the 
human being. It is not a shapeless source, it is somehow— mysteriously— 
primordially shaped and imparts its individual character on the human being. 
Deep down inside every human being is a pure light and then it radiates gushes 
forth outside. Now when man retains authenticity and reality in his life the 
ray of light is clear. It is like a system of mirrors. As long as they are clean they 
convey the ray to the surface. Not only are they clean but also tilted at cor-
rect angles. It is like breathing deeply. I think that now we understand better 
Newman’s idea of the first thoughts and their importance, especially when 
they concern obedience to conscience. He is afraid of any negative intrusions 
from outside, any attempts at rationalization that may blur the original clear 
message from inside, that may contaminate the purity of the source. Or, to use 
another image, it is like a cluttered flat in which it is difficult to move around. 
You can only wobble unsteadily to the entrance.
Therefore when Stein writes about the soul that is most authentic when 
“self- collected,” this term immediately refers us to Newman’s wholeness. And it 
 20 Ibid.
 21 E. Stein, Thine Own Self. Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings, Washington D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2010, 201.







The Interior—the Source of the Truth and Individuality 183
is inside, in this innermost centre of the soul that is composed the root princi-
ple of our individuation. It “cannot be grasped in such a manner that it could 
be given a universal name, nor can it be compared with anything else.”23 This 
is what I have already written before. We become our true self and genuinely 
individual not when we go out and translate our selves in numerous expressiv-
ist forms, but rather when we go inside. The centre lies deeper than character 
traits, therefore it cannot be reduced to them. A conclusion that we can draw 
from this fact is clear: what we learn about the human person mediation of his 
or her character traits is still not his or her true self.
The innermost centre impresses its stamp on every trait of character. Hence 
there are some vestiges of this centre in the outer expression. We find it in 
someone’s character and attitudes. In our encounters with others we must 
be aware that behind what appears on the surface there is this deeper stra-
tum, which is “the key that unlocks the mystery of the structural formation of 
the character of a human being.”24 Behind the words and appearances there 
appears the abyss of the person’s mystery. Newman’s motto ex umbris et imag-
inibus in veritatem renders the situation I am talking about perfectly. We some-
what feel “the ineffable of the soul’s essence also in our communication with 
others.”25
Another thing that is interesting in this context is that very often one per-
son behaves in a similar manner to another person. This happens especially in 
the relationship with some model characters or strong personalities in which 
case one tends to imitate someone else. Although the essential difference in, 
say, two individuals cannot be grasped, “each of these persons feels himself in 
his innermost essence as an ‘authentic individual’ and is so regarded by those 
who have truly ‘grasped’ or ‘apprehended’ the nature of his personality.”26 This 
feeling here is of a special kind, for it has a cognitive value. It is “a spiritual act, 
a spiritual apperception.” And Stein continues that this act is called a feeling 
because it is “a ‘dim’ apprehension, an apprehension that lacks the clarity and 
distinctness of a conceptually expressible, rational insight, and because it is an 
‘apperception in which the heart is engaged’.”27 The cognitive feeling is an effi-
cient response to values. The Samaritan saw the wounded man and took pity 
on him. The Samaritan was moved, yet it was not a mere emotion, but an expe-
rience that led to action. It was not a superficial excitement, but an encounter 
 23 E. Stein, Finite and Eternal, 501.
 24 Ibid., 502.
 25 Ibid.
 26 Ibid.












which effected the mobilization of the person.28 There is an essential coopera-
tion in the integrated person between the two cognitive faculties: the intellect 
and the heart. The heart recognizes what should be done and the intellect sug-
gests how it is to be done. The integrated person— which is another phrase for 
being united, using real words, and acting in conformity with a well- informed 
conscience— rushes to apply the means to what he has recognized as his call 
for duty.
And here we arrive at the core of this intellectual kinship between Newman 
and Stein, for we are in the sphere of implicit thinking, in the language of the 
heart. This is the land in which cor ad cor loquitur, not with words but with 
internal feelings. It is here that the inwardness of one soul— to use Stein’s 
vocabulary— speaks to the inwardness of another soul. This is what I said in 
another context: the conceptual apprehension becomes inadequate hence we 
turn to apperception, for we need to see. What is apprehended is something 
unique and spiritual. It is not accessible to the senses although it pertains to 
them. And it may be deceptive, just like sense data, but we have to accept it as 
it is. Therefore, like for Newman, the attitude of doubt is out of place because 
to dispense with this apperception “altogether […] would be just as unreason-
able as to renounce completely the use of the senses as a means of knowledge 
on account of the fact that the senses are ‘delusive’.”29
5 The Personal Imprint of the I
For Newman, too, to dispense with sense perception on account of the senses 
being at times deceptive would be of no use. In like manner we have arrived 
at something of universal validity. Edith Stein proposes to formulate this uni-
versality. We feel that our own essence of nature as well as the essences of 
others are thus constituted. And this “thus” has universal validity. “The reason 
for this lies in the formal structure of the person: in the uniqueness of the I as 
such that is conscious of its own self, that embraces the particularity of its own 
essence as its ‘very own’, and that ascribes to every other I the same uniqueness 
and individual particularity.”30 We cannot apprehend the content of the “thus.” 
When the heart speaks unto the heart it is the dialogue of interrelation rather 
than an intellectual intercourse.
 28 See Lk 10:25– 37.
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Let us draw in passing yet one more important conclusion. If the root prin-
ciple of our individuation is inside in primeval life, it is inherently counterrev-
olutionary. The true self is inside, not in external forms, therefore the external 
forms cannot essentially thwart the outward expression of the self. This is the 
moment of positive freedom— people can be inwardly free irrespective of the 
political system in which they live. Consequently, the self cannot lay the blame 
of its inadequacy on social institutions. They are merely— as Newman would 
say— the circumstances. In concrete situations they may become hindrances, 
but never determining factors. It would be futile to demolish the external insti-
tutions in order to help the self unfold its potentialities and its individuality, 
for its individual core resides in its innermost recess where the outside has no 
access. And even if we found some good models for us to imitate, it would be of 
no help unless we have made an internal reconciliation with the inside.
Newman found his decision to join the Catholic Church in 1845 as person-
ally irresistible, but he would never recommend it to his followers. There is no 
objective form that can be applied by every person. What is objective must be 
made personal by the individual work of each person. The practical implemen-
tation of this requirement is indeed fascinating both in Newman and Stein, i.e. 
how to translate the objective into the personal, how a dogma can become a 
personal principle. The truth flows from inside and from any outside prompt-
ings; and even if there are external promptings, they must be sifted through the 
personal I. Here Newman’s sermons on ostentation should be recalled again. 
Newman suggested acting within the scope of the Church authority as a safe-
guard against ostentation, for we read: “[God] bids us unite together in one, 
and to shelter our personal profession under the authority of the general body. 
Thus, while we show ourselves as lights to the world far more effectively than if 
we glimmered separately in the lone wilderness without communication with 
others, at the same time we do so with far greater secrecy and humility.”31
This is not to say that we should be recluses. Efforts to become recluses would 
boil down to ostentation— an outcome that Newman definitely rejected. If our 
true difference is inside, then individuality should show up as a spontaneous 
process. Therefore the main activity here is not to run away from other people, 
that would definitely be wrong, but to go inside; so that even amidst fervent 
activities we can hold on to the emanating source of our selves. It is like sit-
ting and warming up at our private fires. After all, Newman elucidates, the first 
duties of a Christian in the order of duties are “to repent and to believe.”32 We 
 31 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 99.






should for instance discountenance evil by silence and be very cautious when 
called to pass judgements. This primeval (personal) life inside is like a serene 
and undisturbed source of stream. By analogy, we may compare this internal 
journey to the sources from which the imagination of the heart emanates to 
Newman’s journey to the sources of Christianity.
Primeval life has no form— this formula denotes that we cannot account 
for all the contents of our selfhood in explicit terms, therefore it runs counter 
the modern tendency. To acquiesce to the return to primordial life means to 
consent “that essential difference [Wesenunterschied] in individuals cannot be 
grasped.”33 This is what in other words means incommunicability. Now to refer 
to Newman— when he says “I am one,” in this word “one” he grasps the implicit 
and explicit elements of the person, therefore things that can be understood 
(and communicated) and things that cannot be understood (or communi-
cated). Argumentation is needed in discourse and marks the power. It creates 
an elusive impression that one rules over reality, whereas what we are dealing 
with in naming is only the verbal trace of reality, abstracted from its essence. 
The true reality is in the hidden space, in the unnamed depth where man lives 
rather than speaks about life. Therefore in this interpersonal communication 
between two hearts we are so close to a mystic experience. In mystic experi-
ence, we go contrariwise, i.e. we abstain from touching, consuming, and feed-
ing the senses. It is like shutting the camera and putting it aside.
The real difference between two people is hidden, any resemblance being 
only external. Our selves are “unrepeatable.”34 Now the interesting point is 
that this innermost difference, that cannot be grasped, is in fact what makes 
authentically individual. In other words we are not different from other people 
in the way we describe ourselves and say how different we are, but we are differ-
ent with regard to the profound ontic sphere of our very being. There is “radical 
difference of individual essences” and these essences are not placed in matter.
What Newman called real apprehension, Stein names apperception. The 
relation between apprehension and apperception is such that the latter denotes 
that “something spiritual and as such not accessible to the senses, even though 
it manifests itself by means of sensible signs […].”35 And apperception may be 
deceptive, just like assent is sometimes deceptive. But Stein, just as Newman, 
does not dispense with the senses although they at times are erroneous. She 
does not propose bracketing on that account. Let me remind the reader that 
Newman opposes doubt as an instrument to arrive at what is indubitable. In 
 33 E. Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 502.
 34 Ibid.
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the Philosophical Notebook we read: “If our consciousness <perception> of our 
existence is to be taken as true and trusted, then our consciousness <percep-
tion> of something external to us, answering both to phenomena & to typical 
principles or ideas is true and to be trusted. We must take ourselves for what 
we are — we cannot divide between the mind & its gifts — we only know the 
mind through its gifts & powers.”36 We have to use ourselves, our faculties, in 
learning about the world because in the concrete we do not find any general-
ized conception of the human being, but this living creature in whom all the 
dimensions and faculties are placed together. Newman opposes any duality 
between the soul and the body.
The I is unique, for it imposes unity on the person. The I “is conscious of its 
own self […], embraces the particularity of its own essence as its ‘very own’, 
and that ascribes to every other I the same uniqueness and individual par-
ticularity [Eigenheit].”37 But we cannot apprehend and express the content of 
the “thus” in the phrase “thus constituted,” as I have written in the previous 
paragraph. I think we have some reason to identify the word “thus” with the 
analysis of “ergo” in Chapter 2. As we remember “ergo” used in implication can 
be grasped intuitively, say, implicitly. The “ergo” is not merely an intellectual 
element, nor the “thus” is.
In view of all this we arrive at personalism in Newman and Stein because 
for personalists— as John Crosby rightly observed— “a human person [is] a 
creature of interiority, does not exist just to provide an instance of the human 
kind, but exists as this unrepeatable person and so stands in a sense above the 
human kind, being always more than an instance of it.”38 Another thing of cap-
ital importance is that Newman speaks about the mind of the Church. There 
are truths in this mind in their latent and implicit form, which it takes time to 
be explicitly formulated. The ideas that have life hardly ever have their explicit 
form, but nevertheless they actuate their reality by influencing people, “so that 
we shrink from principles in substance, which we acknowledge in influence.”39 
This is an interesting point in Newman. Logically speaking, if these ideas are 
latent one can hardly expect them to be well- defined. They exert their influ-
ence by possessing and guiding, as I have said before.
It must be noted that this turn to the subject means precisely the turn to 
what is profoundly hidden in the subject, not to what can be externally dis-
played by the subject. The external may be dissipation what God planted in us. 
 36 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 30.
 37 E. Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 503.
 38 J. Crosby, The Personalism of John Henry Newman, xx- xxi.











It is safe to start this inward journey armed with the armoury of the teaching of 
the Church and personal endowment. Otherwise we can get lost in ostentation 
and display, i.e. in the same artificial forms. It is like groping in the dark for 
some indefinite objects.
The difference between the modern turn to the subject and Newman’s turn 
is that modernity rested on the logical structures of thinking with which to 
define and render the subjective contents in explicit forms. Only these con-
tents are rational in the subject which can thus be rendered. Newman pro-
poses to go further down.
The Little Prince, to use our literary illustration, is on an inward journey with 
some simple rules as his guiding principles: friendship and love. On his journey 
inside he meets various inauthentic characters who like shipwrecks sank on the 
shallow ground of conceit, pride, and addiction. The true (genuine) source of 
variety is deep down inside the person, in the impenetrable and ineffable abyss. 
The point is not to give voice to one’s private opinion, but to the true self inside. 
This is the main idea of subjectivity in Newman and Stein, which is put forward 
by the Fox in Exupéry’s novel: “What is essential is invisible to the eye.”40
6 The Source of the Person’s Dignity
In his discussion with Paul Ramsey, I agree with John Crosby that the dignity 
of “the human persons is in part grounded in their immanent makeup.”41 This 
position converges with Newman’s implicit knowledge and Stein’s innermost 
source of the human mystery. And for Crosby this is the main source of dig-
nity; it is not “that treatment of a person which is appropriate to him or her as 
person, but rather that in a person in virtue of which some treatment is appro-
priate and other treatment is inappropriate.”42 This dignity is related to the 
person’s self- possession, not in the sense of being aware of this self- possession, 
so Crosby does not mean “this consciousness of one’s dignity but with the dig-
nity of which one is conscious.”43
This dignity emanates from the depth of the human person. I also agree 
with Crosby— in view of what I have read about Newman’s and Stein’s per-
sonal approach— that rationality varies from one being to another. Thinking is 
a personal process. We are not of one replicable template. Crosby notes: “This 
 40 See A. de Saint- Exupéry, The Little Prince, trans. K. Woods, London: Heinemann, 1974, 72.
 41 J. Crosby, Personalist Papers, 4.
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commonness goes so far that human beings are plural only through their bod-
ies, as if the rational spirit in them were literally one, so that each human being 
does not have his or her own reason in the same way that each has his or her 
own body. As against this view we have of course to say that each human being 
has his or her own intellect and rational powers, no less than each has his or 
her own body.”44 And here again we find confirmation of Newman’s claim that 
thinking is a living process, for it is not logical structures that think, but persons 
who make use of them. The essential difference between two human beings 
is therefore not in their outlook and external features, but in their innermost 
sphere.
It is true that in some most abstract areas our rational activities may con-
verge. And Descartes opened his Discourse on Method with the well- known 
declaration that “good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally dis-
tributed,” after all he propounded his method for the solution of mathematical 
problems.45 There are two sources of human dignity: one is common that we 
share with others our rational nature; the other one is hidden and incommu-
nicable. And I think it is the latter that is addressed by Newman and Stein. It 
is like a mark, a sign deep down hidden in our innermost nature. This inward 
direction gains yet another confirmation: the only way to save one’s individu-
ality is to seek it inside not outside; the only way to enrich the world without 
with one’s individual character is build it up inside. And let us say something 
that may sound paradoxical: the genuine way to save the world is to turn away 
from the world; the only way to be truly present in the world is to be absent 
from it.
7 Others— Empathy
Incommunicability then is common to all people, but the idiosyncratic char-
acter of this incommunicability is what makes us different. Empathy is not pri-
mordial in content, that is, we do not know the content of one’s consciousness. 
“Empathy […] is the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespec-
tive of the kind of experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness 
is experienced.”46 The perceived world and the empathetic world belong to the 
 44 Ibid., 7.
 45 See Descartes, A Discourse on Method. Meditations and Principles, trans. by J. Veitch, 
London and Melbourne: Everyman’s Library, 1984, 3.









same world. As McCullogh observes, “empathy becomes the foundation for all 
intersubjective experience.”47
Edith Stein argues that values are objective and we respond to values. We 
need to comprehend them in order to respond. Values motivate our actions 
and our responses. In a way, then, values act like imagination. They motivate 
action, but do not cause it. As Sarah Borden writes: “We cannot ‘see’ certain 
values without feeling them.”48 And this is what Newman called real appre-
hension and Stein apperception. And let us note that this unfolding of the indi-
vidual form into a concrete selfhood is safeguarded, in Newman’s doctrine, by 
the obedience to the dogmatic structure of the Catholic Church. This is a very 
important but complicated point. On the one hand the true believer (real in 
his words and deeds) is like the point of reference; on the other this believer is 
open in conscience to the overall Christian system. His selfhood therefore is not 
a self- willed licence but a resultant of these two elements. According to Stein, 
those “who possess the eyes open to the world of values” should “be living as 
members of the community, in live interaction with its other components.”49
Indeed she is talking here about Newman’s real assent and the personal 
readiness to assent to what is real, i.e. to real values. Such a person naturally 
must “become efficacious outwardly,” must become the core of society, the 
centre of attraction. The centre which does not focus on itself, but on the world 
of values. Our response to values is “the <most natural> behavior for the per-
son” and it is by the recognition of the values the person approves of that we 
learn what kind of person she is.50 The same was true for Newman. In his view, 
emotions are a more authentic and immediate portrait of our selfhood than 
intellectual concepts, which usually constitute a certain safe distance to the 
world of experience known in experience. Therefore his later philosophy is “no 
mere psychologism — it is a metaphysics of being as known in experience.”51
The prerequisite of empathy is the cultivation of profound interpersonal 
relations. For Newman, the right circumstances of social charity are cultivated 
in private spheres. Now the requirement of having private relationships as 
the practical lesson for social charity is very Aristotelian. Newman does not 
fear that concentration upon individuals will thwart our love of many. Love 
 47 McCullogh, Edith Stein and Intersubjectivity, in: R. Feist, W. Sweet (eds.), Husserl and Stein, 
Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003, 130.
 48 See S. Borden, Edith Stein, 39.
 49 E. Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, 219.
 50 Ibid., 227, 228.
 51 E. Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 2, 33. See also A. J. Boekraad, The Personal 
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of many is not superior to the love of individuals. Moreover, once we neglect 
the latter kind of love, being involved “in the schemes of an expansive benev-
olence” we shall certainly fail to prepare ourselves for a proper practice of the 
love of many. Therefore Newman concludes “that the best preparation for lov-
ing the world at large, and loving it duly and wisely, is to cultivate an intimate 
friendship and affection towards those who are immediately about us.”52
8 The Person and Soul Life
All we have said so far has brought us to some fundamental conclusions with 
regard to such a varied, complex, and united being as the person. Both Newman 
and Stein sought to grasp the true nature of the human person. They realized 
that the proposals, which modern philosophy had provided, were either reduc-
tive or, at best, insufficient and, taking into consideration a more profound 
understanding of the person, were inadequate. In his quest, however, Newman 
focused on epistemology, at least in his most philosophical endeavour, for he 
was primarily interested in learning and presenting the way in which the per-
son actually arrives at true knowledge. It can be surmised that even already in 
his Anglican years Newman felt that the empiricist view, fostered by British 
empiricism and its proponents, conveyed an incomplete picture of the human 
person.
What Newman originally, intuitively grasped was later, in the 1860s, given 
the form of an extensive study, particularly in his Grammar of Assent. One 
might ask: why did this come so late? Such a question, however, would be 
wrong; each inquirer is on his own individual track towards the truth, no step 
can be bypassed or borrowed from someone else. Besides, Newman primarily 
did not deem it fitting to put forward a theoretical investigation when sensus 
fidelium sufficed. Or perhaps he did not feel ready for the task yet. Stein, for her 
part, focused on ontology, on what the person is, and how the person comes 
to acquire knowledge. Like all phenomenologists she strove to come to grips 
with human experience, i.e. how the person experiences himself and how 
the person is experienced by others. Newman grappled with British empiri-
cism and the heritage thereof, or in general with modern philosophy and its 
destructive encroachment upon the area of theology under the guise of liberal-
ism. He noticed how reductive and devastating this intrusion was. This is why 
he undertook a thorough analysis of the process of knowledge and its basic 





distinction between certainty and certitude. The conclusion Newman arrived 
at was that the person surpasses intellectual barriers and is capable of assent-
ing to the truth that is beyond comprehension. This investigation was of vital 
importance, first of all for Newman himself, particularly with the awkwardness 
he felt towards his Anglican ethos and subsequent realization that there was 
something wrong with it, especially when this ethos opened the door to liberal 
intrusions into theology.
Edith Stein, who was a newcomer, or to be precise, a convert to Christianity 
did not experience this kind of existential need. She was, therefore, if I may 
put it in this way, inclined to adopt a more investigative approach, indeed the 
approach of a professional philosopher. Both Newman and Stein, as should 
be stressed strongly, had grown to a point of being able to witness, with their 
career or lives, that which they had assented to as the only truth— with this 
truth being at one with their consciences. Newman desperately needed an 
answer for his questions as to the genuine depository of Apostolic succession, 
he even felt compelled to embark upon a thorough historical analysis; Stein, as 
a philosopher, investigated the ontological grounds of the person. Surprisingly, 
their divergent paths converged.
In her Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, Stein listed the four lay-
ers inherent in the person: the physical, the sensory (sentient), the mental, and 
the personal. These all remain in a dynamic relationship with one another, but 
the personal layer is of central importance. As Sarah Borden rightly observes, 
“[t] he most central layer is the person or the personal realm.”53 The spiritual 
is the fundamental aspect, and overrules the others, for all these dimensions 
suggest of the ineffable depth of the spirit. The intriguing element, however, 
is that the spiritual, while being so decisive, is hidden from view. It lies deeply 
hidden below what is explicit and visible. Our persons need to awaken what 
is thus deeply hidden. The difference between the visible and invisible aspects 
of our very persons can be seen in the difference between causality and moti-
vation. These are two distinct aspects of our knowledge: causality comes from 
propositions and motivation pertains to persons.
When Newman arrived at Oriel College he noticed, to his horror, that the 
Christian life of the students was thoroughly neglected.54 Such an attitude was 
a legacy of modernity and the prevailing model of individual choice which had 
been given a primary position. Oxford University lived in the illusion that the 
 53 S. Borden, Thine Own Self, 10.
 54 And yet he was dismissed by the authorities (especially Provost Hawkins), which was 
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intellect can assent to religious truths irrespective of how the person who is 
called upon to give this assent lives. Newman realized that individual choice, 
this jewel in the modern treasury, bore practical consequences, some of which 
remained in glaring contradiction to the life of a believer. And if practical con-
duct was wrong, knowledge also became depraved, for Newman firmly believed 
that the person is a unity. We cannot think in isolation from what we are.
In a way, Newman and Stein share one intuition, namely, they seek to under-
stand the person, i.e. the finite being, by referring him to the infinite being. 
Stein expressed her hope in the Finite and Eternal Being that by thorough 
studying revelation she might gain “a deeper knowledge of finite being.”55 Thus 
in order to understand the finite being we should begin with the infinite.
Stein uses the metaphor of light to describe our conscious life, a procedure 
Newman often employed. Conscious life “resembles the lit surface that covers 
an obscure depth, a depth which manifests itself in and through the medium 
of the surface. If, then, we want to understand the human being- person, we 
must penetrate this obscure depth.”56 Our conscious life is like a window that 
furnishes us with a fairly limited view. We may look inside through it, but we 
can see only a part of the room, not the whole of the flat, for the window is a 
conceptual structure, of necessity simplified and generalized.
Human beings carry their being- human. Stein elaborated on this signifi-
cant issue in her Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities. We learn in this 
work that the spirit resides in the soul. The sentient aspect of our being may 
give hints as to the deep seated soul, but the soul “does not yet emerge at the 
outset of the sentient development of an individual, but becomes visible only 
little by little.” The soul “is ripening and imprinting that development with its 
trademark, without the soul’s being determined itself by the sentient develop-
ment. The ripening itself is to be distinguished from [its] showing up within 
the actuality of living and within character development.” In other words, what 
is apparent on the surface is not exactly what is inside. There is no, if we may 
put it this way, literary translation of the inside into the soul’s expression with-
out. The soul may be awakened by some external circumstances (this is what 
Newman called the transformation of the notional into the real), therefore 
“[a] nything and everything can suddenly strike in the depths, to where nothing 
was able to make headway before.”57 This is what Stein means to be awakened 
to soul life.
 55 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 355.
 56 Ibid., 364.








Now if the soul is not awakened yet, we are living, so to say, on the outskirts 
of our very beings. We are absorbed “into peripheral experiences if the depth 
of [our] soul hasn’t yet awakened. […] There’s an escaping from the depths to 
the periphery at the point when a person’s soul life turns into torment for her, 
when the soul is filled with distress.”58 This state is torment and chaos, for it 
signifies one’s living outside of oneself, or of one’s true self; Stein holds that one 
can continue existing on a mere sentient level.
We may be living in a way as if we had no soul and in total oblivion of what 
is deeply inside. As this kind of life is continued in the periphery, it resembles 
the Kierkegaardian aesthetic stage. While living in the periphery (not in one-
self) the ego “gets the feeling that it’s missing its soul, that it’s only a shadow 
of itself detached from its ownmost being” because when the ego descends 
into its depth, it “meets up a gaping void in there.”59 Living in the periphery 
recalls the Newmanian living in notional assents, i.e. in superficial existence. 
This experience of emptiness must indeed be a terrifying and mind- boggling 
experience. This state can be called soullessness.
We need to live from out of our soul, thereby illuminating matter; this is 
how this term “be- souled” should be understood. We need to live an active life. 
Life is for action, as Newman would say, i.e. the person is present in his acts. 
It is in action that our life “pours out [our] soul and is its life. [Our soul] itself 
is a source of life.”60 The individual should be living out of the depths, out of 
his soul. Otherwise we lose the powers of our life. We may be psychologically 
involved in some activity, taking part in various modes of communication, 
but without the vital connection with our depth the flow of personal powers 
begins to trickle and dies down. Wherever our soul is disconnected from the 
actuality of living, the individual is missing “from behavior and from the visi-
ble being of the individual […] the individual flair or […] the ‘personal touch’.” 
The individual’s living then does not come out of the centre of his or her own 
being, “it is lacking the originality and authenticity of ‘core- valent’ living.”61 
Thus, such an individual loses a genuine personality and individuality, loses 
himself and partakes in ‘soul- less’ behaviour.
Our personality has its qualitative distinctiveness “that is fashioned out of a 
core, a formative root. It takes shape in soul, body, and mind; but only in your 
soul does the individuality achieve clear and unambiguous expression. Neither 
the material body nor the psyche, as the substantial unity of all the individual’s 
 58 Ibid., 234.
 59 Ibid.
 60 Ibid.
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sensuous and soul- mind being and living, is determined through and through 
by the core. The core certainly supports accessibility for the world of values to 
whose gradations its depth levels correspond, and with that, the ‘character’ in 
the specific sense.”62 The personal core— writes Sarah Borden— “is central to 
our being, we are most at home in the world of values.”63 Our core is human 
and individual— these two elements must be stressed because not only do we 
belong to a certain species, but we are above all individuals. We are unlike trees 
of a same kind.
In the Finite and Eternal Being, Stein views the human being as a com-
position of body, soul, and spirit.64 The essence of human beings, however, 
is spiritual. This is so, primarily, “because personal life is going out of one-
self and simultaneously being and abiding within oneself, and because both 
of these characteristics pertain to the nature of spirit, personal being must 
always denote spiritual being.”65 The human person carries the body and the 
soul and is carried by them. Stein finds the source of spiritual life inside the 
human being, but this interior is not conceptual so that it could be shown 
and explained. I have already elaborated on this element earlier. The blessed 
Carmelite says that “[t] he spiritual life of the human person rises from a dark 
ground.” And she elaborates on this further: “It rises like a flame that illumines, 
but it is a flame that is nourished by non- luminous matter. And it emits light 
without being light through and through. The human spirit is visible to itself 
without, however, being thoroughly transparent. It is capable of illuminating 
other things without being able to penetrate completely into their being.”66
This dark ground is therefore implicit, which means that the human being 
cannot conceptualize his innermost centre. The body and soul are intercon-
nected. Our physical body is, as was mentioned earlier, be- souled. Edith Stein 
follows Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the relationship of the soul as a form 
of the body. The soul animates the body. The question that is often raised is 
whether our inner life is only sensory or is it also spiritual. If our inner life were 
merely sensory, it would be only receptive and responsive to external stimuli 
which feed the brain with information.
The human being is and is becoming at the same time, for he contains in 
himself an unfolding form that allows for self- formation. The inner form cre-
ates conditions for the bringing of the being to its perfected structure. Thus 
 62 Ibid., 238.
 63 S. Borden, Thine Own Self, 10.
 64 See Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 363.
 65 Ibid., 362.












the soul can be regarded as a forming- of- matter and also as a being- in- itself.67 
Stein stresses “a balance between the external and the internal […], in peo-
ple the soul has a meaningful life even apart from the body.”68 That is why 
the human being can make free and authentic choices in response to stimuli 
which come from without.
If our being is contingent, as it is, it is a “fleeting being,” and therefore, as 
such, it cannot possess its existence. Our being’s existence is a gift, and “only 
he who truly possesses being and who is thus the Lord of being can present 
such a gift. And only a person can be Lord […], not Lord of being if anything 
were exempt from his ontological might, if without him or independent of him 
there could be either being or not- being.”69 Stein defines the relation between 
temporal being and eternal being as follows: “Within itself, eternal being molds 
(in a non- temporal process) those eternal forms in whose image and likeness 
it creates the world in time and with time.”70 The eternal being is the Lord of 
being and the Lord of meaning.
Another phrase that Stein uses to make the human person an exceptional 
being is “personal erectness.” The personal being has been awakened, as she 
masterfully remarked, to a two- directional movement: both outward and 
inward. The person goes outward when he studies the world, makes use of 
material objects for his own benefit; and goes inward when he strives to know 
himself. Newman, as we remember, wrote that only those who are “whole 
can heal others,” with this meaning that we are in possession of ourselves. 
Stein puts this succinctly when she writes that people can respond to exter-
nal impressions of freedom because they transcend these impressions; people 
are “spiritual persons, i.e., carriers of their own lives in a preeminent sense 
of a personal ‘having- oneself- at- hand’.”71 The problem is that human beings 
often abandon this exceptional position they possess among other beings, and 
remain responsive to impressions, a situation Newman would define as living 
inside shadows and images, with this denoting a being responsive primarily 
to what comes from without. In this situation the sentient aspect of our being 
prevails.
In accord with Thomistic Doctrine, Stein holds that created pure spirits are 
not “the authors of their own being, but have received their being and receive 
it again and again as an ever- renewed gift during the entire course of their 
 67 See ibid., 369.
 68 Ibid., 370.
 69 Ibid., 106.
 70 Ibid., 106.
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existence.”72 Personal life is therefore free, but limited, relative, and condi-
tioned. The main role of the soul is to mediate “between spirituality and bodily 
sentient being.”73 The soul is not a third external element in the triune compo-
sition (tri- partition) of body- soul- spirit, but is the site in which body and spirit 
meet and interact. People, therefore, are both brutes and angels, rather than 
being either of the two. The soul, so to say, is the room which both body and 
spirit inhabit.
The I is capable of transcending the sensorial part of the human being and 
can disengage from it and rise above to a higher sphere. We need not under-
stand this process of disengagement as a kind of isolation, but rather as a 
mastering of the life of sense. This creating of self by the I is not absolute or 
unconditioned, for the “I has received the freedom of self- determination as 
a gift.”74 This mastering is indeed the system meant by Newman, of which 
mention has already been made. In like manner the personal life is created 
and formed by the human person. What is implicitly given as a gift is trans-
lated into something explicit. Stein puts it excellently when she writes that 
the sentient life is for a “dark ground,” which awaits personal illumination 
and being turned into a personal form. I have called the soul here a room, 
or else it can be called a special site of encounter between body and spirit. 
The character of the soul is such that it is not “point- like” but rather “spatial.” 
This is an extremely interesting element, for it shows Stein’s thought which 
runs counter to modern thinking, especially counter to Lockean empiricism 
with its conception of the punctual self that I have already mentioned previ-
ously. If the soul in Stein’s view is a space, then it is a history. It is not the pure 
ego. This space is not empty and has its own nature and essence. Thus what has 
explicitly appeared on the surface is not everything that makes up the person. 
Each explicit act is accompanied by its implicit (dark) surrounding. There is 
always much more to the human person than what we can see on the surface. 
By appropriating to itself what is needed for its own destiny, the soul creates a 
history for a particular human person whose “essence or nature streams forth 
from the body and from all personal spiritual acts in a nonconscious and non- 
voluntary manner.”75
The person carries his perfection within himself. The person “carries its life 
out of the fullness of the essence which is resplendent in the awakeness of 
life, without ever being fully illumined or fully mastered. The person carries 
 72 Ibid., 370– 371.
 73 Ibid., 371.
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this fullness and is simultaneously carried or sustained by this dark and deep 
ground.”76 I have already discussed this element of the innermost and dark 
interior of the person. It is brought to light by conscious (rational and volun-
tary) acts of the person. Therefore the human person “resembles pure spirits 
in its free and conscious mode of life, a life which encompasses and carries its 
own fullness, but it lags behind them because it arises from and is carried by 
a dark ground and is incapable of personally forming, illumining, and sover-
eignly governing the totality of its ‘self ’.”77 Whatever the person does is only 
a momentary revelation of some fullness hidden inside, the full revelation of 
which will come to existence in the life to come. This ever- present evolution 
of the person, this constant movement, and this self- changing nature are also 
consonant with Newman’s thought. Stein holds that all material structure is 
penetrated by the spirit. Likewise we come again to the point of form molding 
matter.
In order to recapitulate, let us say that Stein regards “the person as a carrier 
in a preeminent sense because a person not only has and embraces, but ‘pos-
sesses’ its essence or nature, which means that a person is master of its own 
self in several ways.”78 Stein, like Newman, stressed the importance of reaching 
oneself, being faithful to oneself, using oneself because the most one can lose 
is oneself. Subsequently, it becomes apparent that we need to realize our per-
sonal vocation in ourselves and with ourselves.
The person is fully self- dependent and endowed with a rational nature. This 
trait of self- dependence determines the parts of the whole. Self- dependence is 
inherently combined with incommunicability and subsistence. Thus, the fun-
damental part of the person is hidden from view, and is implicitly sojourned 
in oneself. What is fully self- independent is “something that is,” with this being 
“the fullness of the essence.”79 The person is both “the carrier of the essence 
and the composite of carrier and that which is carried— form and fullness.”80 
It is interesting to note that the person is complete in his ontic entity and at the 
same time is becoming towards perfection. Thus we need to stress the static 
and dynamic aspects of the human person. At the same time let us stress that 
this perfection is the subsistence which imparts independence.
The carrier of nature is separated from nature. As Stein stresses, “the thus 
completed and confined whole— is capable of carrying the properties accruing 
 76 Ibid., 377.
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to the essence because in this composite whole the carrier of the nature or 
essence can and must be distinguished from the essence or nature.”81
Subsistence does not accrue to the individual substance, but inwardly per-
tains to the individual substance. Each individual thing has its essence. This 
essence is shared by all other members of the same species. For instance, 
Socrates’ being human is shared with other humans. Nevertheless Socrates as 
a human being is, in his particularity, unlike other human beings. Therefore, 
Stein stresses, “that this essence differs not only numerically but by virtue of a 
special particularity from the essence of any other human being.”82
Stein is writing about “primordial confusion,” a phrase that echoes Newman’s 
functional disarrangement. In her interpretation, however, this confusion con-
cerns the cosmic mixture (chaos) out of which order emerges. I have already 
written that the personal carrier is the ground or root principle of the individ-
ual being. The person carriers in himself eternity. The course of life of a human 
being is something unique and unrepeatable. The person is unlike any imper-
sonal something; his life springs from personal being as from a source— as was 
referenced in Stein earlier. Together with this source the whole individual life 
is annihilated. Stein seems to be suggesting that the same source of life that 
springs forth may then be taken on by another individual. Thus, to conclude, 
the most important difference between two persons is their difference in con-
tent. The person imparts his unique particularity, but this root principle is 
found in the formal structure of the carrier, and this form, as has already been 
observed, is not communicable.
Human beings are unlike transitory material things, for the former shapes 
come from the centre of life and the latter objects are in accordance with their 
species. The role of the individual is of primary importance in relation to spe-
cies. Unlike lifeless things, humans are under the process of the self- formation 
“that issues from a vital center” in which “each individual structure is an artic-
ulate unity with a meaning and expressive worth of its own, and not merely 
a transitional stage with respect to the actual end structures […].”83 Animate 
creatures, e.g. human beings, undergo self- formation “in the sense of a forming 
of the individual structure from its vital center and not merely an unfolding of 
the particularity of the species under the influence of forces effective from the 
outside. And proportionate to this is a collected power and, springing from it, 
a stronger activity and efficacy of the self.”84
 81 Ibid., 476– 477.
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Human beings are thus active centres and creators of their own selves. They 
are responsible for their very beings like artists are responsible for the forms 
they impart to the objects of their artistic expression. Humans are not deter-
mined by a historical process, rather they actively participate in it. They can 
give, to use Newmanian parlance, real assents of their very beings, especially in 
that “the essential forms of animate beings are living forms and as such capa-
ble of unfolding and transformation.”85
Every human being, indeed, shares the same nature with regard to their 
genus and at the same time, as we have already said, this nature is spiritual, 
personal, an internal life, self- contained, and is yet self- transcending; it is a 
world- embracing life that discloses itself to fellow humans. This life is always 
renewed from these aforementioned sources and determined by the I. Indeed 
persons are entire worlds. The material aspect of the person brings us closer to 
the lives of animals and plants, whereas the spiritual aspect transcends these 
material aspects. The I is an emanating life: it commands over the person, 
as was noted, by being conscious of the person and molding him freely. The 
personal I is not a pure ego, as Stein stresses, it is— let us repeat “the portal 
through which the life of the human person passes on its way from the depth 
of the soul to the lucidity of consciousness.”86 In other words, the implicit part 
of the I emerges to its explicit form. This innermost centre, of which mention 
has already been made, is not shapeless. It is the true and most genuine part of 
our selves. Thus, when we are self- centred and self- collected we reach the true 
centres of our beings. This cannot be given a universal name, notes Stein, and 
therefore our centres are individualized. Besides, our innermost centre always 
transcends the explicit form that is given to it. In like manner, we could say that 
this process of the unfolding of the true essence of the person is never- ending 
and can never be completed here on earth. Such a process calls for a continu-
ation in the life to come.
Here Stein touches upon the same points Newman mentioned. For him, as 
we remember, in this world we can only obtain that which has a relative per-
fection, but once started this process seeks to be continued thereafter; other-
wise the very initiation would be nonsensical. The soul has its manifestations, 
but its essence is ineffable. With a view to this ineffable innermost centre two 
persons can hardly be compared or their traits enumerated. Hence Stein con-
cludes that “the essential difference in individuals cannot be grasped.”87
 85 Ibid., 500.
 86 Ibid., 501.
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I have already discussed this important point in Edith Stein, namely the fact 
that the most genuine part of the person is inside in the innermost centre. It 
resides in the human soul and then embraces the person, “insofar as the per-
son receives its form from this deepest interiority.”88 The conscious I is unique 
with its individual particularity which cannot be communicated in its entirety.
The soul is immortal as a purely spiritual form and as a spiritual personal 
substance it is “capable of a supernatural augmentation and elevation of its 
life […].”89 The essence of the person, which resides in the soul, is mostly hid-
den (it is implicit). Let us therefore stress again that the innermost and most 
authentic nature of human beings remains hidden. In the course of his life 
the human being assumes, explicitly, a certain style of character. The essence 
thereof, however, is hidden beneath what is visible. The innermost sphere is 
hidden in darkness and eludes words in its ineffability. Newman, for his part, 
calls the soul “the invisible principle which thinks,”90 with the soul being this 
principle that makes the person one; a person’s oneness is unlike material bod-
ies which are composed of many parts.
Thus, the human being has a dual nature: he is “a spiritual person and he is 
shaped as a body.”91 Besides, although the human being holds a dual nature, 
the person is one being— is spiritual and corporeal together. The person is in a 
process of development which is on earth forever incomplete. This calls for the 
completion of undeveloped potentialities, an element that we have already 
found in Newman and— drawing on St. Thomas— could call a way of imper-
fection. Stein intimates that “it pertains to the essence of the human being 
that the individual is a member of the human race and that this individual 
realizes himself as a whole […] in a humankind.”92 It is the spiritual nature of 
humankind that makes humankind called to a communal life, with this being 
a very strong theme in Newman. This historical aspect of development was 
extremely important for him. The forms of Christian life, in their course, are 
combined together to issue in a system. Stein indeed rises to the height of sub-
lime poetry when she writes that in this process “the individual soul comes to 
bloom in a place prepared for it— prepared by the historical evolution of the 
people of its earthly homeland and by the generations of its earthly family— 
and since, after its pure and full unfolding at its predesigned place, the soul is 
to be inserted as a flower in an eternally imperishable wreath, it does not seem 
 88 Ibid., 504.
 89 Ibid.
 90 Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 907.
 91 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 506.












fitting to see in its essence or nature a species that can be individualized in a 
multiplicity of alike structures.”93
All this comes together to denote what Newman called ethos. He himself 
was reared in his family, circle of friends, university, and in the Church. We 
develop our potentialities in our individual ways, but never to the degree of 
perfection. We use ourselves, as Newman opined, for we have been endowed 
with what we need in our way of development. We must be self- contained and 
collected, for our true essence is in our innermost depth. There God resides, 
and hence in finding ourselves we find God. This is vitally important because 
“those who do not find themselves do not find God either, and do not attain to 
eternal life.”94
Thus the personal is at the same time divine, for it is in the most intimate 
part of the human core that the source of personal life resides. Here is the 
human soul which gives unity to the body. Stein observes: “The living soul of 
natural man has the power to form those material elements which are at its 
disposal for the building up of its body into a unity, and to maintain and ani-
mate this unity in its own structure for a certain length of time. Beyond this, 
the soul has its inner being and the capacity to receive into itself new life from 
extraneous sources and thereby to experience an increase, a strengthening, 
and a heightening of its own life.”95
Edith Stein concludes on a mystic note. In sharing our individuality with 
humankind, we do not lose our distinctive difference, and therefore we can 
establish the Mystical Body with each part playing a different function. In like 
manner every individual person, concentrated in soul life, adds to the perfec-
tion and beauty of this Body. Stein notes:
In this manner, by the cooperation of nature, freedom, and grace, the 
body of Christ is built up. Every individual human being is created to be a 
member of this body. And this is the reason why even on the purely nat-
ural level no human being is like the other— we recall that these reflec-
tions on the Mystical Body were to aid our understanding of the meaning 
of human individuality— but every human individual is a variation of 
the common human essence or nature, an individual structural unit, and 
simultaneously a constructive part of a structural totality.96
 93 Ibid., 508.
 94 Ibid., 509.
 95 Ibid., 519.
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While going into the core of our depth, we acquire the modes of our soul life, 
with this meaning that inasmuch as we sojourn in our depth we truly live 
in ourselves. Metaphorically speaking, the ship of our very being meanders 
between the rocks of images and shadows (to use the Newmanian parlance) 
on its way to the harbour. The interesting thing here is that living inside does 
not take on any concrete form, for the life- springing source is an empty form 
which— in the process of self- formation— takes on a concrete shape. Living 
the soul life is to be free from attachment to external modes of life, which may 
draw us away from our true selves; it is to live within one’s self. The individual 
immersing in the soul must constantly free himself from the external forms 
which revolt for the sake of becoming an individual’s essence, thereby post-
poning or completely disabling one from reaching the source, i.e. the soul life, 
the personal core vibrating with essential life. I use the term “essential life” 
because in the innermost centre of our beings is the true residence of the per-
son, not some accidental life styles which our beings may imitate.
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Conclusion
In this book we have walked the paths of two well- known European think-
ers: John Henry Newman and Edith Stein. The main common characteristic 
of either of them is that they are both exemplars how the human being in 
the heart of modernity, with its emphasis on individual choice and negative 
liberty, can regain the lost world of dogmatic religion. There are two modes of 
reflection: philosophical and religious. Philosophy helps us define the person; 
religion places the person within the horizon of transcendence.
By reading John Henry Newman and Edith Stein I have understood one 
thing of utmost importance: the way to save our individuality is to go inside 
ourselves rather than to go outside in a variety of expressions. Individuality 
is not to shock but to remain in oneself. Such is the main lesson from both 
authors. After all it is heart that speaks to heart, not mouth that speaks to 
mouth. Persons who live inside can communicate on a considerably more pro-
found level. Thus Newman’s and Stein’s contribution is even more urgent now 
than in their days when the opportunities for dissipation in trifles were not 
so abundant. At the same time they are both ardent defenders of individual 
freedom and responsibility because they lived under adverse circumstances, 
and yet managed to face up the adversities and realize what they had assented 
to as true.
The phrase “heart speaks unto heart” denotes two things which in a special 
way combine John Henry Newman and Edith Stein. First, as we have learnt 
from his theory of knowledge, our knowing is composed of explicit and implicit 
elements. What we formulate and express in the explicit form of arguments is 
only a part— and that not decisive— of our knowledge. The implicit dimen-
sion of our minds is a component of our personal conscious endowment. 
It is a kind of reality created in us as a personal result. And it is manifested 
by our assents. Second, there is a sphere in the person, Stein’s primeval life, 
which is not ruled by this person, and if ruled, then not by means of the shared 
logical apparatus, but by virtue of higher logic, of personal influence. And at 
this higher level of communication indeed we can say that a heart speaks to 
a heart, a reality speaks to another reality; in like manner we enter a special 
kind of communing. Our unperceived impressions, decisions motivated by 
conscience, and good deeds become the building blocks of the heart.
When we consider the human person, we have to take into account two 
directions: inside and outside. Both directions are related to their attendant 
attractions. We are drawn outside if we want to investigate the world and are 
guided by our own conceptions; or else we are enticed to something external 
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by someone else, by some other lifestyles and proposals. We often turn away 
from the world and go inside when we feel at a loss, we are disillusioned by 
the world, or we are engaged in some spiritual quest. The crucial element of 
these two directions is that no matter how far we go outside, the self must be 
present. Going out cannot be carried out in oblivion of what is inside. And this 
is what is meant by selfhood, by subjectivity.
In this book, I have been trying to show John Henry Newman as an origi-
nal thinker of the nineteenth century whose writings inspired the twentieth- 
century phenomenologist Edith Stein. The paths of their thinking converge, 
although the starting points were different; and the point of convergence is 
the person. The person, living in his idiosyncratic circumstances, is naturally 
endowed to come to grips with individual problems. For that, he has his nat-
ural reasoning which seeks to adjust solutions and the self that is born in the 
depths of the person. Edith Stein found in Newman a kindred spirit because 
they were both fascinated with the mystery of the person. Phenomenology 
seemed to be especially predestined to examine the visible traces of this mys-
tery in their concrete exemplifications.
We find in Newman, if not phenomenology itself, then at least some basic 
phenomenological elements like, first and foremost, the quest after the intui-
tive perception of beings. For Newman, however, unlike in Husserl, this intu-
itive grasp bore the intellectual and moral dimensions. Husserl sought a pure 
point of departure; Newman focused on the person as his apprehensive grasp 
in the concrete develops. Every individual is the bearer of his own judgement, 
there is no external reference by which to measure the appropriateness of her-
oism. In general considerations we can reach only inasmuch as probability, 
there is no end to the end of the accumulation of probabilities. It is then the 
person, the power of the person that steps in and chooses the right moment 
of a final decision. The ratiocinative mind, the thinking mind of the person 
determines the natural results. Here Newman means not only such conclu-
sions that, for example, we cannot endure too long without eating, but also 
that a moving body when left to itself will never stop, which is Newton’s first 
law of motion. Indeed if we imagine a moving body without any resistance, 
any counteractive force, it will go on moving without end. We do not have to 
turn to physicists to arrive at such a conclusion.
Our ultimate point of reference is the living mind. We can even speak about 
the miracle of the living mind and what it can attain when it is on the right 
track. This mind may have some innate talent or genius, or else be duly formed 
by mental formation or practice. And again we arrive at what I have already 
stressed, drawing on Newman, that we should rely on the whole of the system, 
that in order to evaluate we need to be acquainted with the system, to make 
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our mind connatural (coherent) with the truth of the system. The living mind 
can grasp all the minute recesses of any reasoning, the first principles just like 
the last terms. The first principles are often of a very personal character, tainted 
by one’s intellectual complexion. People are in essential and irremediable vari-
ance with one another.
Obviously, Newman and Stein are interested objects of analysis for one 
principal reason. I have written above that their starting points were different. 
It is true, from the theoretical point of view they were different, but practi-
cally they were similar. They both experienced their own beings as a mystery 
that called for a response. I mean their moments of revelation that the truth 
might be, surprisingly, in the area where they least expected it. Such were the 
moments of conversions. They started first with some puzzling experiences, 
and then evolved, through an internal and hidden process, into certitude. Both 
Newman and Stein journeyed towards their personal certitudes. Therefore 
I used Newman’s motto: “cor ad cor loquitur” [heart speaks unto heart] to enti-
tle this book. We know the ultimate results of these hidden processes, but we 
can never trace the details of their sheltered courses. We can believe what we 
cannot understand or what we cannot prove.
The leading motto: secretum meum mihi [my secret is mine] naturally has 
proved a working principle in Newman’s and Stein’s life. They have themselves 
experienced that each person has inexhaustible resources to stand up to his 
life’s challenges. In the purity of intentions, using real words, and under the 
guidance of conscience each person can return from a waste land to his proper 
destination. Because many of our resources are implicit and hidden, we have 
to make use of our hearts in the interpersonal communication.
And seclusion does not denote any aesthetic or emotional dimension, but 
rather primarily metaphysical and moral. The aesthetic and emotional aspect 
can occur as concomitant elements that result from the experience of certi-
tude that penetrates through the whole being. Newman, for his part, had a 
similar experience when he joined the Catholic community, the community 
he formerly regarded as the seat of the gravest mistake.
In the examples of these two personages we find a confirmatory case of 
their claim that the process of knowledge is not a mere matter of intellect. 
In order to understand one often needs to change, to grow up to the point 
of understanding. Comprehension is a personal process, very complicated in 
itself, and such that cannot be reduced to understanding the propositions at 
hand. It appears from the two examples that the person empowered with intel-
lectual and spiritual prowess can always return from his “waste land.” Newman 
returned from the land that was held in disrepute and Stein from the land of 
unbelief— both of them, however, felt a strong personal urge to reorient their 
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personhood. We are not absolute masters of our conceptual endowment, as 
we are often exposed to influences we cannot explain, nevertheless they sub-
due us.
In the nineteenth century Newman proclaimed a harmony between reason 
and faith, science and religion. His famous premise is that Christianity is a 
system, just like science is a system. Now these systems have their own idio-
syncratic characters. They grow in their individual way, they have their indi-
vidual history. The common trait of John Henry Newman and Edith Stein is 
the amazement with their own personal experiences. They resulted in a con-
clusion that the person does exhaust his essences in what can be intellectu-
ally comprehended. There are implicit dimensions, the abyss of existence, pri-
meval life— the authors sought to find adequate phrases— which go beyond 
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